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This essay reviews some of the problems that face biolinguistics if it is to 
someday succeed in understanding human language from a biological and 
evolutionary viewpoint. Although numerous sociological problems impede 
progress at present, these are ultimately soluble. The greater challenges 
include delineating the computational mechanisms that underlie different 
aspects of language competence, as implemented in the brain, and under-
standing the epigenetic processes by which they arise. The ultimate chal-
lenge will be to develop a theory of meaning incorporating non-linguistic 
conceptual representations, as they exist in the mind of a dog or chimpan-
zee, which requires extensions of information theory incorporating context-
dependence and relevance. Each of these problems is daunting alone; to-
gether they make understanding the biology of language one of the most 
challenging sets of problems in modern science. 
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Prolegomena (from Greek, plural noun, singular prolegomenon) — a preliminary 
discourse, statement or essay prefixed to a book, etc. 
 
In the first years of the new millennium, the word ‘biolinguistics’ has rather 
suddenly come into use as an umbrella term for various biological approaches to 
the study of human language. At least three recent books have ‘biolinguistics’ in 
the title (Givón 2002, Jenkins 2000, 2004), the journal Biolinguistics was founded 
(www.biolinguistics.eu), and the first Laboratory of Biolinguistics (Riken Brain 
Science Institute, Japan) is producing its first generation of PhD students. Based 
simply on the divergent contents of the books mentioned above, this nascent field 
is broad in its interests and incorporates diverse viewpoints, both about what 
language is and how it should be studied. Despite numerous disagreements, 
what the scholars embracing this term all have in common is the core belief that 
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the human capacity to acquire and use language is an aspect of human biology, 
and that it can thus be profitably studied from a biological perspective. While this 
core assumption of biolinguistics is not particularly new (Chomsky 1965, Darwin 
1871, Lenneberg 1967, Lieberman 1975), it appears to be an idea whose time has 
come. Biolinguistics is not yet a science — it is more a loosely-defined collection 
of questions and approaches — but it certainly has the potential to become a 
science. The purpose of the current article is to survey this potential, and to 
highlight some problems that stand in the way. 
 
 
2. The Promise of Biolinguistics and Obstacles to Progress 
 
It is certainly an opportune time for scientists interested in human cognition to 
adopt a biological perspective, since the suite of tools available to support empiri-
cal inquiry into all aspects of biology have recently become so powerful. Human 
brain imaging techniques are now widely available, unthinkable a few decades 
ago, that allow us to examine neural function noninvasively, in normal subjects. 
After a decade or so of somewhat self-indulgent neo-phrenology, this field shows 
signs of maturing into a promising endeavor with important advantages over the 
patient-based approaches to neurolinguistics that preceded it. These tools will 
help map the functional circuits underlying language competence, and ultimately 
help point the way to the underlying neural computations that are of central 
interest. Behavioral techniques for investigating language and related cognitive 
functions, including eye tracking and looking time techniques, are unveiling a 
complex cognitive world in pre-verbal infants and non-verbal animals that 
stands in sharp contrast to their limited communicative ability. Finally, and 
perhaps most profoundly, the revolution in molecular genetics has produced 
genome sequences of humans, chimpanzees, dogs and many other species, and 
gene sequences of humans turn out to be nearly identical in many cases with 
homologous genes in chimps, mice, flies and even yeast. Genes involved in 
diverse aspects of human cognition are being pinpointed, and we can now both 
observe and control gene expression in animal models.  
 These and other new techniques are generating a flood of empirical data 
relevant to age-old questions about the development and evolution of language 
and the mind. These data often demand fundamental changes in entrenched 
ways of thinking about these problems. For instance, accumulating results and 
animal and infant cognition belie the belief that language is a pre-requisite for 
any form of complex conceptual processing. Similarly, the new results from 
developmental molecular genetics necessitate profound changes in traditional 
conceptions of ‘innateness’. Thus, more than ever before, the biological approach 
to language has much to offer the linguist, psychologist, anthropologist, and 
philosopher. Problems that once seemed insuperable, such as interactions 
between ontogeny, cultural ‘evolution’, and phylogeny, are slowly yielding to 
concerted theoretical and empirical effort (Deacon 1997, Kirby, Dowman & 
Griffiths 2007, Kirby, Smith & Brighton 2004, Steels 1999, Tomasello 2001).  
 But there is trouble in this potential interdisciplinary paradise, and despite 
considerable grounds for optimism, it is by no means certain that the new bio-
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linguistic approach will be as successful and productive as it deserves to be. As I 
see it, the problems facing a future science of biolinguistics come in two flavors. 
The first, and the less challenging intellectually, are essentially sociological 
problems concerning terminology, disciplinary turf wars, and struggles for domi-
nance. A reliance on oversimplified models and outmoded distinctions is another 
important sociological impediment to progress. Although these problems are 
easily diagnosed, they may be difficult to solve. Fortunately, some of the more 
deeply-entrenched and recalcitrant disciplinary divides and outmoded debates 
and dichotomies seem to be breaking down, and I am optimistic that the next 
generation of young biolinguists, for whom disciplinary boundaries are more 
fluid, will eventually leave many of these sociological problems behind. 
 The second class of problems involve far more profound theoretical diffi-
culties, and constitute some of the most serious intellectual challenges of our 
time, or indeed that science has ever faced. It is on these difficulties that I focus in 
this essay. I see three broad areas of conceptual challenge, each of them related to 
the others, and all three demanding fundamental theoretical and empirical pro-
gress before we can hope to understand the biological basis for language. The 
first challenge is neuroscientific: Despite huge progress, at a basic level we still do 
not understand how brains generate minds. This is as true of a dog’s brain as for 
a human’s, and it is true of very basic aspects of cognition, such as vision and 
motor control, along with language. The most fundamental neurolinguistic 
questions concern the basic computations underlying language use, and their 
specific neural basis. Current attempts to address this question remain on a shaky 
theoretical footing. The second challenge concerns genes and development: How 
do genes control the development of a single-celled zygote into the trillions of 
integrated cells comprising a complex behaving organism? Again, great progress 
has been made, and the new epigenetic paradigm allows us to reject long-
reigning models of the genome as blueprint. However, the complex and circular 
nature of epigenesis, and the resultant causal indirectness of development, still 
pose serious conceptual challenges. While we now understand in some detail 
how physical structures like the vertebrate limb develop, the principles under-
lying brain development and evolution remain only dimly understood.  
 Finally, while the neuro-computational and developmental difficulties are 
basically biological, and apply to any aspect of cognition, the last and I fear most 
profound difficulty concerns language more specifically. This suite of problems 
concerns questions of meaning. Put simply, we have a good theory of information 
(Shannon information theory), but we lack anything even approaching a good 
theory of meaning (what I intend with this information/meaning distinction will 
become clear below). Problems of reference, relevance and context-dependent 
interpretation remain central unresolved issues in the philosophy of mind. While 
the first two problems have matured to a stage where they appear to be accepted 
as problems of the empirical natural sciences, these last problems remain in the 
philosophical category. (We don’t even know how to devise experiments to help 
sort the issues out.) While these unsolved semiotic challenges pose problems for 
any aspect of cognition (what is it that happens when an organism interprets 
some stimulus as ‘meaningful’), they become particularly acute when discussing 
language, which is that aspect of cognition centrally concerned with meaning. 
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 Recent reviews of new approaches and data in biolinguistics are already 
available (Fitch 2005b, in press, and Johansson 2005). Therefore, my goal here will 
rather be to outline and clarify the problems facing the field. As one interested in 
seeing this field flower and grow, I intend my critical comments to be construct-
ive. I have been working in ‘biolinguistics’ (without knowing it) for the last 15 
years, since my decision as a young marine biologist to refocus my efforts on the 
evolution of language (e.g., Fitch 1994). Although I remain optimistic, I have 
become acutely aware of the difficulties facing the field, in part because successes 
in various areas have brought the remaining problems into sharper focus. 
Through my involvement in a recent interdisciplinary foray in biolinguistics 
(Hauser et al. 2002) and the debate that followed (Pinker & Jackendoff 2005, Fitch 
et al. 2005), I have also developed a healthy (if depressing) awareness of the socio-
logical problems that await attempts at interdisciplinary bridge-building. 
 In this article I will start by briefly discussing the sociological problems and 
disciplinary strife that arise from choices in terminology and differing con-
ceptions of ‘language’. These pose important but soluble problems for those with 
a bona fide interest in solutions, I think, and will not be my core focus here. In the 
main part of the article I will outline and clarify some of the deeper intellectual 
challenges facing biolinguistics, discussing why many currently-popular models 
and metaphors for understanding genes, brain and language need to be aban-
doned if we hope to make substantial progress. In some cases I will also try, 
tentatively, to sketch approaches to the problem that appear to me to offer pro-
mise. But I will be satisfied if the reader, accepting my critique of the ‘state of the 
art’, rejects my proposals for remediation. Each problem alone is extremely diffi-
cult, and combined as they must be in biolinguistics, even guessing at plausible 
answers is difficult. In this essay, as with any prolegomenon, my focus is making 
the problems sharp and clear, rather than defending particular solutions. 
 
2.1. Sociological Challenges: Disciplinary Discord and Terminological Debate 
 
The chance that the key ideas of any professional scholar’s work are pure nonsense is 
small; much greater the chance that a devastating refutation is based on a superficial 
reading or even a distorted one, subconsciously twisted by a desire to refute. 
(Langer 1962: ix) 
 
This wise insight accurately diagnoses much contemporary ‘debate’ in bio-
linguistics, particularly concerning the evolution of language. I know of no other 
field where scholars seem so ready to champion their own pet hypothesis un-
critically, while rejecting those of others as ludicrous. While I confess to finding 
some proposals in the literature uncompelling on first reading (e.g., the 
‘Throwing Madonna Hypothesis’ (Calvin 1983), or the ‘Aquatic Ape Hypothesis’ 
(Morgan 1997)), further reading and thought have convinced me that some valu-
able insights, and probably germs of truth, are to be found in such ideas — for 
one willing to put in the work of understanding them. Unfortunately, such 
willingness is too often in short supply, and debate in the biology and evolution 
of language frequently reduces to either misrepresentation (dismissals based on 
straw-man caricatures) or arid terminological debates (“I dislike the term X for 
some trait and propose term Y for the same thing”). Often the two are combined. 
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This syndrome is particularly true of criticisms of Noam Chomsky, whose ideas 
so many scholars apparently love to hate. In my opinion, once placed in context 
and properly understood, most of Chomsky’s scattered statements about both 
language evolution and its biological bases either are rather uncontroversial 
statements that any modern biologist studying, say, limb development would 
accept as a matter of course (e.g., that there must be various biological constraints 
upon the development of the language system), or statements of unpopular alter-
native hypotheses that deserve more careful consideration (e.g., language as a 
tool for thought rather than communication). Outside of his technical linguistics 
work, Chomsky’s main contribution to biolinguistics is his long championing a 
scientific approach to language as a biological phenomenon (Chomsky 2005). One 
will search in vain in Chomsky’s own writings for the naive conceptions of Uni-
versal Grammar for which he is so often mistakenly pilloried — one reason his 
critics typically quote his few scattered statements out of context, if they quote 
them at all.  
 My purpose in this article is neither to champion nor to attack Chomsky’s 
conception of language (for this, see, e.g., Jenkins 2000, Lieberman 2000, Jacken-
doff 2002, Boeckx 2010) — but rather to argue that such discussions too often 
miss or leave unmentioned deeper commonalities of viewpoint and approach 
shared by most contemporary theorists interested in the biology of language. In 
the next sections, I will try to look past the terminology at some uncontroversial 
facts about the biology of language, briefly discussing the terminological contro-
versies they have driven. My purpose is to shed the rhetoric and move into the 
conceptual heart of biolinguistics. This will set the stage for the main part of the 
article, where I discuss the core outstanding conceptual difficulties in detail. 
 
2.2. ‘The Human Capacity to Acquire Language’: The Core Explanandum 
 
The central research topic in biolinguistics is a characterization and explanation 
of the human capacity to acquire and use language. That this is an aspect of 
human biology is made clear by the everyday fact that any normal child raised in 
a human household will quickly, and apparently effortlessly, acquire the 
language(s) of its family and community, while no non-human animal will do the 
same. The pet dog or cat may learn quite a bit about the social and practical 
aspects of life in a human household, and often to recognize a few dozen spoken 
words of the local language, but its abilities to express its own thoughts using this 
language are little different from those of a potted plant in the living room. 
Perhaps more surprisingly, a chimpanzee raised in a human home will not 
spontaneously do much better: Even with long and intensive training, young 
apes learn to produce only an indistinct handful of inarticulate words (Yerkes & 
Yerkes 1929, C. Hayes 1951). Although use of the manual/visual modality via 
sign or symbols helps young apes considerably (Gardner & Gardner 1969, 
Premack 1971), the adult ape still cannot progress to anything like the level of a 
five-year old child, and its ‘linguistic’ utterances will be mostly confined to 
requests for tickles or treats. While not belittling the accomplishments or value of 
such experiments (cf. Savage–Rumbaugh 1986, Savage–Rumbaugh et al. 1993), it 
is important to acknowledge these limitations as well-replicated biological facts. 
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 Clearly, immersion in a linguistic environment is not enough for spoken 
language to develop in most organisms. There must therefore be something about 
human children which differentiates them from other species, and this something 
provides one of our core explananda in biolinguistics. We might gloss this 
neutrally as ‘the human capacity to acquire language’. In generative linguistics 
this capacity is traditionally called the ‘Language Acquisition Device’, and a 
characterization of its properties termed ‘Universal Grammar’ (Chomsky 1965, 
reviving a 17th century term). Universal Grammar (before Chomsky) simply 
designated those aspects of human language competence which, because they are 
shared by all humans and all languages, went unmentioned in traditional 
grammars (Chomsky 1966, Allan 2007). For example, the notion that words exist 
and have specific meanings does not need to be specified in a grammar of French 
— it can be taken for granted. But this is precisely the sort of fact that does need to 
be explained by a successful biological approach to language. The original usage 
of the term made no particular claims about the nature of this competence (e.g., 
that it was specific to language, or conversely a general aspect of human 
cognition), nor did Chomsky’s revival of the term, which is quite neutral on such 
questions by my reading. However, both ‘Language Acquisition Device’ and, 
especially, ‘Universal Grammar’ arouse suspicion and rejection from scholars 
who nonetheless accept that such a human-specific biological capacity exists (e.g., 
Lieberman 1998a, Tomasello 1999, 2005). A huge amount of ink has been shed 
rejecting the term ‘Universal Grammar’, even by people who accept without 
question that a biologically-based capacity to acquire complex language fully is a 
uniquely-powerful birth-right of any normal human, but no known animal. The 
substantive debate concerns not the existence of such a human capacity for 
language acquisition, which is abundantly clear regardless of terminology, but 
rather its nature (e.g., the degree to which it is specific to language).  
 There remains, today, no widely-accepted term for this central aspect of 
human biology, despite the consensus about its existence. A recent attempt to 
break the resulting terminological logjam by introducing two new terms — the 
faculty of language in broad and narrow senses (FLB and FLN; Hauser et al. 2002) 
— unfortunately elicited similar reactions (e.g., by Pinker & Jackendoff 2005), 
although FLB was specifically and explicitly intended to capture a much broader 
and more inclusive conception of the language capacity than the one connoted by 
Language Acquisition Device or Universal Grammar. FLN was intended to have 
a considerably narrower scope, perhaps even denoting an empty set, but has 
been read simply as ‘language’ by some and ‘Universal Grammar’ by others. The 
term ‘language instinct’, popularized in Pinker (1994), has been rejected equally 
vehemently (e.g., Tomasello 1995). Frankly, it is unclear to me whether any 
acronym or shorthand version of the ‘human capacity to acquire language’ will 
escape a similar rhetorical assassination. Perhaps the field of biolinguistics will 
have to do without any such term for the time being (although I would person-
ally vote for ‘language acquisition capacity’ as a relatively neutral designation).  
 
2.3. ‘Innate Knowledge’ 
 
A similar terminological morass surrounds the term ‘innate’, and particularly the 
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concept of ‘innate knowledge’, although the problems here are at least partly 
substantive rather than terminological. The deep conceptual problem ultimately 
stems from the complexity of epigenesis (the complex interaction in the develop-
ing organism between developmental programs and the internal and external 
environment), to be discussed below. But the terminological problem hinges on 
what we are prepared (or inclined) to call ‘knowledge’. Knowledge is proto-
typically a representational state of adult minds, implemented somehow in their 
brains. We know enough today to say that this implementation will involve the 
morphology of individual neurons, their complex interconnections with other 
neurons, and the computational activities these neural circuits engage in. From 
this mechanistic perspective, it would be odd to ascribe ‘knowledge’ to genes, or 
to the just-fertilized egg. But what about the newborn infant’s ‘knowledge’ of 
language? Here we are on uncertain ground, for the child is certainly born with a 
brain, equipped with proclivities to attend preferentially to certain things (like 
human voices) and not others (like dog barks or engine noises). Even at birth the 
newborn already expresses preferences for its own mother’s voice, or her native 
language, or a lullaby she sang while the child was still in utero (Mills & 
Melhuish 1974, DeCasper & Fifer 1980, Mehler et al. 1988, Hepper 1991, Spence & 
Freeman 1996) — implying that the fetal environment has already shaped this 
newborn brain. This constitutes, perhaps, a kind of knowledge. In addition to 
such rapidly-acquired proclivities, the child manifests constraints on the type of 
regularities it extracts from linguistic input, and these constraints have been 
argued by many authors to be important or even necessary components of the 
child’s capacity to acquire language. Do such unconscious proclivities and con-
straints constitute ‘knowledge’? 
 
2.4. ‘An Instinct to Learn’ 
 
Light can be shed on this question by examining the analogous but better-
understood situation in birdsong learning, where an elegant and insightful 
model of a biologically-based cultural capacity has been developed by Peter 
Marler. Most songbirds (nearly half of roughly 9,000 bird species) learn their 
song: A young bird must hear exemplars of the song of its species in order to pro-
duce a normal song (Catchpole 1973, Marler & Slabbekoorn 2004). Birds raised in 
an aviary with other species, but without access to conspecific song, will sing 
either a completely abnormal song, or (in some cases) will learn the song of 
another species. Crucially, most birds do not simply mimic the song of adults 
exactly: In many species, individuals create new, novel songs that are built upon 
but not identical to the songs they heard as nestlings. This creative aspect of 
birdsong ensures that each generation hears slightly different songs from those of 
the previous generation. This process of song transmission across generations, 
with slight novelties introduced by creativity and or erroneous copying, leads to 
‘dialects’ of birdsong: Birds in different regions sing quite different learned 
songs. This cultural evolution process can quickly ‘repair’ song in a population 
experimentally seeded with aberrant song, correcting it toward the species-
typical norm (Fehér et al. 2009). But just as a human child of Chinese descent can 
learn perfect English, a young bird exposed to a different dialect than that of its 
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parents will master the new conspecific dialect.  
 Equally crucially, young birds exposed to the song of many different 
species will unerringly hone in on the song of their own species: A songbird ap-
pears to be born with a proclivity for the song ‘style’ of its own species, to which 
it will attend preferentially. So the bird’s propensity to learn is constrained in 
certain ways: It is not simply a ‘general purpose’ system that will learn anything 
it hears. These facts have forced students of birdsong to progress beyond simple-
minded nature/nurture dichotomies. Marler’s model of birdsong acquisition 
instead integrates both biological and ‘cultural’ factors, which are inextricably 
intertwined in an “instinct to learn” (Marler 1991). Songbirds, like human 
children, are born with a readiness to master their species-specific communication 
system, but they are not born knowing this system. Part of this biologically-given 
readiness is a proclivity to attend to certain types of auditory stimuli (conspecific 
voices and songs) and not others (dog barking, machine noises, etc). Constraints 
exist on what can and cannot be learned: There are limits on the sorts of artificial 
birdsongs a youngster can absorb. These facts show clear parallels with the facts 
of human language acquisition, and a model of the human cultural capacity as an 
‘instinct to learn’ is an important improvement over currently more popular 
metaphors. This conceptual model has recently been advanced explicitly to 
model the acquisition of human language (Doupe & Kuhl 1999, Marler 2000, 
Okanoya 2002, and Fitch, in press). 
 Returning, thus equipped, to the term ‘innate knowledge’, it seems to me 
somewhat misleading to refer to the constraints on the fledgling bird’s song 
acquisition system as ‘knowledge’. These constraints (whatever they might be) 
are not themselves knowledge but instead influence the knowledge the bird will 
someday possess. I would make the same terminological caveat, mutatis mutandis, 
about human language acquisition. However, many scholars are perfectly willing 
to term such innate constraints ‘knowledge’. I am happy to accommodate them, 
so long as the distinctions are kept clear between behaviors that are truly innate 
(e.g., the acoustic structure of human laughter or cry, and the inborn link 
between these sounds and pleasure or pain) and those, like speech sounds or 
birdsongs, for which an innate basis for acquisition exists, but where the 
behaviors themselves depend on structured environmental input to be acquired 
and expressed. This distinction illustrates why the term ‘language instinct’ is 
misleading. The prototypical cases of instinctual behaviors, such as mammalian 
crying or suckling, a chick’s escape from its shell, or a fly’s grooming, really are 
genetically-coded behaviors, fully-functional at birth. ‘Instinct’ properly 
characterizes the child’s acquisition system, but not the knowledge that system will 
eventually acquire. We are born with a language acquisition ‘instinct’ but not 
language per se. Again, the terminology is less important than the crucial under-
lying principle. What, precisely, is the nature of the capabilities, biases, pro-
clivities and constraints that the human child brings to the problem of language 
acquisition? 
 
2.5. Beyond Disciplinary Discord 
 
Whenever people vehemently reject a proposition, they do so not because it simply 
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does not recommend itself, but because it does, and yet its acceptance threatens to 
hamper their thinking in some important way.          (Langer 1942: 238) 
 
To summarize, the current literature on the biology of language reveals a 
somewhat depressing disciplinary landscape. Despite agreement about the 
central interest of the questions, and core explananda, and the promise of the 
diverse approaches and perspectives represented, members of competing 
factions too rarely cite each other or interact constructively. Theoretical discus-
sions are often dominated by rhetorical battles and ideological or terminological 
debate rather than constructive attempts to make tangible progress. Much of the 
criticism that currently divides the relevant fields boils down to “My opponent 
says we should look to x for answers, but I believe we should look to y instead”. 
Typically, both x and y are probably important. Given the large number of open 
questions, biolinguistics will be better off when individual researchers pursue 
those topics and approaches they believe are important and promising, and 
refrain from attacking others who have different interests or try different 
approaches. There is little to be gained from such attacks, and if my experience is 
any guide, much to be lost.  
 One can only hope that, whatever else happens, biolinguistics will shed 
unproductive rhetoric and get serious about making empirical progress. In 
addition to the stunning progress in contemporary biology, the grounds for opti-
mism within linguistics include increasing convergence among long-separated 
theoretical approaches to syntax (e.g., minimalism, tree adjoining grammar, con-
struction grammar, and functionalist approaches) towards heavily lexicalized 
theory of language, with a few basic and powerful operations (e.g., merge, adjoin 
or unify — see Joshi et al. 1991, Stabler 2004). Neighboring fields like neuro-
linguistics have proven willing to take insights from generative linguistics and 
test them empirically (Caplan 1987, Friederici et al. 2002, Arbib 2005, and Hagoort 
2005b), and biolinguistics as a whole will do well to follow this path. Interest in 
biological approaches to language seems to be growing rapidly in all disciplines, 
so those established scholars prepared to indulge in self-destructive turf wars 
should be equally prepared to watch the incoming neuroscientists and biologists 
take over the field. 
 
 
3. Beyond Evolutionarios: Testing Biolinguistic Hypotheses 
 
I consider it self-evident that the appropriate models for biolinguistics come from 
the natural sciences, such as physics in the early twentieth century, and cellular 
and molecular biology or neuroscience today. Theorists in these fields consider 
the issues, define their terms, and propose hypotheses that generate testable 
predictions. Experimentalists implement empirical research programs to test the 
predictions, based on widely accepted norms of good experimental design (e.g., 
explicit consideration of, and controls for, alternative hypotheses) and inferential 
statistics. The historical success of this ‘normal science’ approach hardly needs 
emphasizing: Our modern lifestyle from computers and cell phones to agri-
culture and medicine relies upon it, and the future holds, if anything, an 
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acceleration of progress in understanding the physical and biological world.  
 There is no reason that theorists and experimentalists should be different 
individuals, and I think at the present state of play most biolinguists need 
thorough familiarity with both theory and experiment. This is especially true for 
evolutionary questions, since generating testable predictions is far more difficult 
than coming up with untestable evolutionary scenarios. ‘Evolutionarios’ are 
entertaining but typically offer experimentalists little to work with. Despite the 
dearth of testable hypotheses, and surfeit of evolutionarios, in current discus-
sions, I think the situation is remediable. The onus is on theory-makers to gener-
ate clear definitions of terms and hypotheses, and practically testable hypotheses. 
Furthermore, progress will be aided by comparing and contrasting multiple 
hypotheses, not simply rejecting implausible null hypotheses in favor of single pet 
hypotheses. Ultimately, as for physics, what biolinguistics needs most are 
creative empirical tests of hypotheses. 
 Since Darwin, evolutionary biologists have been testing functional and 
phylogenetic hypotheses quite successfully, despite our lack of time machines, 
using the comparative method (Harvey & Pagel 1991). Although Language, writ 
large, is unique to our species, many (probably most) of the mechanisms involved 
in language have analogs or homologues in other animals (Hauser et al. 2002, 
Fitch 2005b), and their comparative study thus offers biolinguistics crucial in-
sights. Furthermore, new genetic techniques make it possible to roughly date the 
origins of mutations (e.g., Enard et al. 2002). A combination of a broad compara-
tive approach, molecular genetic techniques, and creative examination of indivi-
dual differences among humans offers many ways to test evolutionary hypo-
theses. For example, consider two venerable hypotheses about the origins of 
human speech. 
 Scholars have debated for centuries whether the lack of speech in other 
animals results from peripheral anatomy of the vocal tract (H1), or the nature and 
structure of the central nervous system (H2).  
 Recognizing that dolphins were mammals with large brains, Aristotle 
suggested that their lack of speech results from their lack of loose tongues and 
lips (Aristotle 350 BCE). Similarly, the discovery by Europeans of the (speechless) 
apes led to renewed consideration of the crucial capacities underlying speech, 
and anatomist Peter Camper concluded that the lack of speech in orangutans was 
caused by their large air sacs (Camper 1779). Both of these ideas are special cases 
of H1. Other scholars, like Darwin, considered these arguments, but sided with 
H2, that central neural factors must be critical: “The relation between the 
continued use of language and the development of the brain, has no doubt been 
far more important” (Darwin 1871). 
 
3.1. The Descended Larynx 
 
As a modern instantiation of H1, consider the descent of the human larynx (Fitch 
2000b). The lowered larynx and tongue root of humans was hypothesized by 
Philip Lieberman and colleagues (1969) to constitute an adaptation to produce a 
wider range of speech segments (particularly the point vowels, and the ‘super-
vowel’ /i/, used in vocal tract normalization). At that time, and for the next 20 
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years, both the descended larynx and vocal tract normalization were believed to 
be uniquely human (Lieberman 1984). In my PhD thesis (Fitch 1994), I developed 
a related hypothesis, based mainly on principles from physics and physiology, 
that human formant perception might build upon a capacity for size estimation 
predating speech, providing a pre-adaptation for the use of formants in speech 
(H3). This hypothesis required formants to be tied to body size, and clearly 
predicted that formant perception, and its use in size estimation, would be more 
widely present in other animals. Thus, it was based on a number of testable 
assumptions and made numerous testable predictions, and in the last 15 years 
my colleagues and I have been busy investigating them. We have found that, as 
predicted, formants provide a reliable cue to body size in many species, because 
body size, vocal tract length, and formant frequencies are inter-correlated (Fitch 
1997, 2000a, Reby & McComb 2003). Further, it predicts that listeners should use 
this potential source of information as an indicator of body size, as several 
species do (Fitch 1994, Reby et al. 2005, Smith et al. 2005, Ghazanfar et al. 2007). 
Finally, these finding spurred a closer look at non-human animal vocal pro-
duction, revealing a descended larynx (once believed uniquely human) in several 
non-human species (Fitch & Reby 2001, Weissengruber et al. 2002, Frey & Riede 
2003). 
 Most of the studies above were directly spurred by specific theoretical 
questions about the evolution of speech. Besides demonstrating that the descen-
ded larynx is not uniquely human, and suggesting that both formant perception 
and vocal tract normalization build upon primitive mammalian auditory mecha-
nisms, these data revealed that formant signals are an important component of 
vertebrate communication, are used to judge size, and that these ancient shared 
uses are still operative in modern humans. They provide abundant evidence 
consistent with H3, the pre-adaptive hypothesis of Fitch (1994), which thus 
becomes a serious contender as the original adaptive force driving the descended 
larynx in our species. Improved speech is no longer the only plausible 
evolutionary explanation for laryngeal descent, as previously assumed (Lieber-
man 1984), and it is possible that the descended larynx in adults evolved before 
spoken language. 
 Equally importantly, these and other recent data on vocal production in 
mammals demonstrate that the vocal tract is a highly flexible, reconfigurable 
system: Any mammal can lower its larynx dynamically (Fitch 2000c). Such data 
offer strong evidence against H1 in its strong forms. While our vocal tract 
certainly influences the types of sounds we can make, and has presumably been 
selected in human evolution for its beneficial effects on mechanical control and/ 
or the speed of information transmission (as argued by Lieberman 2006), peri-
pheral anatomy is not a crucial Rubicon that needed to be passed before humans 
could evolve spoken language. The descended larynx/tongue root is not the core 
factor keeping chimpanzees from speaking, and by process of elimination, that 
factor must rest in their brains, not their tongues. The comparative data indicate 
that neural factors, rather than peripheral anatomy, provide the core mechanistic 
basis for human speech capacities. What keeps chimpanzees from talking, but 
allows some seals to talk (Ralls et al. 1985) is the configuration of their brains, and 
not that of their tongues or vocal tracts. But while we have made tangible 
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progress by rejecting the peripheral vocal apparatus as the core factor underlying 
human speech, this research as yet offers little insight into which aspects of the 
central nervous system are different. Rejecting H1, we tentative accept the 
alternative hypothesis H2. 
 
3.2. Hypothesis 2: Into the Brain 
 
Any hypothesis based on the idea that it is increased neural control over vocal 
production that allows humans, and not other primates, to speak must posit 
some difference in neural circuitry that enables this increased control. Given the 
complexity of speech, and of motor control, there are likely to be several such dif-
ferences. One well-documented difference between humans and other primates 
is that our species possesses direct connections from lateral motor regions down to 
the motor neurons that drive the vocal apparatus, particularly the larynx and 
diaphragm (Iwatsubo et al. 1990, Jürgens 1994). By hypothesis, these connections 
allow increased voluntary control over the vocal organs, and better coordination 
between the facial and tongue musculature and phonation (which is crucial to 
human speech). Of course, although plausible, this ‘Kuypers/Jürgens’ hypothesis 
(H4) does not by itself prove anything: There are many small differences between 
a human and chimpanzee brain, and no guarantee that this one is critical to the 
known behavioral difference. How could H4 be tested? 
 The existence of other vertebrates with complex vocal learning open the 
door to an understanding of the mechanisms of vocal control, at both the neural 
and genetic levels. Although songbirds are by far the best understood group, 
mammalian vocal learners include cetaceans, seals (Janik & Slater 1997), bats 
(Knörnschild et al. 2009) and probably elephants (Poole et al. 2005). Unfortu-
nately, both birds and tractable cetaceans (e.g., dolphins) have a brain and vocal 
tract very different from that of humans. Nonetheless, the data from birds are 
consistent with H4: Birds have direct connections between the telencephalon and 
the primary motor neurons controlling their phonatory organ, the syrinx. While 
consistent, this is not perhaps as compelling as we would like. 
 Among mammals, both seals and bats use a normal mammalian brain to 
control a normal mammalian vocal tract, and thus provide a unique but mostly 
untapped source of information into the neural and genetic mechanisms under-
lying complex vocal control (particularly in phocid seals with complex learned 
‘song’ (Janik & Slater 1997, van Parijs 2003)). Currently, though, most questions 
one might ask about seal neuro-anatomy and vocal production have a simple 
answer: Nobody knows, because nobody has looked. The discovery of a species 
of fruit bats with complex vocal learning is so new that very little is known about 
neural control in this species (Knörnschild et al. 2009). So these are clear, open 
predictions of the hypothesis, waiting to be tested. 
 
3.3. Convergence, ‘Deep Homology’, and the Broad Comparative Method 
 
Although the significance of research on birds, bats, deer or seals is sometimes 
disregarded by those interested in human language because it does not concern 
primates, and thus does not reveal homologous mechanisms, this attitude misses 
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two crucial points about the comparative method. First, convergent evolution 
(e.g., of complex vocal imitation in humans, birds, seals and bats) allows us to test 
adaptive hypotheses. In convergent evolution, each clade that has evolved a trait 
constitutes an independent evolutionary data point. This is not true of a group of 
species that all inherit a homologous trait from their common ancestor: No 
matter how many species share it, such a trait constitutes a single data point. This 
is a fundamental insight of Darwin’s use of the comparative method, as well as 
modern statistics for evolutionary hypothesis testing (Felsenstein 1985, Harvey & 
Pagel 1991). 
 A second, more surprising, fact about convergent evolution is much more 
recent. It follows from a central realization in modern molecular biology 
concerning the profound conservation of genetic mechanisms across disparate living 
organisms. Genes involved in development turn out to be highly conserved 
(Gehring & Ikeo 1999, Carroll 2000). Even traits that have evolved convergently 
may often rely upon homologous genetic and developmental mechanisms (termed 
‘deep homology’ by Shubin et al. 1997). This discovery vastly broadens the scope 
of the comparative method, which has traditionally focused mainly on homology 
(though see Gould 1976). The new data pouring in from diverse distantly-related 
species (especially birds and rodents, but including pufferfish, flies, worms, 
yeast, and slime molds) reveals a stunning consistency in underlying genetic and 
developmental mechanisms in this diverse assemblage (Carroll et al. 2005). Such 
underlying conservatism of genetic details was unimaginable two decades ago. 
Even phenotypic traits that evolved convergently (and are thus homoplastic) 
often share common developmental and genotypic mechanisms. Therefore, a 
broad comparative approach that incorporates homoplasy in addition to super-
ficial homology has deep insights to offer. Biologists can avail themselves of a 
much broader range of species than previously thought, and confidently expect 
that much of the resulting data will be relevant to human traits (Carroll 2003, 
Carroll et al. 2005). For example, the discovery of mammals with a descended 
larynx opens the door to genetic and physiological research on the mechanisms 
underlying this trait. Widespread conservation of developmental mechanisms 
gives hope (though not certainty) that similar mechanisms may underlie laryn-
geal descent in humans and in species, like deer, amenable to experimental 
study. 
 This story is of course far from over: Replications remain scarce, and fur-
ther data are clearly needed. While a plausible case can now be made against H1, 
and for the pre-adaptive hypothesis H3, one might suppose that H3 never could 
be demonstrated, as these events occurred pre-historically but do not fossilize. 
Fortunately, this is not true: Comparative molecular biology offers a new and 
exciting path out of this apparent dead end. If we can uncover the molecular 
genetic basis for the descended larynx and for the complex vocal control 
underlying speech, we can use the techniques developed by molecular 
evolutionists (e.g., Enard et al. 2002) to date the selective events that established 
the corresponding alleles during human evolution. If the selective sweep leading 
to ‘laryngeal descent genes’ preceded that leading to ‘control genes’ (in quotes 
because it is unlikely that the alleles in question function exclusively in these 
domains), this would be strong evidence against Lieberman’s hypothesis that 
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speech preceded (and selected for) the descended larynx (and therefore in favor 
of the alternative). 
 In summary, the evolution of speech provides numerous evolutionary 
hypotheses that can be, and have been, tested. This leads us to a certain amount 
of optimisim about our ability to move beyond the domains of speech 
production, and resolve debates about core aspects of language: Syntax and 




4. Mind and Brain: The Need for Bridging Theories of Neural Computation 
 
Trying to understand perception by studying only neurons is like trying to under-
stand bird flight by studying only feathers.           (Marr 1982: 27) 
 
In his book Vision, a foundational work in cognitive science, David Marr argued 
that progress in understanding the visual brain requires research at multiple 
levels — including the implementational level (neurons and synapses), the algo-
rithmic strategy used to tackle the problem, and the computational-level 
description of the problem space itself (Marr 1982). He used Chomsky’s goal of 
formulating a computational model of language (what Chomsky termed a 
‘competence’ model), as an exemplar of this approach. While Marr’s multi-level 
approach has been embraced in the computational neuroscience of vision, its 
application to language remains relatively unarticulated (though see Poeppel & 
Embick 2005). I think this results at least partially from a failure in the cognitive 
sciences to fully embrace the insight that progress will require multiple, comple-
mentary levels of description, at the computational, algorithmic and implemen-
tational levels. Most crucially, we need bridging theories that go between levels of 
description, particularly the computational and algorithmic levels. 
 
4.1. Multiple Levels of Description 
 
Despite a long-running debate between connectionists and symbolists in cogni-
tive science (e.g., the many responses to Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988), a connectionist 
model at the implementational or algorithmic level is not necessarily in conflict 
with a symbolic computational model, but rather a potential complement to it, as 
clear thinkers in this debate have remained well aware. But accepting the need 
for multiple levels of description unfortunately doesn’t provide a road map for 
how to formulate models at each level, or how to link the levels. For that, lacking 
a general theory of neural computation, we must currently take a catch-as-catch-
can approach, using whatever clues we can find. The problem is particularly 
sharp given that our most powerful empirical tools at the neural level (e.g., 
single-unit recording or experimental gene regulation) are unavailable for the 
study of language because the species employed lack language, and the 
techniques cannot generally be applied to humans. At the highest computational 
level of language, our best guides must still come from behavioral studies, both 
psycholinguistics and traditional theoretical linguistics, with some help from 




 Comparative linguistics and typology are important additional elements, 
since the study of diverse languages can sharpen our focus on the problem by 
cataloging the diversity of solutions to it. In a few cases (e.g., metrical phonology 
and stress systems), linguists have already developed quite sophisticated models 
that seem capable of encompassing most of the diversity of the world’s languages 
(e.g., B. Hayes 1995): Both the required theoretical primitives (such as syllables, 
stress, feet, and prosodic words) and generalizations (e.g., the ‘iambic/trochaic 
law’), are relatively clear and uncontroversial. Such aspects of language seem 
ripe candidates for constructing algorithmic models incorporating psychological 
data (e.g., Cutler 1996) which can ultimately be translated to models of imple-
mentation. Unfortunately, however, such oases of clarity and agreement are the 
exception in linguistics. Consideration of the diversity of languages allows one to 
exclude certain possible theories (e.g., a theory that syntactic structure 
assignment relies necessarily on word order is falsified by ‘non-configurational’ 
languages like Warlpiri that have free word order; cf. Austin & Bresnan 1996). 
However, besides a general agreement on such theoretical primitives as words 
and sentences, and on the need for structure-dependent rules, there seem 
precious few specific theoretical claims that are beyond dispute in contemporary 
syntax or semantics. 
 
4.1.1. The Mechanistic Level 
 
Given that research and discussion at the purely computational level have so far 
failed to converge, perhaps there are lessons to be learned from considering the 
lower levels of description. A crucial lesson from computational neuroscience has 
been that progress typically results not from investigations at a single level of 
description, but by attempts to bridge between levels: It is the intersection of 
constraints from the different levels that gives us purchase on the problem (Rolls 
& Deco 2001). Our theory of color vision is informed by the understanding that 
there are three types of cones, and our theory of motion detection by the 
discovery of separate populations of cells interested in motion and not color. 
Similarly, consideration of neural data may help theoretical linguists ‘cleave 
nature at the joints’ in their attempts to discover robust and useful computational 
primitives in language. Current brain imaging techniques (fMRI, PET) provide 
little insight into the computation ⇔ algorithm linking problem. Knowing where 
brain activity increases in some language-related task (e.g., generating an 
inflected verb, or imitating a spoken word) provides pointers about where to 
look. Similarly, systems that provide high temporal resolution (EEG, MEG) can 
provide indications of when certain neural regions are activated, and thus 
provide better data for testing causal models of language processing. But both 
still leave open what the actual corresponding computation is: What aspect(s) of 
the circuit diagram are crucial.  
 
4.1.2. The Search for Computational Primitives 
 
Despite the value of brain imaging techniques, we cannot expect them to solve 
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the central problem. For that, we need to distill what we know from linguistic 
theory into a set of computational primitives, and try to link them with models 
and specific principles of neural computation. Unfortunately, appeal to general 
computational principles may be of limited value. To the extent that vision is best 
conceptualized as a ‘bag of tricks’, where each aspect of vision (color, motion, 
depth perception, etc) has its own unique solutions, there may be no general 
conclusions available about computations underlying ‘vision’ in general. The 
same may be true of ‘language’. However, vision is a far more ancient evolved 
system than language, so this lesson may not generalize, and certain classes of 
models seem to pop up consistently. Individual neurons are slow and sloppy, 
and sometimes die, and these basic facts have often led to the evolution of paral-
lel redundant circuits, rather than circuits that seem optimal to electrical 
engineers who have fast, precise and reliable computing elements available.  
 This difference between silicon and cell-based computers has led to abstract 
notions of ‘natural computation’ (Richards 1988, Ballard 1999) that may hold use-
ful clues for biolinguists building bridges between the algorithmic and compu-
tational levels. While a focus on just the computational level (‘competence’) 
remains a necessity in everyday work, consideration of ‘performance models’ 
(including both algorithmic psychological models and, implementational neural 
models) should ultimately inform our debates about ‘natural’ theoretical primi-
tives (Fitch 2005a, Hagoort 2005a, Friederici et al. 2006). Thus we need linguistic 
models that are explicit about the computational primitives (structures and 
operations) they require, and that attempt to define linguistic problems at a fine 
enough grain that one can discuss algorithmic and implementational approaches 
to their solution. We need a list of computations that linguistic theorists deem 
indispensable to solve their particular problem (e.g., in phonology, syntax, or 
semantics). 
 
4.2. A Tentative List of Computational Primitives  
 
A non-exhaustive smorgasbord of linguistic computational primitives, based on 
my reading of the linguistic literature, may help make my point, illustrating the 
sort of computational structures and operations that any model of language will 
need to incorporate. While different theorists might give rather different names 
to them (e.g., Jackendoff 2002), or object to my overly schematic descriptions, 
experts can hopefully read between the lines to see what I’m getting at. Alter-
natively, my list may spur the theoretically-inclined reader to generate their own, 
quite different, list of primitives. This list simply illustrates by example the sort 
breakdown needed to begin building bridges between computational theories, 
and the algorithmic and implementational levels. 
 
(1) Phonology and Syntax: Data structures including trees and related multi-
level structures are needed, as are structure-building algorithms that conca-
tenate constituents into tree structures, perhaps by forming temporary 
links among smaller structures stored in long-term memory (the ‘Lexicon’); 
evolutionary links with motor control seem likely. 
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(2) Phonology: ‘Natural classes’ of phonemes, such as stops or high vowels, 
are required because many phonological phenomena apply to specific 
classes (rather than specific isolated phonemes, or broader class such as 
vowels); evolutionarily, such natural classes may have built upon more 
general auditory categorization circuits. 
 
(3) Syntax (structure-dependent rules): Computations that apply to classes of 
structures (noun phrases or sentences) rather than specific words or broad 
types such as nouns. 
 
(4) Syntax and Semantics: Dependencies between words require the equivalent 
of variables or subscripts that can bind constituents into temporary 
linkages, such as article agreement, anaphora (binding pronouns to whole 
noun phrases, in the simplest case), or topic/comment markers in con-
nected discourse. 
 
(5) Semantics (thematic roles): Distinctions like agent vs. patient are necessary 
to distinguish the roles of multiple actors in such propositions as ‘John likes 
Mary’ vs. ‘Mary likes John’; although English does this mainly with word 
order, many languages have more flexible ways of marking and expressing 
this key semantic difference (e.g., case-marking). 
 
(6) Semantics: Complex conceptual structures, built up with embedders, con-
junctions, and disjunctions with scope, are needed and combining primi-
tive predicates into larger complexes, with possible attribution of an 
external referent, or truth or falsity, to the whole complex, is a crucial com-
putation in linguistic thought; despite considerable disagreement about 
whether this computational capacity is part of syntax, semantics or more 
general conceptual abilities, there is little disagreement about its basic 
necessity for both language and other aspects of complex thought. 
 
4.3. Examples of Bridging Constructs 
 
I will focus on the algorithmic ⇔ computational bridge in biolinguistics because 
we clearly have substantial work to do in attempting to build this specific set of 
bridges. The good news concerning the other, algorithmic ⇔ implementational 
bridge is that there is little evidence suggesting that language involves any major 
discontinuities from other aspects of cognition at low implementational levels. 
The neocortical circuits involved in language have the same layered arrangement 
as other non-language circuits, are connected with subcortical systems like thala-
mus, basal ganglia and cerebellum in the same ways, and use the same types of 
cells releasing the same neurotransmitters with the same kinds of action poten-
tials. The developmental processes by which these circuits arise follow the same 
basic principles as the circuits involved in vision or motor control in diverse 
mammals (Finlay & Darlington 1995). Whatever implementational details differ-
entiate language from other cognitive functions, they appear to be only rather 
subtly different from those underlying other aspects of cognition. Thus we can 
confidently expect that most aspects of language implementation will be based 
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on more general principles of brain development and function, and that good 
first-order approximations can be built upon shared principles of neural 
computation (Ballard 1999, Rolls & Deco 2001). We can also expect that such first-
try models will uncover some important differences in the details (otherwise, all 
brains, including those of other species, would be able to compute language 
readily), but these will not rely on wholly new neurophysiology or connectivity. 
For this reason, I see the algorithmic specification of the various components of 
language, based upon explicitly stated computational primitives and algorithm 
models, as a crucial missing link in our attempts to build the larger bridge 
between mind and brain. For a similar argument see (Poeppel & Embick 2005). 
 
4.3.1. Tree Networks and Algorithms over Trees 
 
To illustrate how a computational primitive might be fleshed out at the 
algorithmic and neural levels, consider the first computational primitive: Linking 
trees into larger complexes. First, because tree abstractions appear to be 
ubiquitous in theoretical models of cognitive phenomena (Simon 1962), not just 
language, research in other cognitive domains (e.g., chess playing, music 
perception, object recognition, or motor control) may offer insights into the 
nature of linguistic trees. Second, since words have a hierarchical internal 
structure (Kenstowicz 1994), and can be thought of as memorized chunks of 
structure, the processes by which words are learned, stored and recalled should 
have much in common with other aspects of long-term memory. Once recalled, 
such ‘treelets’ must be temporarily combined into larger structures via some 
process of binding (either adding a treelet’s root to the twig of the larger tree, and 
thus preserving tree structure topologically, or binding two twigs to create ‘tree 
networks’). This process may inherit aspects of the process whereby automatized 
motor subroutines are combined into temporary motor plans as we execute 
complex novel actions (e.g., Lieberman 1998b, Arbib 2005). In the same way that 
our ongoing plans are sometime interrupted and demand a reconfigured plan, 
the linguistic tree we have built during an ongoing parse may need to be aban-
doned and reconfigured (e.g., in garden path sentences). Thus, ‘performance’ 
theories about how linguistic trees are stored, recalled and recombined may 
profit from our pre-existing understanding of the neural basis of memory, motor 
control and other cognitive domains (as envisioned in Miller & Chomsky 1963). 
 At a more abstract level, such implementation-informed theoretical 
constructs could have important implications for how we formulate our overall 
theory. For instance, if we conceptualize language as a whole as a system that 
maps between high-dimensional conceptual structures (‘thoughts’) onto low-
dimensional signal structures (phonetically-realized speech or sign streams) it 
immediately becomes clear that this is an ill-posed problem in the technical sense 
that there can be no unique solution to the signal ⇒ concept expansion problem 
(due to the greater dimensionality of the target domain), nor perfect solution to 
the concept ⇒ signal compression problem (there being multiple candidate 
mappings, each omitting something). There can’t be enough data in the signal to 
allow perfect reconstruction of the original thought structure. Given this ill-posed 
problem, what is remarkable is that language works so well for communication, 
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and that (in general) we succeed at expressing our thoughts in words, and in 
reconstructing others’ thoughts from their words. The solution demands a 
massive quantity of shared world knowledge: Far more information is generated 
by ‘reading between the lines’ than is literally present in the signal. Pragmatic 
inference using shared world knowledge is a computational necessity (Sperber & 
Wilson 1986).  
 
4.3.2. Evaluating Optimality 
 
Syntacticians have long recognized that one aspect of the signal ⇔ meaning 
mapping process is an element of cyclicity in the application of syntactic rules 
(Miller & Chomsky 1963). Beyond a certain point of expansion, we become 
unable to deal with large structures and loose ends dangling: We must ‘close’ or 
complete old structures if we are to cope with new ones. The first question one 
can ask is why this effect occurs at all. One likely answer might be that memory 
limitations (‘performance constraints’) simply prevent us from what would 
otherwise be an optimal solution (in much the same way that many theorists 
agree that memory limitations prevent easy parsing of arbitrarily center-
embedded sentences). But an alternative answer is that the nature of the concept-
signal mapping problem makes cyclicity a computational necessity: Even an ideal 
model would include cyclic application of mapping rather than an ‘all-at-once’ 
compression. Both models are logically plausible, and adjudicating between them 
would require two idealized models with which to compare actual human 
performance. Contemporary computational linguistic parsers don’t provide such 
a model, because they assign syntactic structures, not conceptual structures, to 
strings. Indeed, mapping strings to concepts remains the major unsolved 
problem in computer language processing (see below). Thus, contemporary 
linguistics still lacks an ‘ideal communicator’ model comparable to ‘ideal 
observer’ models in vision, and only once we have such models can we decide 
whether actual human performance on this task is sadly sub-par, due to memory 
or processing limitations, or in fact are nearly optimal.  
 
 
5. Genes, Bodies and Brains: Biology Comes to Grips with Epigenesis 
 
Another core issue that faces biolinguistics, and biology in general, is develop-
ment. How can a single cell (the fertilized egg), with two copies of a few giga-
bytes of DNA, contain within itself the basis for a newborn’s body with 100 
trillion cells and a brain with a trillion synapses? How can 25,000 genes possibly 
possess enough information to specify this process? Alternatively, how could the 
environment in utero provide this information? How could evolution have 
encoded it? Where does all this information come from? 
 
5.1. Three Reductios of Naïve Models 
 
Let us first dispense with the obvious possible answers in a series of simple 
arguments, each a reductio ad absurdum of the corresponding oversimplistic 
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models, by considering the information available for pure nativist or empiricist 
models more closely. 
 
5.1.1. The Naïve Nativist Model 
 
The human brain is estimated to contain roughly 100 billion = 1011 cells, each of 
which has between 100 and 10,000 synapses, leading to at least 1014 synapses in 
the brain. To specify 1 of 1011 cells exactly, you need 37 bits. Therefore, to specify 
simply the connecting cell corresponding to each synapse you would need 37 x 
1014 bits (and to specify the synaptic weight you would need at least eight bits per 
synapse). There are about 3 billion (3 x 109) base pairs in mammalian genome, so 
even if the genome was fully dedicated to specifying brain structure (which it is 
not) and had perfect coding in an information-theoretic sense, we would have a 
shortfall of at least 5 orders of magnitude to specify the connections in a human 
brain: We have 1/10,000th of the DNA we would need to code the detailed wiring 
of our brains. This ‘gene shortage’ has led scholars like Paul Ehrlich to conclude 
that little of our behavior could possibly be innate (Ehrlich 2002). Let us therefore 
similarly consider an exclusive role for the environment.  
 
5.1.2. The Naïve Empiricist Model 
 
Let us optimistically suppose that we learn something from our environments 
every second, waking or asleep, of our lives. There are 31 million seconds in a 
year (3.15 x 107). If we live to 100, that’s just 3 x 109 seconds (roughly the number 
of base pairs in the genome). The first five years of life, when most language 
learning is occurring, contain only 15 x 107 seconds. Even the most fortunate and 
well-stimulated baby has this paltry number of environmental inputs available to 
specify 1014 synapses. Although we can hope that many synapses are influenced 
by each environmental input, this doesn’t help unless each input event, is very 
highly structured, carrying a large amount of optimally coded information. This 
seems optimistic, to say the least. Thus the naïve empiricist faces the same vast 
information shortfall as the naïve nativist. 
 
5.1.3. The Naïve Evolutionist Model 
 
Finally, for completeness, consider the plight of a different type of nativist: An 
idealized ‘evolutionary empiricist’ who suggests that natural selection alone has 
programmed behavior. Vertebrate evolution has occupied about a billion (109) 
years. If we optimistically hypothesize (e.g., Worden 1995) a few bits of 
information per generation to accumulate, that’s only a few billion bits again 
(and of course any particularities of the human brain have had far less time — 
roughly, 6 x 106
 
years — to accumulate). Again a vast information shortfall exists, 
of roughly the same order: This one a shortage of evolutionary time. 
 Are we to conclude from this little exercise that development is impossible? 
Or that the evolution of the brain could not have occurred? No, such basic 
considerations force us to reject overly simplistic models, and to conclude that 
both the naïve nativist (genome as blueprint) and naïve empiricist/evolutionist 
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(environment as instructor) viewpoints are woefully inadequate models. Such 
considerations quickly lead all serious thinkers on these problems to realize that 
understanding any aspect of development and evolution requires understanding 
the interactions between DNA and the world beyond the cell nucleus. Despite its 
tiresome persistence, ‘nature versus nurture’ is a sterile conceptual dead-end, and 
any valid answer must consider ‘nature via nurture’ in some form or other 
(Ridley 2003). 
 
5.2. Respect for the Cell 
 
An important new insight in our understanding of how genes build bodies and 
brains is the central role of cell biology in all aspects of development (Kirschner & 
Gerhart 1998, 2005). Crucially, the trillions of cells in our body break down into 
only 200-odd cell types, and there are only roughly 25 morphologically distinct 
cell types in the cerebral cortex. What the genome carries is not instructions for 
individual cells, but instructions for cell types. Furthermore, most of the basic 
behavior of these cells is shared among all cells in the body (as well as with free-
living single celled organisms like an amoeba or yeast), so something like half of 
our genome deals simply with basic cellular behavior, and only the differences 
from this ‘average’ cell need to be further specified (e.g., proteins like 
hemoglobin that are expressed only in blood cells). Each of the many trillion cells 
in our body is a semi-independent living thing: Under optimal tissue-culture 
conditions individual human cells can live for years on their own. This is not 
surprising when you consider that the first two billion years of evolution took 
place at the single-cell level. Since single-celled organisms have much shorter 
generation times than multicellular organisms, most of our ancestors were free-living 
single-celled organisms. From this long evolutionary history, each of our cells 
inherits some rather impressive behavioral capabilities. Each cell contains a 
complete copy of the DNA of the organism of which it is a part: It carries the 
entire ‘recipe book’ for the body along with it. Cells may make epic migrations 
through the body, following gradients of nutrients and responding to signals left 
behind by earlier pioneers, and each must eventually find a home and a job in 
order to survive. Individual cells are highly responsive and adaptable, and can 
deal successfully with evolutionarily novel circumstances (e.g., finding them-
selves in a damaged brain or mutant limb). 
 Once we recognize cells as active, adaptive, information-processing 
entities, we see that they form a crucial intervening level of explanation between 
the genetic and whole-organism levels. The apparent paradox of genetic and 
environmental information dissolves. Sewell Wright already recognized this in 
1931: “From the view that structure is never inherited as such, but merely types 
of adaptive cell behavior which lead to particular structures under particular 
conditions, the difficulty to a considerable extent disappears” (Wright 1931: 147). 
The technical details allowing us to flesh out this basic insight have only recently 
become clear. From a genetic viewpoint, much of the overall complexity of 
organisms arises through local interactions between cells and their immediate 
organism-internal environments: The genome doesn’t need to specify the shape 
of a human hand or a bats wing, but simply must constrain the overall pattern of 
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development of a mammalian limb, in a sense ‘sculpting’ a pre-existing develop-
mental archetype rather than building an iconic ‘blueprint’ of the final structure 
(Goodwin & Trainor 1983). As often correctly emphasized (e.g., Dawkins 1986, 
Ridley 2003), the genome is nothing like a blueprint. It is more like a recipe or 
program. Like any recipe, it leaves a lot of detail unspecified, and up to indivi-
dual cells’ ‘decisions’ based on their particular history and circumstances. From 
an evolutionary viewpoint, there is no need for natural selection to perform a 
detailed and complete hill-climbing process through a complex, mostly non-
adaptive morphogenetic space: It can let robust developmental processes do 
much of the work. Natural selection simply ‘chooses’ among the various 
relatively worse or better-formed, but still functional, options that result from 
development. This perspective on cells as prime movers in development and 
evolution is nicely described, with many examples, in (Kirschner & Gerhart 
2005), and many of the molecular developmental mechanisms explicated in 




Thus, in a way we are finally beginning to understand, recipes for building 
bodies are constrained both by the information in our genomes and the 
separately inherited cellular machinery acting on this information. Equally, 
development is constrained and informed by the environment, and has been 
shaped by evolution to respond robustly to it. Despite the apparent shortfall of 
information in any one of the relevant domains, the reality of epigenesis — the 
close interaction between information in the developmental ‘program’ and infor-
mation stored in the environment — is that such interaction is fully adequate to 
specify bodies along with brains and behavior as special cases (Gottlieb 1992). 
Environmental stimulation, and even social interactions, turn genes on and off, 
and development occurs via successive waves of interactions among cells, and 
between cells and their local environments within the body (themselves 
structured by previous such interactions). Crucially, the relevant ‘environmental 
information’ in epigenetic interaction is mostly the local environment surrounding 
each cell, and not that in organism-external world. This local environment has 
traditionally been left out of both nativist and empiricist models, but is clearly 
where the action is in development, filling in the information shortfall described 
above. 
 Each of the trillion cells in our body or the billion cells in our brain has its 
own, rather myopic, local environment which informs its DNA regulation and 
thus developmental decisions. Each second of development, different local 
environments are separately effecting each cell in our body in parallel. While this 
local internal environment is, for the most part, dependent upon past decisions 
made by neighboring and predecessor cells, it is also often influenced in 
important ways by the organism-external environment. This influence is perhaps 
most marked in the brain (which is the organ most specialized to process 
organism-external information), but other systems like the immune system have 
a similarly rich external-responsiveness. 
 Epigenetic, interactive developmental models are nothing new: The 
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concept has been standard in embryology for many years (Waddington 1957). 
Experimental embryologists like Spemann recognized that cells respond to 
messages generated by other cells, and that this determines their fate later in 
development. Huge advances in our understanding of the genetic basis of 
development in the last decades have brought such ideas to fruition, and now the 
molecular basis of Spemann’s ‘organizer’ signal, and many other similar cell-cell 
signaling systems, is becoming clear (see Gilbert 2003). The mechanisms by 
which DNA expression is regulated, both in classic epigenesis via transcription 
factors (proteins that bind to DNA), and longer-term changes (e.g., the new 
epigenetics of ‘genetic imprinting’ that can span generations) are now becoming 
clear (Reik 2007). This progress in turn has led to the construction of new bridges 
between evolution and development — evolutionary developmental biology or ‘evo-
devo’ — which promise to finally close the most crucial remaining gap in our 
understanding of biology (for authoritative introductions see Carroll 2005, 
Carroll et al. 2005). Today’s biolinguists can help themselves to some well-
developed models of epigenesis, and how development interacts with evolution, 
before trying their hand at understanding the epigenesis of language. For further 
implications of this perspective on the evolution of mind see Fitch (2008). 
 
5.4. Neurons: A Very Special Cell Class 
 
This cell-based epigenetic perspective, a central tenet of the evo–devo revolution, 
is as applicable to the development of brains as to the rest of the body. However, 
neurons are unusual in a number of ways. The most important is that they are 
specialized for information processing by networks of neurons, over and above 
the normal cell-cell interactions that influence all cells. In the case of a neuron in 
the developing brain, ‘finding a job’ means taking part in a circuit that behaves 
coherently, and many of the neurons that are born fail to achieve this goal, and 
undergo programmed cell death as a result. While the primary constraints on a 
skeletal cell in a developing bone are physical forces (stresses and strains), for a 
neuron the relevant forces are the complex ebbs and flows of an ‘information 
economy’ established by myriad surrounding cells (both neurons and glia) as 
well as quite distant neurons influencing it through their axonal projections. Thus 
the local environment of the brain is unusual both in the type of commodity 
processed (information) and the topology of interactions (including precise long-
distance connections, made possible by the unusually elongated neuronal 
morphology). While there is every reason to believe that insights from the 
development of limbs or the lung will carry over to the brain, we can also be 
certain that new principles are involved in brain development and evolution 
(Striedter 2004).  
 
5.5. The Way Forward 
 
One of the principal objects of theoretical research in any department of knowledge 
is to find the point of view from which the subject appears in its greatest simplicity.  
(J. Willard Gibbs) 
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The revolution underway in developmental biology has important implications 
for biolinguistics. Anyone interested in understanding the biological basis for 
human language acquisition must be prepared to jettison simplistic debates 
about nature vs. nurture, and unhelpful notions of heritability from old-school 
genetics (“Dyslexia has a heritability of 45%”). Instead we can expect highly 
complex interactions between cells of different types, and in different brain 
regions, to provide the link between genetic changes and individual phenotypes. 
We can expect few if any cellular behaviours or cell signaling molecules that are 
qualitatively novel, either to our species or to language (Hill & Walsh 2005), but 
instead seek combinations of conserved cell processes building neural circuits 
that perform qualitatively novel classes of computation (Szathmáry 2001). We 
can expect that such circuits, built of ‘normal’ neurons using standard 
neurotransmitters, will exhibit properties and connections that are ‘standard’ in 
the mammalian brain (e.g., cortico-thalamic loops), but that these same circuits 
may show patterns of connectivity that are unusual, and perhaps in some cases 
unique, to our species or to language itself. 
 It would be hard to overstate the difficulties we face in discovering such 
subtle implementational differences. Despite a long history of trying (e.g., 
Braitenberg 1977), even circuits whose structure is already known in detail (e.g., 
in the hippocampus or cerebellum) have proved remarkably resistant to abstract 
computational analysis. Although a variety of simple models of memory or 
motor control exist, computational neuroscientists have yet to converge on 
models that are adequately comprehensive yet simple enough to understand. 
And these systems are broadly shared with well-studied ‘model’ animal species 
(mice, rats, monkeys, etc). 
 Integrating our computational and developmental problems, we can expect 
that any simple developmental model of the key neural computations involved 
language will be incorrect in its details. Nonetheless, progress will be fastest if we 
attempt to develop explicit simple models of various language mechanisms, 
amenable to experimental disproof, and then let the data show us where they are 
wrong. In the same way that Galileo and Newton achieved huge gains in physics 
by abstracting away from the existence of friction, we may expect that abstract 
models of neurolinguistic function and development, based on known aspects of 
neurophysiology and neural development but tailored to the specific 
computational needs of language, will offer hope of rapid progress. Progress 
requires posing simple (perhaps over-simplified) models, knowing they will be 
wrong, and letting the data tell us where they are wrong. As Einstein advised, 
“everything should be as simple as possible, but not simpler”, and falsifiable, 
simple models will be vastly preferable to complex, unfalsifiable models with too 
many unconstrained variables. 
 
 
6. Information and Meaning: The Final Frontier 
 
I will end with a brief look at the aspect of language that I think promises to be 
most difficult to solve: The problem of meaning. While we have a powerful and 
well-understood theory of information, we still lack a mathematical theory of 
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meaning, and developing such a theory poses some knotty conceptual and 
computational problems. Here, more than anywhere else in this article, I attempt 
only to point out the problems, without offering even sketches of solutions. I 
think the magnitude of the problem often (or even typically) goes unnoticed in 
linguistics, where theorists tend to rely on an already-linguistic conception of 
semantics (a ‘language of thought’ of some sort) without focusing on the far 
deeper difficulties for modeling non-linguistic concepts (cf. Millikan 1987). The 
last thirty years of animal cognition research leaves little doubt that non-
linguistic animals have complex concepts and can reason with these, and in 
general can have rich, active mental lives — despite their inability to express their 
thoughts to others (Vauclair 1996, Hauser 2000, Griffin 2001, Hurford 2007). 
These cognitive systems predated language, and form the cognitive foundation 
for word and sentence meanings today. Thus the problems involved in 
developing an adequate theory of meaning are very broad, and extend far 
beyond the confines of language or linguistics. Indeed many of the problems 
have been recognized most clearly in artificial intelligence and robotics, where 
attempts to build computers that can execute simple but novel motor acts, 
recognize objects, or recognize basic referents and thus implement even the 
roughest approximation to ‘meaning’ have thus far been relative failures. Some 
of the key missing ingredients of a rich cognitive theory of meaning include a 
sub-theory of context, and a theory of relevance. 
 
6.1. Shannon Information as a Foundation 
 
Claude Shannon’s formalization of ‘information’ as a quantifiable mathematical 
entity was a bold, unifying theoretical move, recognized as revolutionary almost 
immediately upon its publication (Shannon & Weaver 1949). The success of 
information theory in the domain of technology would be hard to overstate: This 
formalization was the basis for all subsequent work on digital representation and 
communication theory, without which today’s digital world would be unthink-
able, where virtually all communicated material (text, speech, music, images, 
video and other data) is rendered as a pattern of bits. Shannon’s paper 
introduced the very term ‘bit’ and the underlying conceptual framework of the 
digital revolution. Shannon’s ‘information’ was also recognized as deeply 
interesting theoretically, because its intimate formal connection with the physical 
concept of entropy offers a link between the inanimate world of particles and 
probabilities, and the biologically critical worlds of information and meaning. 
However, Shannon and co-inventor Norbert Wiener both clearly recognized that 
the revolution they sparked was only partial, because ‘information’ in this 
formalization is far from identical with information as normally understood. In 
particular, Shannon and his popularizer Weaver were both explicit in 1949 that 
Shannon information fails to incorporate any notion of the meaning of a signal. 
This limitation leads to some non-intuitive propositions in information theory 
(e.g., that the ‘information’ in white noise is greater than that in a symphony or 
speech). Despite Shannon’s own clarity on the limitations of ‘information’ in his 
sense, this caveat has been largely ignored on two important fronts. From a 
practical viewpoint the distinction between meaning and information has 
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become blurred (e.g., in engineering), and from a theoretical viewpoint 
Shannon’s call for an extension of his concepts into the domain of true, 
biologically-relevant meaning has gone unanswered (e.g., in cognitive science or 
neuroscience). 
 Although its incompleteness has periodically led to a call to abandon 
Shannon information theory entirely (e.g., King 2004), this would be unwise 
given the manifest success of this theory in all domains to which it has been 
earnestly applied (both technology and neuroscience), along with the steady 
improvements in the theory (MacKay 2003). Thus, I think the goal for an eventual 
theory of meaning should be to build upon Shannon’s formalism, incorporating 
his theorems and extending them. I suggest that two key desiderata for such an 
extended theory of information, incorporating meaning, are formalizations of 
context and of relevance. 
 
6.2. Context and Relevance — ‘One Man’s Signal is Another Man’s Noise’ 
 
The same signal may be meaningful in one context and meaningless, or 
meaningful but irrelevant, in another. At several levels this context-dependence 
is captured by the phrase quoted above. Meaning must be defined relative to 
some context: A broad temporal-spatial window of data, both organism-internal 
and -external, much larger than the signal whose information is to be interpreted. 
This context, provides the data relative to which the meaning of any signal is 
interpreted. A signal (e.g., white noise) may have a meaning of 0, despite its 
information-rich high bit rate. This distinction may help to resolve the non-
intuitive nature of Shannon information: A signal could have high information 
and low meaning, or lower information (e.g., speech or music, which are quite 
redundant) and high meaning. Relevance, a basic quantity in any adequate formal 
theory of pragmatics (Sperber & Wilson 1986), depends not just on current 
external context, but also on an individual’s current cognitive state: Drives, goals, 
unanswered questions, hypotheses being processed. Relevance is thus in the eye 
of the beholder, and demands a formalization of external context and goal-
directed internal context. 
 We should in principle be able to define ideal observer (‘ideal interpreter’) 
models that can extract all the possible connections between all possible signals 
for a given world and goal context. Unfortunately, the well-known combinatorial 
explosion that results poses serious obstacles to using such models to control 
action, because a set of computations subject to unconstrained combinatorial 
explosion is of little use in real-time computation of meaning. This is the 
infamous ‘frame problem’ in artificial intelligence (Ford & Pylyshyn 1996), and 
the ‘solutions’ to the frame problem currently on offer in AI all essentially 
involve a priori limits on the extent of this explosion: All variants of what Simon 
long ago dubbed ‘bounded rationality’ (Simon 1957), or of Chomsky’s innate 
biases. However, it is unclear that such bounded models can do justice to the 
seemingly unfettered connection-finding revealed by individual human 
linguistic creativity, or of the social ramifications of this creativity, as seen both in 
culture and science. While discussions of the frame problem in technology have 
grown less central as various work-arounds have been developed, the central 
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epistemological issue in understanding the mind is not solved, or even obviously 
confronted, by such ‘solutions’ (for discussion see Fodor 2000: Chap. 2). Further, 
no ideal interpreter model alone can capture the relevance of a signal without an 
additional specification of goals, problem states, current behavioural sequence, 
current location, etc. There is a considerable amount of explicit computational 
theory still missing here. 
 
6.3. The Future: Comparative Cognition Meets Formal Semantics? 
 
Given the problems context-dependent combinatorial explosion causes for 
contemporary computers and robots, the remarkable fact is that organisms seem 
to rarely suffer from the frame problem. Indeed, simple motor tasks that seem 
trivial to us (or to a monkey or a dog) — locomoting around obstacles, 
negotiating novel paths successfully, or picking up objects without breaking 
them — remain daunting for today’s robots. At the level of perception, 
perceptual ‘mistakes’ like illusions are the exception and not the rule, and we 
seem quite effortlessly to exclude a huge variety of possible interpretations, 
converging reliably on a relatively accurate but extremely flexible model of the 
world — again a trick that evades today’s best machines and algorithms. In 
computational linguistics, even simple sentences generate hundreds of possible 
parses — but we humans rarely even consider more than one of them. One thing 
that seems common to many of these feats is our ability to use context of various 
sorts to prune away all but the most probable branches of the tree of possibilities. 
Our ability to evaluate the relevance of various possible interpretations builds on 
this more basic context-dependence to explore models of the future or possible 
worlds. Almost all of this computational generation and pruning is unconscious 
(perhaps necessarily so, as I have argued in Fitch 2005a, 2008). Furthermore, most 
of these processing capabilities must have predated the evolution of language, 
since effortless incorporation of context in decisions of relevance typifies the 
behavior of a dog or chimpanzee as much as a human. Thus, in some sense, the 
conceptual and neural basis of ‘meaning’ is a more basic problem than, and its 
solution should be logically prior to, an understanding of semantics in natural 
language. Thus, unfortunately, a general theory of ‘meaning’ ultimately demands 
a complete theory of how brains make minds, clearly one of the hardest problems 
left for science to solve. Ultimately, I believe that new theoretical tools will be 
necessary to understand meaning in the more general non-linguistic sense I have 
been discussing, and that the study and modeling of non-linguistic animal 
cognition will play a crucial role in such an enterprise. For now, an attack on the 
problem from multiple (hopefully someday converging) perspectives will be 
required. 
 Linguistics, in the guise of formal semantics, potentially has something to 
offer this enterprise. Contemporary semanticists have developed a rather power-
ful set of theories and formalisms, with truth-value, possible word, and model-
theoretic semantics among the prominent theoretical approaches, and a variety of 
formalisms based upon propositional and predicate calculus and their extensions 
(Portner 2005). Such approaches are unlikely to solve some of the deeper 
problems of an embodied (organism-dependent) and context-dependent theory 
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of meaning, precisely because they intentionally abstract away from such 
problems (see e.g., Montague 1974). Nonetheless, the tools provided by formal 
semantics should play an important role in our final understanding of linguistic 
semantics by providing rigorous definitions of the sorts of problems that must be 
solved (e.g., logical entailment or scope of quantifiers). Contemporary semantics 
appears largely to take for granted the existence of non-linguistic models of the 
world (though work on spatial language provides a welcome, if narrowly 
circumscribed exception: Landau & Gleitman 1985, Landau & Jackendoff 1993). 
But real progress in understanding this extra-linguistic context- and relevance-
sensitive domain of basic cognition will require considerably more work in this 
direction, (cf. Jackendoff 2002). Until a well-developed, mathematically-
formalized cognitive theory of meaning, applicable to animal cognition and 
including basic reference and context-dependent relevance, is available, any 
biologically-based theory of language will remain incomplete. 
 
 
7. Conclusions and Some Outstanding Biolinguistic Questions, Framed as 
Testable Hypotheses 
 
With these prolegomena, I have tried to clarify some core problems that face the 
new science of biolinguistics. The sociological problems discussed at the outset 
should be soluble with good-will, mutual respect, and self-imposed restraint. 
Sober biolinguists will recognize that the core problems facing this field are far 
too big for any one individual to solve on their own (if only because mastery of 
all the relevant disciplines is impossible for even the most gifted polymath), and 
will team up to solve them together. I am thus guardedly optimistic that the 
fascination of the questions and exciting promise of new techniques and 
approaches will sweep away many traditional barriers to success. 
 In contrast, the three problem areas that form the heart of this article pose 
serious scientific challenges. Each is daunting in its own right. When these 
challenges are combined, it becomes clear that developing a biological 
understanding of human language is one of, if not the, most difficult problems in 
all of contemporary science. Although I have tried where possible to indicate 
possible solutions to at least some aspects of the problems discussed, my primary 
motivation in this article was simply to clarify the problems themselves. I think 
that all researchers interested in biolinguistics can profit from musing over these 
difficulties, and trying to clarify their nature. At the very least, a meditation on 
the gravity and breadth of these problems can induce a humility about one’s own 
attempts at solutions, perhaps contributing somewhat towards remediation of 
the sociological problems that hinder the field. But in any case, a clear 
understanding and statement of unsolved problems is the best spur to their 
solution. 
 I emphasized above that the model for progress in biolinguistics will be 
empirical testing of theoretical predictions, along the lines of physics or 
molecular biology. Thus I end this article by taking a dose of my own proposed 
medicine, recapping one testable hypothesis and presenting six more, spanning 
the range of the problem spaces discussed in this article. Hypothesis (A) below is 
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recapped from section 3, as a reminder of the type of multifaceted research 
program that we will need to find answers to any of these questions. I imagine 
key contributions by researchers in disciplines as diverse as field and laboratory 
ethology, theoretical, comparative and historical linguistics, developmental 
biology and psychology, molecular genetics, experimental psychology, 
computational linguistics, comparative neuroanatomy, sociology and brain 
imaging. I will make no attempt to flesh out the theoretical underpinnings of 
these hypotheses, or to detail the experiments that would be involved in testing 
them. These are left as an exercise to the reader, as a prolegomenon is best 
summed up with questions, rather than answers. While these questions don’t 
begin to exhaust the list of testable hypotheses in biolinguistics, I hope they give 
some sense of the potential interest, breadth and promise of this nascent field, 
and illustrate the future need for broad and productive interdisciplinary 
collaboration.  
 
(A) Speech Followed Laryngeal Descent  
If size exaggeration was a pre-adaptation for speech (Fitch 2002), human 
genes controlling male pubertal laryngeal descent should have fixated 
before those involved in complex vocal control (Hypothesis H3, section 3 
above). 
 
(B) Speech Entails Babbling  
If ‘closing the loop’ between production and perception is a prerequisite for 
complex vocal learning, all vocal learning species should normally babble 
(show an early stage of autostimulatory vocal play, e.g., sub-song in birds; 
Fitch 2006a, 2006b); untested species include pinnipeds, bats, cetaceans. 
 
(C) Signal Imitation  
If vocal and visuomanual imitation both reflect an abstract domain-general 
capacity for ‘mimesis’ (Donald 1991), auditory and visual imitation abilities 
in individual humans should be closely correlated; if they reflect indepen-
dent, separately-evolved mechanisms there should be no such correlation. 
 
(D) Syntactic Power  
If human sentence-parsing capacities indeed occupy the mildly-context 
sensitive level of the formal language hierarchy (Joshi et al. 1991, Stabler 
2004), the additional form of memory involved in processing grammars 
beyond the finite-state level should have the characteristics of a queue, 
rather than a stack. 
 
(E) Language Acquisition  
If human language acquisition is just a special case of a general innate 
capacity for acquiring culture (Tomasello 1999), then individual children’s 
progress in acquiring language should be closely correlated, both tempo-
rally and across individuals, with their progress in other aspects of sociali-
zation and mastery of non-linguistic culture (cf. Markson & Bloom 1997). 
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(F) Semantics and Neuronal Arborization  
If natural language has cognitive access to conceptual mechanisms that are 
encapsulated in other species (e.g., chimpanzees), populations or subclasses 
of neurons with broadened dendritic or axonal arbors should quantitative-
ly distinguish our brains from a chimpanzee brain, and these arbors should 
be widely distributed throughout the brain rather than restricted to 
traditional ‘language’ areas (cf. Enard et al. 2009). 
 
(G)  Plasticity of ‘Critical Periods’  
If epigenetic interaction between genes and external environment plays a 
key role in developing the neural circuits underlying language (Bates 1999), 
‘sensitive periods’ (Lenneberg 1967) during which such interactions are 
possible should be plastic; in particular, some classes of extreme environ-
mental change (e.g., adoption) should be capable of ‘resetting’ the language 
acquisition system in young enough children, with a concomitant change in 
gene expression patterns in the child’s brain — this should not be true of 
epigenetic processes dependent only on the early-developing organism-
internal environment. 
 
 One could easily generate many more such hypotheses. The difficulties lie 
not in hypothesis generation but in developing empirical research programmes 
to test such ideas. If the current essay helps current and future workers in this 
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This paper scrutinizes the recent proposal made by Lassiter (2008) that the 
dichotomy between Chomskyan internalism and Dummett-type externalism 
is misguided and should be overcome by an approach that incorporates 
sociolinguistic concepts such as speakers’ dispositions to defer. We argue 
that Lassiter’s arguments are flawed and based on a serious misunder-
standing of the internalist approach to the study of natural language, failing 
to appreciate its methodological nature and conclude that Lassiter’s socio-
linguistic approach is just another instance of externalist attempts with little 
hope of scientific achievement.  
 
 





1. Introduction  
 
In a recent paper, Lassiter (2008) argues that both the Chomskyan internalist 
approach to human language and the Dummett-type externalism fail to provide 
an account of some semantic and social facts that he claims are crucial to any 
linguistic theory. Furthermore, Lassiter claims that we can overcome such 
difficulties in these two approaches by incorporating some sociolinguistic notions 
into linguistic theory. We will argue that Lassiter’s claim is misguided, and that 
he misunderstands crucial aspects of the Chomskyan internalist project.  
 We will first provide an overview of Lassiter’s claims, and then examine 
his critique of the internalist project, and discuss why the alternative he presents 
is highly problematic. We take the failure of his externalist theory to be rather 
suggestive of the general feasibility of any scientific investigation of language 
that rests mainly on an externalist foundation.  
 
 
2. Lassiter’s Claims 
 
This section is devoted to an overview of the argument presented in Lassiter 
                                                
  We are indebted to Noam Chomsky, Jim McGilvray, and Paul Pietroski for valuable 
comments and advise on this piece, as well to two anonymous reviewers for their remarks. 
Thanks also to the editors, Cedric Boeckx and Kleanthes Grohmann, for their support and 
enthusiasm. 
T. Lohndal & H. Narita 
 
322 
(2008). Before we proceed, we have to clarify some of the terminology Lassiter 
misleadingly adopts. Throughout his paper, Lassiter repeatedly attributes to 
Noam Chomsky and generative linguistics led by him (which he often calls 
‘descriptive linguistics’) a claim that “a language just is a mental grammar” (p. 
619) and calls such a claim ‘individualism’. Individualism, as he construes, is a 
claim that semantic properties, such as reference, of an individual’s speech 
behavior rest exclusively on, and can be explained solely by, the facts and 
knowledge internal to the individual. This is in itself a serious misrepresentation 
of the Chomskyan internalism (Chomsky 1995, 2000), as we will argue in the next 
section, but since his discussion rests heavily on this misrepresentation, we will 
adopt it and review his arguments with regard to this straw man hypothesis. In 
order to avoid unnecessary vagueness in terminology, let us tentatively call the 
‘individualism’ under his particular conception sketched here L-individualism. 
 In a nutshell, Lassiter’s claim is that (i) there are some sociological facts of 
human linguistic behavior that can be accounted for only by a linguistic theory 
that incorporates individuals’ intentional contributions to the meaning/reference 
of linguistic expressions, and (ii) neither L-individualism nor the philosophically 
dominant tradition of semantic externalism (led by people like Hilary Putnam, 
Tyler Burge, Michael Dummett, and David Lewis) can satisfy this need. We will 
articulate these points in what follows. 
 Basing his argument primarily on observations made by externalists such 
as those just mentioned, Lassiter claims that there are certain ‘crucial’ socio-
linguistic facts of human speech behavior that highlight the relevance of social 
contexts in a speech community and also of speakers’ intentions. A primary 
example of this kind is, according to him, individuals’ intuitions about the 
‘(in)correctness’ of their language use against the standards of the speech 
community they belong to. Lassiter notes, “sometimes an individual’s use of 
language is just wrong, and individuals often acknowledge making mistakes 
upon reflection or correction” (p. 608). As an illustration, he takes a familiar 
example from Burge (1979), where we are asked to imagine an English-speaking 
individual, say Jim, who has rheumatism in his thigh but suspects he has arthritis 
as a result of having an ailment in his thigh. This individual, not being a doctor, 
does not know that arthritis is a condition of the joints only, and so when he 
utters “I have arthritis in my thigh,” he is expressing a false belief. In such a 
circumstance, however, Jim should be able to become aware of his mistake, for 
example, by being explicitly corrected by a doctor. Given this much, Lassiter 
argues that “a descriptive theory emphasizing knowledge of language” would pre-
dict (wrongly, as he argues) that his utterance above is not false but rather is just 
“true-in-his-idiolect” (p. 609), which he regards as a serious flaw of such a theory. 
That is, he argues with Burge that the reference of ‘arthritis’ in such a case is 
rather fixed by the word’s use in the speech community Jim belongs to. 
 Furthermore, Lassiter claims that L-individualism is seriously flawed in 
that it does not provide any room for language-external concepts such as speech 
communities and community standards for normative meaning, in its account of 
sociologically and contextually varying semantic properties of human speech 
behaviors, as in Jim’s cases above. In this regard, Lassiter more or less endorses 
Dummett’s (1986) claim that an individual’s knowledge of his language is merely 
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“a second-order theory: a partial, and partly incorrect, theory about what the 
meanings of the expressions are in the common language, that may be represen-
ted as a partial theory of what the correct theory of meaning for the language is” 
(Dummett 1986: 469). 
 However, Lassiter also claims that we should not take at face value the 
strong form of externalism that Dummett and other externalists like Putnam and 
Lewis envisage. His target is what he calls communitarianism, a position implicitly 
or explicitly shared by these externalists’ approaches which holds that a language 
is primarily a social object belonging to a speech community, and that such 
speech communities exist prior to individual speakers and are capable of 
determining a unique community language (a communalect, in his terms) with or 
without the individual speakers’ cooperation (p. 610). Lassiter argues that we 
should reject communitarianism, because it makes a clearly unsustainable 
prediction that ‘speech communities’ that communalects correspond to should be 
determinate and isolable real objects that we can find in the world. The problem 
of this prediction lies in the difficulties in isolating the relevant speech communi-
ties in a well-articulated fashion. For example, we cannot define a community 
corresponding to a communalect language neither by political or institutional 
boundaries, nor by communicative notions like mutual intelligibility. It is by now 
an established fact that languages vary both synchronically over geographical 
and sociopolitical space and diachronically over generations, and moreover that 
such variation is rather continuous and gradual in most cases, without any sharp 
divisions in terms of geographic space, sociopolitical boundaries, generation 
gaps, or mutual intelligibility. Consequently, as Lassiter argues, we should give 
up any hope to find any objective or absolute criteria for isolating speech 
communities, which in effect militates against the backbone of communitarianist 
approaches.  
 He then goes on to suggest that his sociolinguistic approach to semantics 
can overcome both the difficulties in L-individualism and those in communi-
tariarism. His alternative theory posits that “the meaning of a word in the mouth 
of a speaker S is determined by S’s dispositions to defer to other speakers with 
regard to the meaning and use of this word” (p. 623). For example, as for the 
rheumatism patient Jim in Burge’s example, he notes, “if we wish to know what 
‘arthritis’ means in Jim’s mouth, we must ask who Jim would defer to with 
regard to the meaning of this word” (p. 622), say, his doctor, in which case his 
utterance. “I have arthritis in my thigh” can be still said to be expressing a wrong 
belief, since “he would be willing to change his use if he were to go [to see the 
doctor—L&N]” (p. 623). This way, we can make room for the effect of the 
speaker’s intuitions of correctness by relocating the effect of normativity to the 
speaker’s dispositions to defer, without making recourse to the dubious commu-
nitarianist notion of speech community. 
 
 
3. The Externalism vs. Internalism Debate 
 
To begin with, let us first state clearly that we have no problem in accepting 
Lassiter’s counterarguments to L-individualism and communitariarism as such, 
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since they both seem dubious, although we don’t regard his argumentation as 
particularly strong. What we regard as particularly misguided and problematic is 
his continuous misrepresentation of Chomsky’s internalism (Chomsky 1995, 
2000) as L-individualism. In our opinion, L-individualism is a straw man hypo-
thesis that says that the meaning of an individual’s speech is to be determined 
solely by facts internal to the individual. From this, Lassiter subsequently con-
cludes that the dichotomy between Chomsky’s position (again, misrepresented as 
L-individualism) and externalism is misguided and to be remedied by 
“unify[ing] the two approaches” under the realm of sociolinguistics (p. 607).  
Lassiter’s “broad outlines of the debate” say, on the one hand, that 
internalists “believe that the proper object of the scientific study of language is 
the language of an individual, his idiolect or, in Chomskyan terms, his mental 
grammar, knowledge of language, or I-language. […] This does not necessarily 
mean that social aspects of language are unimportant or that they do not admit of 
a scientific description, though some [internalists] have made this further claim: 
cf. Chomsky (1975). However, most [internalists] do believe that only individual-
listic aspects of language can be formalized and used to make predictions (e.g., 
about entailment and grammaticality)” (p. 608). Elsewhere, he also (correctly) 
attributes to Chomsky the claim that “only the ‘internalist’ aspects of language 
can admit of a truly scientific description” (p. 631). On the other hand, semantic 
externalists “hold that a language belongs to a community of language users, and 
that common languages or communalects exist above and beyond individuals. 
According to this conception, a language has an ontology (e.g., words and gram-
matical rules, or social practices and/or conventions) and norms (standards of 
correctness) that are in some sense independent of the linguistic competence of 
individual speakers” (p. 608). These two “broad outlines” seem to be a sufficient-
ly accurate approximation. Crucially, note that internalism thus understood is 
primarily a conjecture about a proper object of the scientific study of language (which 
internalists claim to be I-language), whereas externalism is rather a philosophical 
belief about the ontology of some mind/brain-external aspects of human linguistic 
behaviors (which would be E-language of some sort).  
 Typically, then, both positions would not, and Lassiter also does not, take 
issue with the fact that there exist aspects of language purely internal to the 
human mind/brain (i.e. I-language): Thus Lassiter’s remark, “I think mental 
grammars are fully real” (p. 619). Indeed, to the extent that the externalist propo-
sals are even coherent, they presuppose some notion of I-language, as Chomsky 
repeatedly has stressed (e.g., in Chomsky 2000). An I-language can in many ways 
be identified as a generative system — an I-language enables a speaker to 
generate linguistic expressions. It’s a (trivial) fact that speakers are able to gener-
ate an unlimited amount of hierarchically structured expressions. An I-language 
makes it possible to make sense of the linguistic creativity we all possess as hu-
man beings, a creativity that is unbounded, innovative and uncaused (Chomsky 
2009 [1966]; see also McGilvray 2009 on this). This linguistic creativity is in obvi-
ous ways individual: It is something that each person uses and how it is used is 
independent of how other people are using their linguistic creativity. The 
utterances that are generated are part of what is commonly called E-language. 
 However, E-language cannot exist without the utterances being generated 
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in some way or other. Certainly language cannot just appear out of nowhere. 
Hence individuals have to create it using their linguistic creativity. This creati-
vity, of which I-language is a crucial part, is by definition internal. One can 
debate what the exact content of I-language is, as people following Chomsky 
have done since the 1950s, but it is very hard to see that it is possible to debate 
the reality of I-language. If one wants to study E-language, one has to suppose 
the existence of some sort of I-language since E-language would not exist without 
I-language. One can choose not to focus on its existence, but it should be clear 
that it has to exist. More advanced examples can be adduced in support of this, 
involving central well-known empirical facts about human language that doesn’t 
create themselves (hierarchy, as mentioned above, but also structural relations 
like c-command and others that are crucial properties of I-languages). Thus, we 
take it for granted that it should be clear why an E-language approach is 
presupposing the existence of an I-language. 
 Surrounding the dichotomy between internalism and externalism are, then, 
(at least) two separate issues:  
 
(i) Whether we have reasons to believe in some ontology of ‘language’ outside 
of individuals’ mind/brain, and  
(ii) Whether we can ever construct a serious scientific theory of such 
‘language’.1 
 
Internalists like Chomsky would typically answer a skeptical “No” to (i) and (ii), 
as Lassiter correctly acknowledges. Externalists strongly answer “Yes” to (i), 
rooted in their philosophical belief in the existence of such an ‘object’. But they 
seem less concerned about arguing for an articulated “Yes” to (ii), as far as we 
can see. This is an important difference. For internalists, (i) is not really an impor-
tant research question, whereas (ii) is really the question they/we are concerned 
with. Again, this is an important methodological difference that bears emphasis, 
as Collins (2009) also underlines. 
 
 
4. Evaluating Lassiter’s Contributions 
 
Despite the sufficient accuracy of the “broad outlines of the debate” above, which 
is presented on the second page of his paper, Lassiter continuously misinterprets 
                                                
1  McGilvray (2002: 73) provides a nice exposition of what we have in mind for the term serious 
science:  
A serious science is a theory for which there is not only empirical support in the 
form of the descriptive and explanatory adequacy of a set of formal, explicit 
principles (adequate to their domain by standards that are universal, although 
adjusted to a specific domain) and evidence of progress (a history of revision of 
theories with good reason to think that there have been improvements in 
adequacy, simplicity, and explicit statement), but some reason to think that the 
theory’s principles can be accommodated to the principles of other, relevant 
sciences. In the science of mind, the relevant science would, presumably, be some 
branch of biology — perhaps a much-revised form of neurophysiology. 
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what internalism is all about elsewhere in his paper, and repeatedly mis-
represents it as L-individualism. For example, he makes the following odd claim: 
”In contrast to the assumptions of thinkers from Chomsky to Putnam, I do not 
think that externalism and mentalism are incompatible: I think mental grammars 
are fully real, though I do deny the claim that language just is a mental 
grammar” (p. 619). Here, Lassiter is attributing to Chomskyan internalism the 
“claim that language just is a mental grammar.” In the same vein, elsewhere he 
also says, “Individualists hold that an individual’s language just is her idiolect” 
(p. 610).2 This is a serious misrepresentation of the internalist claim. As noted 
above, the core claim of internalists who, like Chomsky, seek a naturalistic theory 
of language is that the proper object of a serious linguistic science should be 
organism-internal aspects of human language (namely I-language). Internalists 
never deny that there are phenomena broadly related to language (in particular 
to language use) that are beyond the narrow confines of the architecture of the 
human mental grammar (I-language). Such phenomena would surely include 
prescriptive pressures from the linguistic community, speakers’ intentionality for 
communicative success, and all sorts of other E-language phenomena that Lassi-
ter and others argue for. What internalists doubt is rather the feasibility and/or 
legitimacy of providing a serious science of any mind-external phenomena such 
as these. Thus, Chomsky (1995) writes: “[G]eneral issues of intentionality, inclu-
ding those of language use, cannot reasonably be assumed to fall within natural-
istic inquiry” (p. 27); see also Chomsky (2000) for much relevant discussion. 
 Cast in this real internalism vs. externalism debate, we cannot find any 
compelling reason to believe that Lassiter constructed even a relevant argument 
for his conclusion that “the choice between individualism [referring to the 
Chomskyan internalism] and externalism is a false one” (p. 630). He is mostly 
attacking the ‘claim that language just is a mental grammar’, i.e. the incorrect L-
individualism, a claim never defended by Chomsky, but Lassiter never addresses 
all the serious issues raised by the Chomskyan internalism that an externalist 
theory would have to face. Rather, his alleged ‘theory’ is just another instanti-
ation of externalism, expressing but not quite arguing for his intuitive “Yes” to (i) 
and (ii).  
 Let us now turn to the more specific aspects of Lassiter’s proposals, where 
we in particular will focus on important problems surrounding an E-language 
approach and why Chomsky and others have focused on studying I-language. 
As we have seen, Lassiter’s claims are as follows:  
 
(A) There are facts that cannot be addressed purely internalistically (such as in-
dividuals’ intuitions on (in)correctness of language use, e.g., the impreci-
sion of a rheumatism patient’s usage of the word ‘arthritis’, as seen above).  
                                                
2  An additional note on Lassiter’s terminology may be in order here. Throughout his paper, 
he uses the notion ‘idiolect’ as more or less synonymous with grammar or I-language. This 
is a misunderstanding. Never has Chomsky squared idiolect and I-language; on the 
contrary, he has been very explicit in numerous writings that idiolect and I-language are 
very different (e.g., Chomsky 1986, 2000). A notion like ‘idiolect’ is very much like ‘dialect’ 
and ‘language’; vague and ambiguous notions that are notoriously hard to define. This fact, 
together with the numerous other often remarkably vague notions used by Lassiter, makes 
it quite hard to assess his theory. 
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(B) Any linguistic theory must account for these facts. 
(C) We can actually construct (or at least imagine) an explanatory theory of 
such facts which incorporates externalist (I-language-external) concepts like 
speakers’ dispositions to defer to normativity or authority in their speech 
community. 
 
As for the claim in (A), we looked at an example borrowed from Burge where the 
meaning of a rheumatism patient’s word ‘arthritis’ is determined by who the 
speaker would defer to, and in what fashion. That is, if we want to know what 
the speaker meant to refer to by the word ‘arthritis’, we are told by Lassiter to ask 
who the speaker would defer to with regard to the meaning of this specific word. 
Internalists would have no problem accepting Lassiter’s mundane (and trivially 
true) claim that such notions as individuals’ dispositions to defer, and the E-
linguistic system (communalect) that the totality of a person’s dispositions to 
defer in a particular communicative situation map out, obviously go beyond a 
purely internalistic account. Thus (A) should not be at issue here. 
 However, internalists may very well be inclined to deny (B) and (C). As for 
(B), we fail to see any serious justification of this claim in Lassiter’s paper, apart 
from his personal belief that these facts regarding (A), like most phenomena 
investigated by sociolinguists, are of general interest. It is not clear that an 
internalist theory needs to take into account the facts of Lassiter’s interest, given 
that the past fifty years of generative investigation have provided more than 
ample evidence that the I-linguistic mental system can be fruitfully studied 
purely internalistically, under the abstraction from the external fluctuations from 
sociological circumstances or intentions of speakers or the like. Thus, nobody 
would claim that dispositions to defer or other sorts of an individual’s social 
intentions have any influence on the computational properties of the I-linguistic 
mechanism that generates the mental compositions of hierarchical structures of 
words and sentences. As long as they can construct and investigate the science of 
I-language, internalists are fine to admit that they have to leave whatever 
remains beyond the reach of their I-linguistic science for the time being, such as 
the facts that Lassiter and other externalists’ interest think are very important 
(see Chomsky 1995, 2000, McGilvray 2009, and Hinzen 2006a, 2006b, among 
others). In this regard, it is not clear what Lassiter thinks would go wrong if an 
internalist approach to human language set the facts of his interest aside, and left 
it to other disciplines such as sociolinguistics to investigate I-language-external 
facts. Lassiter never articulates his claim on this point, so we do not see any 
reason to abandon the internalist theory of I-language. In this regard, we 
completely agree with the following remark by Chomsky (1995: 50): “As for 
sociolinguistics, it is a perfectly legitimate inquiry, externalist by definition. It 
borrows from internalist inquiry into humans, but suggests no alternative to it.” 
By contrast, Lassiter somehow believes that not just some but any linguistic 
discipline must account for the relevant facts, but he never articulates why that 
should be. 
 More to the point, most internalists suspect that we need to understand the 
I-language much better than we currently do before we can even start to attempt 
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at pursuing some serious understanding of how I-language is embedded in 
sociolinguistic contexts, and specifically how the utterances generated with 
recourse to I-language are used in a given context to refer to things outside the 
head. Admittedly, internalists have scarcely started to understand how an I-
language that an individual possesses contributes to the semantico-pragmatic 
performance of that individual in a sufficiently comprehensive way, and thus it 
would be an inextricable leap at this point to broaden the object of study to 
individuals’ varying deference and any other E-linguistic notions; hopelessly 
complicating the task. We need a more complete understanding of the internal 
properties of I-language before we can even attempt to try to understand how 
individuals utilize them to deal with all sorts of E-language phenomena. This is a 
very different methodology than that of externalists, and a difference that 
Lassiter seems to have failed to notice. In total, we see that there are both 
theoretical and metholodogical reasons to be skeptical regarding (B) (cf. Collins 
2009). 
 Furthermore, it is hard to see how one could even imagine a successfully 
explanatory theory within the framework that Lassiter pursues given that he 
does not acknowledge the importance of I-language. In this regard, we side with 
Chomsky (1995, 2000) and McGilvray (1998, 2002, 2009), and many others, in be-
ing very skeptical about the feasibility of (C). The claim that we can construct or 
should be able to construct an explanatory theory of (E-)language by incorpora-
ting various sociolinguistic notions is central to Lassiter (2008). Unfortunately, 
Lassiter never defines crucial notions that are part of his theory, for example, 
‘deferential dispositions’, ‘communicative success’, ‘social identification’ or, 
elsewhere in the paper, important notions such as ‘norms’, ‘correctness’ and 
‘reference’, in a sufficiently meticulous way that enables us to derive predictions 
from his theory. Rather, to address these notions, he seems to borrow heavily 
from common sense understandings of these terms. However, we have no reason 
to expect that any commonsense understanding of words like these can merit 
scientific investigations. Compare Chomsky’s (1999: 113) remark: “[T]here is no 
reason to suppose that common usage of such terms as ‘language’ or ‘learning’ 
(or ‘belief’ or numerous others like them), or others belonging to similar semantic 
fields in other linguistic systems, will find any place in attempts to understand 
the aspects of the world to which they pertain, just as no one expects the common 
sense terms ‘energy’ or ‘liquid’ or ‘life’ to play a role in the sciences, beyond a 
rudimentary level” (see also Chomsky 1980). The point is much the same for 
Lassiter’s ‘deference’, ‘social identification’, ‘norms’, etc. Thus, it is hard to assess 
to what extent we are actually dealing with a theory here. 
 Related to this point is the fact that crucial aspects of Lassiter’s theory fail 
to provide obvious criteria for falsifiability. Whenever he encounters problematic 
examples, he stipulates some superficial elaboration of his terms in order to 
dismiss them. Consider the following illustrative case: “Recall that, in the case of 
Jim and his community’s deviant use of ‘arthritis’, we came to the conclusion that 
the deviant usage could be incorrect in certain circumstances (e.g., talking to the 
doctor), but it could just as well involve dialect-switching in which both usages 
are correct in different social contexts. In the latter case, some sort of translation 
manual would be in order” (p. 625). And as above, he never specifies what role 
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the newly invented terms like ‘dialect-switching’ and ‘translation manual’ are 
supposed to play in his theory. What seems to be going on here is that Lassiter 
allows there to be multiple ‘explanations’ for the same phenomenon. Moreover, 
there seem to be no principles behind these possible explanations. That is, no 
guidelines can be found that tell us where/when we should use explanation x 
and where/when we should use explanation y. Without such guidelines or prin-
ciples, the theory easily becomes vacuous. Though again, it might be eventually 
possible to develop such principles, but at least they are not stated in his paper. 
 Furthermore, Lassiter himself admits (correctly) that the crucial external 
factors he is utilizing would be subject to much fluctuation, in what appears to be 
unpredictable ways. Thus he even suggests a possibility that “what a term means 
must be resolved on a case-by-case basis” in reference to speakers’ dispositions to 
defer (p. 622). Thus, even if it were possible to formalize the externalist factors 
Lassiter is relying on, no systematic account of these changes seems to be on the 
horizon as his notions are not precisely formulated, let alone explained, which 
again undermines the scientific significance of the notions employed by Lassiter.  
 These are all insurmountable problems facing the ‘theory’ Lassiter propo-
ses. He fails to provide convincing arguments for the feasibility or legitimacy of 
constructing an externalist linguistic theory of the sort he envisages. For these 
reasons, we find it particularly puzzling to see Lassiter’s remark in his con-
clusion: “Chomsky […] insists that only the ‘internalist’ aspects of language can 
admit of a truly scientific description. I have attempted to provide several 
counter-examples to this claim in the form of explanations of problems that 
cannot be addressed or even formulated without externalist concepts“ (p. 631). 
His “counter-examples” (the facts relevant to (A)) are orthogonal to Chomskyan 
internalism, which just amounts to “the methodological decision […] to study less, 
prior to studying more: To study the organism, prior to the infinitely more 
complex task of studying how it embeds in a social, physical, and cultural 
surrounding”, to borrow Hinzen’s (2006a: 161) words (cf. Collins 2009). Lassiter 
also fails to demonstrate why internalists have to worry about his “counter-
examples”, nor does he convince us of how the sociolinguistic theory that he 
envisages can be explanatory, going beyond case-by-case descriptions. 
 We take Lassiter’s contribution to be somewhat important, since, contra 
Lassiter’s own intention, its failure is actually quite suggestive of a much more 
general conclusion: namely the absence of explanations or even descriptions that 
go beyond common sense in externalist approaches such as Lassiter’s. We 
suspect that any account that ever tries to address such I-language-external 
complex phenomena as community standards or speakers’ intentions would be 
relevantly like Lassiter’s, and would fail in the same ways as Lassiter’s does. This 
point is plainly another corroboration of the conclusion by Wittgenstein in 
Philosophical Investigations: There is no theory of the domain of language use, 
apart from just more or less helpful description (McGilvray 1998: 228; cf. 
Chomsky 1995: 27). 
 However, as noted, Lassiter’s failure has no bearing on the internalist 
research enterprise. His attempt to articulate a sociolinguistic theory of the sort 
he envisages is orthogonal to the goal of internalist investigations of the 
Chomskyan sort, which is to provide a naturalistic scientific theory of I-language. 
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We should, though, make it clear that this assessment is an assessment of 
Lassiter’s particular sociolinguistic theory, and in particular his unwarranted and 
misguided intention of replacing the internalist project. It is perfectly possible 
that a different kind of sociolinguistics might emerge that makes explicit its 
dependence on, or its supplementary nature to, internalist inquiry. Moreover, it 
might also turn out to be the case that some of the work that is done by people 
working on language use will turn out to be grounded in phenomena that can be 
investigated within an internalist approach to language. In any case, socio-





The purpose of this paper was primarily to emphasize the methodological aspect 
of internalism. To repeat, internalists never deny that there are complicated social 
aspects in the domain of language use; they just decide not to let these 
unexplainable aspects of language use enter into their naturalistic theory at the 
present stage of inquiry: “Naturalistic inquiry is a particular human enterprise 
that seeks a special kind of understanding, attainable for humans in some few 
domains when problems can be simplified enough” (Chomsky 1995: 10). Thus, 
focusing on I-language (i.e. taking an internalist approach) is primarily a metho-
dological decision, as we have argued above. And within this domain of study, 
any I-language-external phenomena such as speakers’ intentionality and pre-
scriptive pressures by the linguistic community are of rather little interest. Thus 
internalists decide to abstract away from these complicating factors when they 
study their object of inquiry, just as physicists abstract away from various factors 
such as colors and smells when they study motion and movement of physical 
objects; an abstraction that is not a scientific necessity. We have argued that 
Lassiter’s criticism of internalism is off the point, based on the serious misrepre-
sentation of Chomsky’s position as L-individualism. Rather, the significance of 
Lassiter’s ‘contribution’, if any, lies in his demonstration that the I-language-
external conceptions of linguistic meaning might well be beyond the reach of 
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On Parametric (and Non-Parametric) Variation 
 
Neil Smith  &  Ann Law 
 
 
This article raises the issue of the correct characterization of ‘Parametric 
Variation’ in syntax and phonology. After specifying their theoretical 
commitments, the authors outline the relevant parts of the Principles–and–
Parameters framework, and draw a three-way distinction among Universal 
Principles, Parameters, and Accidents. The core of the contribution then 
consists of an attempt to provide identity criteria for parametric, as opposed 
to non-parametric, variation. Parametric choices must be antecedently 
known, and it is suggested that they must also satisfy seven individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient criteria. These are that they be cognitively 
represented, systematic, dependent on the input, deterministic, discrete, 
mutually exclusive, and irreversible. 
 
 





A persistent preoccupation of generative linguistics has been the tension, border-
ing on paradox, between two questions: “Why are there so many languages?” 
and “Why are they all so similar?”. The tension is sufficiently great that many 
writers, dazzled by the obviousness of the first, are tempted to deny the truth of 
the second: Evans & Levinson’s (2009) ‘The myth of language universals’ is a 
recent example. A resolution of the tension can be found in the framework of 
‘Principles–and–Parameters’ (Chomsky 1981a, 1981b; for overviews and history, 
see Roberts 1997, Baker 2001, and especially Biberauer 2008a), but making this 
claim plausible to the skeptics necessitates elaboration and refinement of the 
theory, in particular of the nature and scope of ‘parametric’ variation. It is this 
issue we try to address in the current contribution, suggesting identity criteria for 
parametric as opposed to non-parametric differences among languages. The 
situation is reminiscent of the debate about human types: The apparent obvious 
diversity of different ‘races’ disguises profound underlying unity, and specifying 
the nature of the variation is fraught with difficulty. In what follows we spell out 
our theoretical presuppositions, we present the elements of the Principles–and–
Parameters framework and their motivation, and we suggest and defend our 
identity criteria. 
 We take seriously the central claim of the Minimalist Program (Chomsky 
1995) that in elucidating the nature of the human faculty of language, linguistic 
theory should restrict itself to what is conceptually necessary or descriptively 
inevitable. Accordingly, we adopt Hauser et al.’s (2002) contrast between the 
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Faculty of Language in the broad sense (FLB) and the Faculty of Language in the 
narrow sense (FLN), seeking to identify defining properties of FLN, even if this 
latter may perhaps consist simply of possible re-combinations of elements of FLB. 
We have argued elsewhere against Hauser et al.’s claim that recursion is the 
unique property of FLN (see Smith & Law 2007: 2) on the grounds that recursion 
must be characteristic of the Language of Thought in Fodor’s (1975, 2008) sense. 
However, we are happy to go along with Chomsky’s (2009a: 29) suggestion that 
Natural Language is the same as the Language of Thought except for ‘externaliz-
ation’ (cf. Smith 1983). That is, language links the Conceptual–Intentional and 
Sensori–Motor interfaces, where the former equates to the language of thought 
and the latter, as used for communication (perception and production), character-
izes natural languages, which emerged evolutionarily as the result of being exter-
nalized. This external form is anyway the domain of parametric variation, the 
existence of which may moreover be a defining property of the human language 
faculty.  
 The Principles–and–Parameters framework provides simultaneously a 
solution to Plato’s problem and the problem of characterizing typological variety. 
UG (short for ‘Universal Grammar’, the innate endowment that the child brings 
to the task of language acquisition) specifies that human languages consist of a 
Lexicon and a ‘computational system’ (referred to as CHL, the computation for 
human language). The lexicon consists of a set of lexical entries, each of which is 
a triple of phonological, morpho-syntactic, and semantic features, and with a link 
to associated encyclopedic information. UG also provides a set of exceptionless 
principles, such as structure dependence (Chomsky 1971), (strict) cyclicity 
(Freidin 1999, Chomsky 2002), the Extended Projection Principle (Chomsky 1995), 
etc., which constrain the operations of the computations and act as a constraint 
on language acquisition: Children learning their first language have their ‘hypo-
thesis space’ tightly constrained with the result that they never make mistakes of 
a particular kind. However, “[…] principles do not determine the answers to all 
questions about language, but leave some questions as open parameters” 
(Berwick & Chomsky, forthcoming: 8 [in the 2008 manuscript]). 
 That is, in addition to a set of universal principles, UG provides a set of 
parameters which jointly define the limits of language variation. This is typically 
conceptualized as the setting of a number of ‘switches’ — on or off — for 
particular linguistic properties. Examples of such parameters in syntax are the 
head-direction parameter (whether heads, such as Verb, Noun, and Preposition, 
precede or follow their complement), the null-subject (or ‘pro-drop’) parameter 
(whether finite clauses can have empty pronominal subjects), and the null-deter-
miner parameter (whether noun phrases can have empty determiners). Typical 
examples in phonology are provided by the stress differences characteristic of 
English and French, and the possibility of complex consonant clusters found in 
English but not in Japanese. English stress is ‘quantity-sensitive’, whereas French 
stress is ‘quantity-insensitive’, with the result that words with the same number 
of syllables may have different stress in English but must have uniform stress in 
French; in English, words may begin with clusters of consonants in a way which 
is impossible in Japanese, with the result that English loans into Japanese appear 
with the clusters separated by epenthetic vowels. 
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 The theory thus unifies two different domains: typology and acquisition. 
Variation among the world’s languages (more accurately the set of internalized I-
languages; Chomsky 1986) is defined in terms of parametric differences and, in 
first language acquisition, the child’s task is reduced to setting the values of such 
parameters on the basis of the stimuli it is exposed to — utterances in the 
ambient language. Given the strikingly uniform success of first language acqui-
sition, it follows that “the set of possibilities [must] be narrow in range and easily 
attained by the first language learner” (Smith 2004: 83). By hypothesis, the 
principles do not vary from child to child or from language to language so, as 
Chomsky (2006: 183) puts it, “acquisition is a matter of parameter setting, and is 
therefore divorced entirely from […] the principles of UG”. 
 The theory is at once ‘internalist’ (i.e. it is a theory of states of the mind/ 
brain), pertaining to knowledge which is largely unconscious, and universalist. 
An immediate implication of this position is that the range of parametric choices 
is known in advance and, as a corollary, it claims that acquisition is largely a 
process of ‘selection’ rather than instruction (see Piattelli–Palmarini 1989) and 
that such acquisition is likely to take place in a critical period or periods.  
 This brief characterization raises a number of problems. The first of these is 
the issue of deciding which phenomena are to be accounted for by reference to 
principles and which by reference to parameters, as exemplified in the history of 
subjacency which began as a universal principle but was later parameterized. 
More importantly, does this binary choice exhaust the ontology? We argue that 
parameters account for some of the surface variability — but only some: Much 
variation is accidental. Accordingly, we need a three-way distinction: Universal 
Principles, Parameters, and Accidents. Note that even universal principles may 
have their status obscured by recalcitrant data. For instance, the universality of 
Merge is not in question even though some items — interjections — do not parti-
cipate. Similarly, a clear and classic instance of a parameter is ‘head direction’, 
even though some examples are problematic like English notwithstanding, which 
can occur before or after its complement, or the occurrence in German of synony-
mous (and etymologically related) pairs of preposition and postposition (e.g., 
längs des Flusses/ den Fluss entlang ‘along the river’). Finally, there are ‘accidents’, 
exemplified by gaps in morphological paradigms, such as the lack of a past tense 
form for beware; by the (claimed) absence of recursion in Pirahã (Everett 2005), or 
by the absence of initial consonants in Arrernte syllable structure (Breen & Pen-
salfini 1999). 
 Assignment to each of these categories may of course be problematic, with 
the uncertainty having potentially significant implications for broader consider-
ations such as innateness. Thus Chomsky (2009b: 385), in discussing the optimi-
zation of the language faculty in terms of third-factor considerations, writes: “If 
you take a parameter and you genetically fix the value, it becomes a principle 
[…]. So adding parameters is reducing genetic information”. This stance is 
similar to Janet Fodor’s (2009) characterization of principles and parameters as a 
Minimax solution: ‘minimize genetic information’ and ‘maximize/optimize the 
amount of learning’.  
 Reverting to the remarks above about Natural Language and the Language 
of Thought and the assumption that the syntax of both is the same (but see Smith 
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2004: 43f. for problems with this position), it is clear that “parameterization and 
diversity too would be mostly — maybe entirely — restricted to externalization” 
(Chomsky, in press: 14 [2008 manuscript]; to “language shorn of the properties of 
the sound system” as Smith 2004: 43 puts it), hence mainly morphology and pho-
nology. One reason for the multiplicity of languages is then that “the problem of 
externalization can be solved in many different and independent ways” 
(Chomsky, in press: 15 [2008 manuscript]), where, moreover, these may all be 
‘optimal’ in different ways. The interesting implication is that there is no para-
metric variation at the Conceptual–Intentional interface (but see below) and per-
haps not even any parametric variation in the syntax narrowly construed (CHL). 
 Despite these observations, we propose for illustrative purposes to pursue 
with the majority of linguists the possibility that parametric variation (hereafter 
‘PV’) characterizes both syntax and phonology. Further, if there is to be any 
content to the ‘parametric’ part of PV, there is need to work out necessary and 
sufficient conditions for something to count as parametric. That is, we are in 
explicit opposition to those such as Kayne (2005: 6 and elsewhere), Manzini & 
Savoia (2007), and Rita Manzini (p.c.), for whom all (syntactic) variation is para-
metric. We reject this stance because of the need to constrain possible parameters. 
In the absence of such constraints “the term ‘parameter’ would end up being 
nothing but jargon for ‘language-particular rule’” (Newmeyer 2005: 53) or, as 
Moro (2008: 107) puts it: “If there were no restrictive generalization on the format 
of parameters, the theory would be too weak”. 
 Before suggesting such restrictions, it is important to note that the nature of 
the identity criteria, even the possibility of coming up with any, is dependent on 
the version of Principles–and–Parameters theory that one adopts. There are 
several possibilities available in the literature. First, as seen in Rizzi’s (2009: 95–
96) discussion, there is a conceptual contrast between theories which indulge in 
overspecification (where UG contains specific statements for certain choices, 
which must be fixed by experience) and those which indulge in under-
specification (where UG has nothing to say — there are gaps, to be filled by 
experience; cf.: “UG limits the space of possible hypothes[e]s, but does nothing 
more” (Nevins 2004: 121)). 
 Second, this distinction cross-cuts that between macro-parametric and 
micro-parametric variation (for discussion see Baker 2008). ‘Macro’-PV is 
typically exemplified by the head-direction (head-first/head-last) parameter 
(Chomsky 1981a) or Baker’s (1996) polysynthesis parameter which determines 
the overall morphological structure of the language. Each of these parameters has 
a wide variety of effects, whereas ‘micro’-PV of the sort exemplified by the choice 
of auxiliary to accompany unaccusative verbs (Perlmutter 1978, Burzio 1986) or 
case realignment in Albanian causatives (Manzini & Savoia 2007) is characteristi-
cally more restricted and has correspondingly fewer repercussions. An emerging 
consensus seems to be that the ‘macro/micro’ contrast is not important: “The 
extent-of-variation question is not well defined or theoretically very interesting” 
(Baker 2008: 371). We agree, though we wish to argue that the parametric/non-
parametric distinction is important both in syntax and in the phonological 
domain where there is no comparable macro-micro contrast. There is, third, the 
related issue of whether parameters pertain to principles, as in Chomsky’s 
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original proposal (Chomsky 1981b) or the later, widely accepted, ‘Borer–
Chomsky Conjecture’ (cf. Biberauer 2008a) that all (syntactic) parameters refer to 
features of functional heads in the lexicon, so that the number of parameters cor-
responds to the size of the functional lexicon. While we are sympathetic to the 
restriction implied by the conjecture its apparent irrelevance to phonology makes 
it less central to our concerns. 
 At a lower level of abstraction we come, fourth, to the domain or locus of 
parametric variation. Biberauer (2008a: 32) suggests that the locus of parameters 
is “the Lexicon and one or more of the Interfaces”. We are anxious that our 
identity criteria should pertain to phonology as well as syntax and if, despite the 
remarks about externalization above, it proves that there are relevant examples, 
to semantic choices at the C–I interface (cf. Chierchia 1998), so we are happy to 
follow this suggestion. At a finer level of detail, Rizzi (2009: 213ff.) observes that 
syntactic parameters, located within the lexicon, may pertain to any of the three 
basic computational processes of the syntax: Merge (e.g., head direction), Move 
(e.g., V to T), and Spell-Out (e.g., Null-subject). Again, there is no obvious phono-
logical counterpart to this taxonomy. 
 There are many other considerations which are not directly relevant to our 
concerns or about which we have nothing to contribute. For instance, Nevins 
(2004: 123) argues on the basis of ‘parametric ambiguity’1 that “variation is the 
result of maintaining multiple parameter settings simultaneously” (cf. Yang 
2002). We are suspicious of this position as it looks like a conceptually undesir-
able version of ‘multiple grammars’ (for discussion, see Smith, in press). 
 We turn now to the main concern of the article: Suggesting, illustrating, 
and defending a number of criteria which variation has to meet to count as para-
metric rather than accidental. 
 The theory of PV hypothesizes that the range of choices is ‘antecedently 
known’, and this basic property correlates with a number of others which 
distinguish PV from non-parametric variation, and allow us to provide identity 
criteria for it. Being antecedently known may not be as straightforward as we 
have previously (Smith & Law 2007, in press) assumed. There is both a termino-
logical and a substantive issue. Chomsky (2009b: 395) observes that in many 
languages the expression used for ‘knowing a language’ does not involve the 
word ‘know’, but rather the equivalent of ‘come’, ‘hear’, or ‘have’. This has pro-
bably underlain some of the philosophical dispute about whether knowledge of 
language, in the sense of competence, constitutes real knowledge or not, but this 
terminological concern is of minor importance in the present context. The sub-
stantive issue is whether ‘antecedently known’ entails cognitively ‘represented’ 
or could refer simply to ‘architectural’ (third factor) constraints on the hypothesis 
space. The strongest position is that all options are laid out — so ‘represented’ — 
prior to experience and whatever abilities the child brings to the task of first 
language acquisition are deployed to select among them. The weaker, archi-
tectural, position may be preferable if it allows properties of the language faculty 
to be derived from more general considerations.  
                                                
    1  This refers to the situation where several analyses or structures could underlie the data of 
interest. 
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 Whichever position is correct, we take our first criterion to be that variants 
licensed by parametric choice must be cognitively represented. To make clear 
what motivates this condition, consider by contrast acclimatization, specifically 
sweating. We have a critical period for setting our sweating switch: Experiencing 
hot and humid weather in the first three years of life leads to a different setting 
from exposure to different conditions, and these settings cannot be significantly 
altered thereafter (Gluckman & Hanson 2005: 7). Despite a certain superficial 
similarity, this is not PV because the different states are not (mentally) repre-
sented and have no cognitive effects. Further, it is relevant to note that where 
there is evidence that some linguistic fact is not represented there is also evidence 
that this is not a domain of PV. For instance, Smith (2003, in press) claims that the 
learning child does not represent its own mispronounced output (e.g., saying 
[bɔkəl] for bottle), but equally such mispronunciation does not constitute the 
locus of PV. 
 This leads to our second criterion: systematicity. This is implicit in Moro’s 
(2008: 106) remark that the relevant domain is one where variation is “minimal 
and systematic”; or equivalently, to what Biberauer (2008a: 2) describes as ‘non-
random’ variation. A simple example is provided by irregular morphology of the 
type exemplified by the impossibility of *amn’t in (most varieties of) English, or 
the kind of defective paradigm seen in Latin vis–vim–vi. We do not consider this 
to be PV because it is by definition not systematic and hence we could not 
plausibly acquire knowledge of it by any process of triggering in the way which 
is plausible for systematic contrasts such as the possibility of null determiners or 
the absence of codas. Although systematicity and ‘potentially triggered’ may be 
extensionally the same the two notions are conceptually distinct so need to be 
kept separate, but we link them under a single criterion. 
 Our third criterion is dependence on the input; that is, the variant chosen 
must correspond to a possible state of the adult language, and hence can be 
illustrated most clearly from first language acquisition. The head-direction 
parameter clearly reflects properties of the ambient language in a way that is not 
characteristic of all variation. An example of systematic but input-independent 
and non-parametric variation is provided by the individual differences in 
consonant harmony in phonological development (cf. Smith 1973: 163), or the 
variation in the choice of initial or final negation in syntactic development (cf. 
Smith 2005: 29). For instance, two children in essentially the same environment 
may produce the adult duck as [gʌk] and [dʌt] respectively. These may both be 
manifestations of consonant harmony, but they do not count as PV because the 
particular variants chosen appear to be independent of the input (and consonant 
harmony is anyway essentially alien to adult phonology). A comparable syntactic 
example is provided by the development of negation. All children typically go 
through a stage in which the negator is peripheral, either initial or final. Indivi-
dual children then differ such that one child learning English may say ‘no like 
cabbage’ and another ‘like cabbage no’. We take such variation to be non-parametric 
as no language allows only such peripheral negation. This universal exclusion 
enables us to differentiate this non-parametric variation from UG-licensed errors 
of the sort described by Crain and his colleagues (cf. Crain & Pietroski 2002). A 
child may produce a form which never occurs in the input (e.g., ‘What do you 
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think what pigs eat?’) because the structure is licensed by UG and so occurs as a 
parametric choice in other languages.2 Despite this potential complication, the 
case of consonant harmony in phonology and negation in syntax should make 
the conceptual contrast between parametric and non-parametric variation clear.  
 Our fourth criterion is that PV must be deterministic:3 That is, the input to 
the child must be rich enough and explicit enough to guarantee that a parameter 
such as pro-drop or the presence of complex onsets in phonology can be set. If the 
input does not meet this requirement we are dealing with non-parametric 
variation. A syntactic example is provided by sequence of tense phenomena 
where individual variation verges on the random (see Smith & Cormack 2002). A 
phonological example is provided by Yip (2003: 804) who argues that some 
speakers treat a post-consonantal glide as a secondary articulation of the conso-
nant, others as a segment in its own right: “[T]he rightful home of /y/ [is] under-
determined by the usual data, leaving room for variation”. Her conclusion is that 
“speakers opt for different structures in the absence of conclusive evidence for 
either”. Again that indicates for us that the variation is non-parametric. Determi-
nisticness suggests that the process of parameter-setting must be ‘reflexive’ (cf. 
Chomsky 2009b: 384) but, as with systematicity and triggering, the notions are 
conceptually distinct so we keep them apart, though again not as separate 
criteria. 
 Our fifth criterion is suggested by an observation of Dupoux & Jacob 
(2007) to the effect that PV in language is ‘discrete’ (usually binary), whereas in 
other domains — moral judgment, for instance — one typically finds continuous 
scales. A linguistic example of the contrast is provided by vowel height. Whether 
a language displays 2, 3, or 4 degrees of vowel height in its phonological system 
is a matter of parametric choice(s). The degree to which the particular articulation 
of some vowel is high — either randomly or as a matter of individual difference 
(maybe my articulations of [i] are systematically higher than yours) is continuous 
and could not be parametric.  
 Our sixth criterion is ‘exclusivity’. PV gives rise to mutually exclusive 
possibilities: Languages are either [+pro-drop] or [–pro-drop] — the choice leaves 
no room for compromise, no language is both. By contrast, the choice in a [+pro-
drop] language of using or not using a subject pronoun is non-parametric. The 
contrast is again most obvious with morality where moral diversity involves 
“different preference orderings among competing members of a finite set of 
universal moral values” (Dupoux & Jacob 2007: 377). An extension of mutual 
exclusivity would be that the choices are exhaustive in that they exhaust the 
relevant hypothesis space interdependently. That is, the parameters are not 
independent (as claimed explicitly in e.g., Manzini & Wexler 1987) but are 
hierarchically nested: The choice of a parameter [±X], gives rise to a range of 
further choices within each of [+X] and [–X], and apparent exceptions to 
exclusivity are due to choices being either subordinate or parallel to a given 
parameter. We do not make this (non-)independence criterial as we know of no 
                                                
    2  We take it that such over-generalization is a sign that the child has, temporarily, mis-set the 
relevant parameter. 
    3  Compare Nevins’ (2004: 120) approving remark that his (multiple-precedence) view of redu-
plication “yields a deterministic output”. 
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cogent evidence either for or against. Similarly, although the phrasing used here 
in terms of [±X] suggests binarity, which is often presupposed in terms of 
[strong/weak] in the literature (see e.g., Radford et al. 2009: 314), we see no 
reason to make this essential. 
 A possible further seventh criterion is ‘irreversibility’: That is, the putative 
impossibility of the re-setting of parameters in second language acquisition (see 
e.g., Tsimpli & Smith 1991). The implicit contrast is with the reversible variations 
found in lexical learning. For instance, despite half a century’s exposure to 
examples like “I didn’t see him yet”, one of us (NS) still judges them ungramma-
tical (the only licit possibility is “I haven’t seen him yet”). This is in contrast to 
examples like the second sentence of this article, written without malice afore-
thought, which begins: “The tension is sufficiently great that many writers […]”. 
This construction was originally ungrammatical for NS (the only licit possibility 
being “The tension is sufficiently great for many writers to have […]”) but has 
now changed its status. The former contrast is arguably a matter of PV, the latter 
not.  
 We summarize and illustrate the foregoing criteria in the following table: 
 






consonant harmony  




irregular morphology  
3.  Choices must be dependent on the input and hence correspond to a possible 
state of the adult language 
Parametric 
quantity-sensitivity 
word order — head direction 
Non-parametric 
consonant harmony 
word order in early negation  
4. Choices must be deterministic 
Parametric  
pro-drop 
complex onsets in phonology  
Non-parametric 
sequence of tense  
Post-consonantal glides 
5. Choices must be discrete 
Parametric 
number of vowel heights 
Non-parametric 
realization of vowel height 




choice of a pronoun (or not) in a pro-
drop language 
7.  Choices must be irreversible  
Parametric 
temporal adverbial modification 
Non-parametric 
sub-categorization possibilities 
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 A number — a huge number — of issues remain open. We list a few below: 
 
(1) We have in general not committed ourselves to where the parametric choices 
reside. It is not clear whether there is a single answer, but we assume in the 
absence of definitive evidence that all such choices are lexical. 
 
(2) It would be helpful to determine which of these criteria might derive from 
other properties, bearing in mind that nothing so derivable would be part of 
FLN. In particular, it is desirable to establish which criteria (e.g., deter-
ministicness and mutual exclusivity) might fall out from general properties of 
complex cognitive systems (‘third-factor’ considerations, where these include 
general learning strategies and principles of computational efficiency’, as in 
Chomsky, in press: 15 [2008 manuscript]).4 An example in principle is provided 
by the head-direction parameter. It seems clear that the choice between head-first 
and head-last is a function of the need for linearization imposed by the temporal 
structure of speech. Given that ‘merge’ combines A and B it is physically neces-
sary either that A precede B or that B precede A. In such a situation, as Boeckx 
(2009: 198) observes, appeal to a parameter may be supererogatory. Two points 
are, however, relevant. First, the physical necessity for linearization may be the 
ultimate cause of the parameter but the skew distribution of the world’s lang-
uages and the consistency of head direction within a language suggest that the 
parameter does exist: The physical constraint has led to grammaticalization of the 
parameter. Second, although this parameter has a ‘third factor’ motivation it is 
only one example and not a criterion for parameterhood whose status is affected. 
For plausible instances of a criterion being rendered unnecessary we probably 
need to look elsewhere. We leave the issue for future research. 
 
(3) In earlier work (Smith 2007; Smith & Law 2007, in press) we have investigated 
whether the criteria for parametric status allow a generalization to other 
domains, either human or animal, suggesting that our knowledge of music and 
our moral judgment might be such examples in the former domain, and birdsong 
in the latter. We are currently less sanguine about the possibility.  
 
 The preceding discussion implies that many of the parameters postulated 
in the literature are, by our criteria, accidents rather than reflecting genuine, but 
not exceptionless, generalizations. We have already alluded to some of the work 
of Kayne and Manzini, and Evans & Levinson (2009: 432) explicitly assume that 
parameters account for all differences: The ‘full set of possible combinations’. 
Our attempt to delineate criteria for PV should not in any way be taken to 
impugn the value of the work of these authors, but we think it is time for the 
theory to be put on a more explicit footing. We await corroboration or refutation 
of our putative criteria with anticipation and apprehension in equal measure. 
                                                
    4  Though we are skeptical of the claim that “[t]o externalize the internally generated expres-
sion ‘what John is eating what’, it would be necessary to pronounce ‘what’ twice, and that 
turns out to place a very considerable burden on computation” (Berwick & Chomsky, 
forthcoming: 11 [in the 2008 manuscript]). The burden seems slight, especially given that in 
first language acquisition children regularly repeat material ‘unnecessarily’ (see the 
examples from Crain & Pietroski 2002 above). 
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On Multidominance and Linearization  
 
Mark de Vries 
 
 
This article centers around two questions: What is the relation between 
movement and structure sharing, and how can complex syntactic structures 
be linearized? It is shown that regular movement involves internal remerge, 
and sharing or ‘sideward movement’ external remerge. Without ad hoc restric-
tions on the input, both options follow from Merge. They can be represented 
in terms of multidominance. Although more structural freedom ensues than 
standardly thought, the grammar is not completely unconstrained: Argu-
ably, proliferation of roots is prohibited. Furthermore, it is explained why 
external remerge has somewhat different consequences than internal re-
merge. For instance, apparent non-local behavior is attested. At the PF inter-
face, the linearization of structures involving remerge is non-trivial. A cen-
tral problem is identified, apart from the general issue why remerged mater-
ial is only pronounced once: There are seemingly contradictory linearization 
demands for internal and external remerge. This can be resolved by taking 
into account the different structural configurations. It is argued that the line-
arization is a PF procedure involving a recursive structure scanning algo-
rithm that makes use of the inherent asymmetry between sister nodes im-
posed by the operation of Merge. 
 
 






1. Introduction and Overview 
 
Displacement is one of the central tenets in generative grammar. The underlying 
idea is that a word or phrase may be involved in more than one relationship; 
therefore, it can be associated with a sentence position where it does not surface. 
A simple example in English is wh-movement, such as illustrated in (1): 
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(1) a. This talented girl should purchase a new violin. 
 b. Which violin should this talented girl purchase ___? 
 
The unmarked direct object position in English is shown in (1a), where it is 
occupied by a new violin. This phrase is categorically and semantically selected by 
the verb purchase. In (1b), the preposed object which violin is thought to be related 
to the regular direct object position next to the main verb as well, here indicated 
by an underscore. How does the grammar make sure that the object is pro-
nounced in the higher, operator-related position (leftmost), and not in the lower, 
thematic position (rightmost)? A fairly standard approach in generative grammar 
has been the assumption that movement is hierarchically directional, and that a 
moved phrase leaves an unpronounced trace in the original lower position. In 
current minimalist theories, specialized traces no longer exist (this follows from 
the Inclusiveness condition proposed by Chomsky 1995: 225). From the pers-
pective of a bottom-up derivation, it seems that we must make sure that the first 
occurrence of the relevant phrase (here, which violin) remains phonologically 
silent if, after movement, there will be a second, higher occurrence of it. Clearly, 
then, the linearization of a sentence structure is a non-trivial process taking place 
at the interface between syntax and phonology. This article is an attempt to 
explicate that process, and its preconditions. 
 An interesting complication is that there appear to be constructions that 
essentially show the opposite pattern, though not exactly in a mirror fashion. A 
relevant example is the so-called Right Node Raising (RNR) construction. In (2), 
this beautiful Stradivarius is the object of admired as well as bought, but here only 
the rightmost occurrence is spelled out, contrary to the situation in (1b). 
 
(2) The boy only admired ___, but the girl actually bought this beautiful 
Stradivarius. 
 
Though I do not think that there is rightward or lowering movement, there are 
reasons to believe that phrases can be structurally shared, which could be repre-
sented by a multidominance configuration (this will be explained below). The 
questions we then face are the following: 
 
(Q1) How are sharing configurations derived, and what is the theoretical re-
lationship with movement? 
(Q2) When and how does the linearization procedure operate, and how does it 
distinguish between the two different construction types illustrated by (1b) 
and (2), respectively? 
 
 In section 2, I argue that a freely applicable operation Merge gives rise to 
the possibility of both internal remerge and external remerge. The concept of move-
ment corresponds to the first, and that of sharing to the second. I should mention 
right away that this article is not about the correct analysis of RNR, wh-move-
ment, or any other particular construction still to be mentioned. Rather, I intend 
to explore the theoretical consequences of remerge. References to particular 
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analyses are used for concreteness’ sake, and serve as illustrations, mainly. 
 Since the syntactic configurations arising by applying the two types of 
remerge are different, the linearization procedure can be made sensitive to it. 
This is the subject of section 3, which presents a solution to the seemingly 
contradictory linearization demands briefly introduced here. It is claimed that 
linearization involves the scanning (traversal) of a full sentence structure. 
Various complicated construction types are examined. Section 4 presents a more 
detailed graph scanning algorithm, and discusses the computational load of such 
a procedure, taking into account the difference between representations and the 
actual theoretical assumptions. Finally, section 5 is the conclusion. 
 
 
2. Internal and External Remerge 
 
2.1. The Operation Merge: Input and Output 
 
The input for Merge, which I assume to be binary (following standard as-
sumptions dating back to Kayne 1984), is restricted to objects recognizable by 
syntax, that is, words and phrases — or rather the features associated with these. 
Nevertheless, judging from general minimalist practice since Chomsky (1995), 
the selection of these objects must be free with respect to their location or history. 
There are three possibilities, two of which are logically necessary if Merge is the 
only structure-building device. First, input objects for Merge can be selected from 
the lexicon or ‘numeration’. Of course, syntax would be idle without subject 
matter. Second, the result of a previous instance of Merge can be selected as the 
input for a subsequent instance of Merge. This corresponds to the general 
hierarchical aspect of syntax. Without the recursive application of Merge, objects 
more complex than two words could never be derived. Non-trivial objects are 
created in the syntactic workspace. It is not only the active structure itself that is 
complex after first Merge: Auxiliary structures are also necessary. For example, 
subjects and adverbial phrases are often complex (notice that even a simple noun 
phrase like the man counts as such, as it consists of more than one element). If 
they are to be attached to the main projection line, they must have been derived 
already in an auxiliary derivation.  
 The third possibility is fairly standard as well, though not undisputed. Let 
us assume that there is such a thing as displacement, as indicated in the intro-
duction. Displacement from a derivational perspective implies that a constituent 
(‘term’) of a derived structure is accessible as a possible input object for another 
instance of Merge. It follows that a syntactic object can be merged more than 
once. In this way, we account for the fact that syntactic objects can be involved in 
more than one relationship, associated with different positions in the structure. 
Here, it is presupposed that grammatical relationships are a direct or indirect 
function of Merge, and hence of structure. This is a central insight of generative 
grammar, and I will not question it. 
 To sum up, three differently situated kinds of objects may serve as input 
for Merge: (i) lexical items, (ii) complex items that are the result of previous 
instances of Merge, (iii) terms of complex items. The option in (iii) normally 
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corresponds to what is often called Move (Chomsky 1995). However, it is impor-
tant to see that there is only one basic operation, Merge. Depending on the input, 
the result may be Move. If Move involves the creation of traces or copies with 
special properties, it would constitute a separate, complex operation. However, 
according to minimalist reasoning, this cannot be a priori assumed. In recent 
work, Chomsky refers to iii) as internal merge, as opposed to external merge for (i) 
and (ii), stressing that the possibility of movement simply follows from Merge 
(Chomsky 2001a). One could also say that the distinction is between (first-time) 
merge and remerge (that is, Merge again). The first, merge, is inevitably external. 
But is remerge always internal? Standardly, this is tacitly assumed. However, it 
does not in any way follow from the definition of Merge, or from the boundary 
conditions mentioned so far. This will become clear in a moment. 
 The essence of Merge is that it is structure-building. It combines units into a 
larger unit, which then constitutes a new root. In accordance with the two usual 
boundary conditions, it combines two distinct syntactic objects (say, A and B) 
into a new, larger unit (C), which, by definition, is then also a syntactic object. Let 
us notate this as Merge (A, B) → C, which is an operation resulting in the possible 
representation [C A B]. If we go on merging C with an external D (lexical or 
complex), we create another syntactic object, call it E: Merge (D, C) → E, resulting 
in [E D [C A B]]. If instead we merge a term of C, say B, with the root C again, we 
create a movement configuration by internal remerge: Merge (B, C) → E, giving  
[E B [C A B]], where B has now two sisters (that is, Merge-mates), namely both A 
and C. We are used to calling the lowest B a copy, but this is misleading: Nothing 
in the syntactic system distinguishes the two Bs in the representation (unless 
further, complicating assumptions are made). In fact, there is no second B to 
begin with. There is just one B that is involved in two relationships created by 
Merge. The two Bs are an artifact of the representation. A less misleading way of 
representing the result of the two mergers under discussion is the multi-
dominance representation in (3), although it has the disadvantage of being 
graphically a little awkward. Notice that we can picture B in its first-merge 
position, in its Spell-Out position, or in fact anywhere else on the paper: 
 
(3)  Merge (A, B) → C 
  Merge (B, C) → E 




See also Epstein et al. (1998), Starke (2001), Gärtner (2002), Zhang (2004), and 
Frampton (2004), among others, for further arguments against the copying view 
of displacement.1 For earlier discussion of similar ideas, see Sampson (1975), 
Karlgren (1976), McCawley (1982), Peters & Richie (1982), Engdahl (1986), Huck 
& Ojeda (1987), Blevins (1990). What should be clear is that the assumption of 
                                               
    1 From a completely different perspective, Karttunen & Kay (1985) warn that the amount of 
computational effort that goes into producing copies is much greater than the cost of 
‘unification’ (that is, multidominance) when a graph is being parsed. For this reason, they 
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copies would require theoretical machinery in addition to the operation Merge 
per se. A different matter is how the phonological interface interprets the result in 
(3); this will be discussed in detail in section 3. 
 Movement, as we saw, involves remerge, that is, a syntactic object that has been 
merged before, is merged again. If a previously merged object α is selected as 
input for Merge, and if the other input object is the root R from which α has been 
selected, this instance of remerge can be called internal. However, as announced 
before, this does not exhaust the possibilities: α can in principle be remerged with 
an independent syntactic object, that is, an object that is not R and not embedded 
in R. This is what I will call external remerge; see (4).2  
 
(4) For some constituent α embedded in root R: 
 a. internal remerge =def remerge α with R; 
 b. external remerge =def remerge α outside R  
  (i.e., with some root β not included in R). 
 
Crucially, there is just one operation Merge; labels such as internal remerge are just 
names for the different situations caused by selecting different input objects. This 
is expressed in (5): 
 
(5) Merge (α, β) → γ constitutes 
 a. first-time merge iff α and β are independent roots before merger; 
 b. internal remerge iff β is a root and α is included in β (or the other way 
around) before merger; 
 c. external remerge iff β is included in some root δ, and α is an 
independent root (or the other way around) before merger.  
 
Notice that heads introduced from lexicon or numeration are (trivial) roots before 
they are merged. For discussion concerning the strict cycle, I refer to section 2.3.. 
 Although external remerge leads to unconventional structures (see further 
below), I must be stressed that the possibility of this operation simply follows 
from the combination of two independently motivated options: The selection of 
external material as input for Merge (needed for the introduction of lexical 
material), and the selection of terms (needed for regular movement); see also de 
Vries (2005c) and van Riemsdijk (2006a). It is of course possible to impose stricter 
boundary conditions on the input for Merge. For instance, the input could be 
restricted to roots. The consequence of this would be that remerge is excluded 
altogether (including regular movement). This point of view is defended in 
                                               
    2 As far as I know, Barbara Citko, Henk van Riemsdijk, and I myself first published basically 
equivalent ideas around 2005, independently of each other, and with somewhat differing 
terminology. In fact, it was predated by a remark in Wilder (1999), and of course inspired by 
earlier work on interarboreal movement, among others (see further below in the main text). 
It is perhaps worth mentioning that Chomsky (2007: 8, fn. 10) does not seem to agree: “[Ex-
ternal remerge] requires new operations and conditions on what counts as a copy”. Further 
explanation is lacking, and frankly, I fail to see why this would be so. Moreover, the ob-
jection is invalid from the present perspective, since a copying mechanism was rejected to 
begin with. 




Koster (2007), among others.3 The grammar would then be more restricted, but at 
the cost of an additional rule. If the familiar internal remerge is to be allowed, but 
the unorthodox external remerge to be excluded, more specific additional 
conditions must be formulated. However, it may be interesting to put off such 
stipulations, and allow for remerge in general. Here, I will follow this track, and 
explore some of the consequences. 
 Several possible interpretations of what can now be recognized as external 
remerge have been proposed in the literature. These include ‘interarboreal 
movement’ (Bobaljik 1995, Bobaljik & Brown 1997), ‘sideward movement’ (Nunes 
2001), ‘multidominance/multidomination/multiple dominance’ (McCawley 
1982, Ojeda 1987, Blevins 1990, Wilder 1999, Chen–Main 2006, Johnson 2007, 
Bachrach & Katzir 2009), ‘sharing’ (Guimarães 2004, Chung 2004, de Vries 2005b, 
Gracanin–Yuksek 2007), ‘grafting’ (van Riemsdijk 1998, 2006a), and ‘parallel 
merge’ (Citko 2005). Furthermore, external remerge is allowed in some way or 
another in many theories involving ‘parallel structures’ (Williams 1978, Goodall 
1987, Mu’adz 1991, G. de Vries 1992, Moltmann 1992, Grootveld 1994, te Velde 
1997). See also Carnie (2008) for a brief overview. I cannot do justice to all these 
proposals, but the two central ideas that are relevant here are pictured in (6). 
Notice that (6a) equals (6a’), and (6b) equals (6b’); apparent differences are only 
due to the position of the independent two-legged mini-structures on the paper: 
 












In (6a/a’), B is moved to an independent structure. Let us provisionally call this 
iMove (short for interstructural movement). This iMove is different from tradi-
tional (rightward or leftward) movement, which involves movement to a 
position within or at the top of the same structure. In (6b/b’), B is shared between 
two structures. Let us call this mDom (short for a hydraic — that is, multi-rooted 
— multiple dominance configuration), which, like internal remerge as in (3), 
involves giving up the ‘single mother condition’ used in previous frameworks 
                                               
    3 Koster (2007) argues against ‘internal [re]Merge’, and in favor of a generalized application of 
pied piping; in the case of displacement, the properties of a gap are pied-piped along the 
projection line up to the point where the relevant constituent is base-merged (and 
pronounced). This proposal bears resemblance to ideas current in HPSG, and related 
frameworks; see, for example, Sag & Fodor (1994). Another take on the issue is put forward 
by Blevins (1990), who eliminates movement by treating order as completely independent 
from hierarchical structure; this is inspired by earlier work by Sampson (1975) and Mc-
Cawley (1968, 1982).  
A  (Bi/ti) 
C 
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(see Sampson 1975); in a derivational framework, it also involves giving up the 
‘single root condition’ — at least during the derivation (see further section 2.3). 
However, if structures are derived by Merge, all representations in (6) are 
derived by the following two applications of Merge: 
 
(7) a. Merge (A, B) → C 
 b. Merge (B, D) → E 
 
In (7a), B is merged with A, which gives C. In (7b), B is remerged with D, which 
gives E. Since D is not related to C (the root), the step in (7b) is an instance of 
external remerge. Thus, the perhaps surprising conclusion must be that it is only 
the notation that suggests a difference between iMove and mDom, captured as 
external remerge: iMove = mDom. 
 Without further assumptions (such as special properties of copies/traces 
and chains, which we must reject a priori until strong independent evidence to 
the contrary comes up, pace Nunes 2001 and others), iMove is actually equivalent 
to mDom. The representations in (6) are just that: More or less successful repre-
sentations of certain theoretical concepts. What is ‘real’ is that Merge creates basic 
relationships between syntactic objects: Grammatical inclusion and grammatical 
sisterhood (see section 4 for further discussion). A graph that represents such 
relationships has no independent theoretical status. See also de Vries (2009b) on 
the issue of notation in syntax, including an unorthodox proposal. Furthermore, I 
would like to stress that multidominance is independent of multidimensionality 
(e.g., ‘3D grammar’), despite some suggestive descriptions in the literature. An 
additional syntactic dimension, in my view, would imply the assumption of an 
additional basic relationship (next to dominance or sisterhood); see also Groot-
veld (1994).4 
 In (7), there is only one B, and this B is engaged in two basic ‘triads’, if I 
may borrow an expression from Koster (2007). A triad is the minimum amount of 
structure, equivalent to what is created by one instance of Merge. Thus, Merge (α, 
β) → γ relates α, β and γ such that α and β are directly included in γ, and α is the 
grammatical sister of β. The advantage of using multidominance graphs as in (6) 
is that they represent the fact that some node (here, B) is involved in a double set 
of basic relationships, without suggesting that this node itself is magically multi-
plied. The mDom notation, therefore, can be used to represent remerge in gener-
al, and I will stick to it in the remainder of this article. 
 
2.2. Potential Examples of External Remerge 
 
In section 2.3, I will address the status of the strict cycle and some other 
theoretical issues, but first let me provide some concrete examples of sentence 
                                               
    4 Such proposals exist for both parenthesis and coordination (see also de Vries 2005a, 2007, 
2009b for discussion and further references, some of which are mentioned in the main text). 
Strict definitions aside, it seems clear that all four combinations of [±3D] and [±mDom] 
occur: There are ‘parallel structures’ with and without ‘sharing’, and there may be remerge 
in regular hypotactic configurations as well. See the next subsection for some examples of 
the <+, +> pattern. 
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structures that may involve external remerge.  
 A by now almost classic case is RNR (or backward conjunction reduction). 
A simple example is provided in (8): 
 
(8) John admires ___, but Jill hates Bush. 
 
The implied object in the first conjunct is Bush. McCawley (1982) proposed that 
this construction can be analyzed by allowing a constituent to be shared between 
two conjuncts, as is depicted in (9) — my example, with a simplified sentence 













Although it is has not remained uncontested (see Postal 1998, Sabbagh 2007, Ha 
2008a, 2008b), the idea of applying multidominance to RNR has been picked up 
and defended by several authors, for instance, Ojeda (1987), G. de Vries (1992), 
Wilder (1999, 2008), Chung (2004), de Vries (2005b), Chen–Main (2006), Johnson 
(2007), Kluck (2007, 2009), Bachrach & Katzir (2009), and Kluck & de Vries (to 
appear). Even though it is cast in different frameworks and stages of general 
syntactic theory, the basic idea is still the same. From the present perspective, we 
would say that the derivation of (9) involves merger of the NP Bush with one of 
the verbs, and then it remerges with the other verb.5 Temporarily, this leads to a 
doubly-rooted structure, but since the two conjuncts are united at the top, the 
problem is resolved. (I will return to this.) 
 The reason for treating RNR in this special way is that it behaves 
differently from forward ellipsis/deletion, and also from regular movement and 
extraposition. For instance, RNR is apparently insensitive to island conditions 
(see Neijt 1979 and Hartmann 2000, among others; see also below), and it is im-
mune to the Head condition on remnants (Fiengo 1974, Wilder 1997). Both pro-
perties fall out naturally from a multidominance approach. Trivially, since there 
is no ellipsis, there are no remnants, so the head condition does not apply, as 
                                               
    5 A concern for a theory in which an argument can be shared is that the relevant DP is 
assigned a theta-role twice (or more). It is conceivable that this is only allowed if these theta-
roles are identical. Indeed, it is hard to imagine acceptable instances of RNR involving 
semantically different types of arguments. Thus, the matching effect induced by structure 
sharing may in fact serve as an explanation of certain parallelism requirements in reduced 
coordinated clauses. Notice that the situation is different in amalgams (see below); here, 
what is shared functions as a predicate in the interrupting clause, so the issue of a double 
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required. Furthermore, no matter how deeply embedded the shared constituent 
is (here, the NP Bush), it is locally related to each sister (here, the two verbs). That 
is, the multidominance connection creates a kind of bypass (see also section 2.4). 
For more discussion concerning RNR per se, see Kluck & de Vries (to appear) and 
the references mentioned. 
 Other constructions that qualify for external remerge are wh-amalgams and 
cleft-amalgams, as discussed in Guimarães (2004) and Kluck (2008), based on 
earlier work in Lakoff (1974), van Riemsdijk (1998), and Tsubomoto & Whitman 
(2000) — pace Zwart (2006b) and Grosu (2006). These are illustrated in (10a) and 
(10b), respectively. 
 
(10) a. Jack gave [you will never guess which girl] a flower. 
 b. Jack gave [I think it was his girlfriend] a flower. 
 
Here, the interrupting clause between brackets gives rise to a bracketing paradox, 
since the content kernel in italics is also part of the main clause. A multidominance 






The content kernel is dominated by a projection of the main clause as well as the 
interrupting clause. The latter is inserted as a parenthetical in the main clause 
(Kluck, in progress, contra Guimarães 2004; see also de Vries 2009b). The details 
need not concern us here; what is relevant is that the shared constituent needs to 
be externally remerged.  
 Another construction that has been argued to involve sharing is Across-
the-Board (ATB) movement; see Williams (1978), Goodall (1987), Citko (2005), 
Mayr & Schmitt (2009), among others. A standard example is (12): 
 
(12) Which man does John admire ___ but Bill hate ___? 
 
The idea is that prior to wh-movement the relevant constituent (here, the object 
which man) is shared between positions within two or more conjoined clauses 
(IPs); see (13): 
 
main clause content kernel    (…) 
[ interrupting clause        (…) ] 
























This structure is derived by externally remerging the object from one VP to the 
other; after that, both conjuncts are completed and joined by means of a coordi-
nation phrase;6 finally, the CP level is added, and regular wh-movement takes 
place. Thus, the ATB-construction combines external and internal remerge. In 
section 3 it is discussed how it must be linearized. 
 Let me list some further, interesting proposals that involve externally re-
merged material (for the record, I am not personally committed to all of these). In 
chronological order: 
 
  — van Riemsdijk (1998, 2006b) on transparent free relatives, where the content 
kernel (the predicate) of the TFR is shared with the matrix (he also suggests 
a similar approach to internally headed relative clauses; 
  — Nunes (2001, 2004) on parasitic gap constructions, where the wh-constituent 
is ‘sideward moved’ before fronting; 
  — van Riemsdijk (2001a) on wh-prefixes, where the wh-word is shared 
between the matrix and the ‘prefix’ (for instance, “God knows who…”); 
  — van Riemsdijk (2001b) on bracketing paradoxes as in a far from simple matter, 
where the adjective is part of two different trees; 
  — van Riemsdijk (2006b) on regular free relatives, where there is sharing of 
the wh-operator between the matrix and the subordinate clause (the 
purpose of this is to explain Case matching effects). 
  — Henderson (2007) on relative clauses, where there is sideward movement 
of the head NP between the relative clause and the matrix; 
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  — Gracanin–Yuksek (2007) on coordinated wh-constructions, where there is 
‘bulk sharing’ after the wh-constituents; 
  — Meinunger (2008) on bracketing paradoxes in certain complex numerals; 
  — Heringa (2009, in progress) on appositional constructions, where the appo-
sitional core is shared between a parenthetical position and a position in 
the matrix; 
 
 Whether each individual analysis of a particular phenomenon just men-
tioned will eventually be embraced or discarded does not matter for the purpose 
of this article. The point is that there is a by now substantial body of literature on 
structures involving external remerge. This in itself justifies a closer look at the 
formal properties of sharing, and the problem of linearization in comparison 
with regular movement. 
 
2.3. The Strict Cycle 
 
The possibility of remerge raises questions about the course derivations can take. 
In this respect, consider the so-called extension condition, also known as strict 
cyclicity (Chomsky 1995: 190, 327). Since Merge is structure-building and not 
structure-changing, counter-cyclic merge or remerge is simply impossible. Basical-
ly, Merge (X, Y) combines X and Y but leaves the internal structure of X and Y 
intact. This is worked out in some more detail in (14) and (15), for merge and 
remerge, respectively. In each case, the projection E is created, but E is not the 
new root. Instead, E is inserted as the daughter of C, and the original direct 
inclusion relationship between C and A in (14a) and (15a), and the one between C 
and B in (14b) and (15b) is destroyed. In each example, the original existence of [C 
A B] is the result of a previous instance of Merge. 
 
(14) a. (i)  Merge (D, [C A B])     —//→   [C [E D A] B]  
  (ii) [C A B] and Merge (D, A)   —//→   [C [E D A] B]  
 b. (i)  Merge (D, [C A B])     —//→   [C A [E D B]] 
  (ii) [C A B] and Merge (D, B)   —//→   [C A [E D B]] 
 
 
             





(15) a. (i)   Merge (B, [C A B])        —//→ [C [E B A] B]  (mDom of B) 
   (ii)  [C A B] and Merge (B, A)     —//→ [C [E B A] B]  (mDom of B) 
  b. (i)   Merge (V, [C A [B U V]])     —//→ [C A [E V [B U V]] (mDom of V) 
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(15a)            (15b)       








Clearly, if this were possible, it would be an undesirable complication of the 
theory. A similar reasoning can be found in Chomsky (2005), who introduces the 
no-tampering condition. The no-tampering condition can be considered a derived 
consequence of the system. It need not be an independent principle of grammar, 
since tampering is simply not what Merge does, at least not from the most 
minimalist perspective.7 That said, the reader may have noticed that instances of 
external remerge may eventually lead to structures that seemingly involve 
tampering. I will come back to this shortly. 
 Now we know what the mergers as in (14) in (15) do not lead to, let us 
consider which structures they do create. The mergers in (16a–b) are familiar, as 
they involve merge or remerge at the root. The option in (16c) constitutes external 
remerge, which leads to a doubly-rooted graph: 
 
(16) a. Merge (D, [C A B])   →  [E D [C A B]]  
(regular first-time merge) 
 b. Merge (B, [C A B])   →  [E B [C A B]] 
(reg. internal remerge: mDom of B) 
 c. [C A B] and Merge (D, A) →  [C A B] and [E D A] 
(reg. external remerge: mDom of A) 
                                               
    7 However, Chomsky (2000: 137), following Richards (1999), leaves open the possibility of 
‘tucking in’ for ‘third Merge’, which would be a clear violation of the extension principle. 
The reason that this might be allowed is that it does not change the relationships of a head 
with respect to its complement and first specifier. Obviously, it does change basic 
relationships with and between projections of the head. It seems to me that in the absence of 
overwhelming evidence for tucking in, such a complication of Merge must be rejected. 
Merge, in its simplest definition, operates on syntactic objects, regardless their internal 
structure and projection status, creating lasting basic relationships between the input objects 
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            => 
 
 
For completeness’ sake, note that (16a) replaces (14a–b.i), (16b) replaces (15a.i), 
and (16c) replaces (14a.ii). The mergers in (15b.i) and (14b.ii) also involve regular 
internal and external remerge, respectively, and the actual resulting structures 
can be compared to (16b) and (16c), only then remerge concerns the other sister. 
 The problematic cases are the mergers in (15a.ii) and (15b.ii), which involve 
remerge with a non-root (namely, in (15a.ii), the term B is remerged with the 
term A; similarly, both V and B are embedded in (15b.ii)). The result cannot be 
structure-changing, as in (15), but instead an additional root node will be created, 
comparable to what happens in (16c). Consider a slightly more sophisticated and 
illustrative example. In (17), the problematic instance of Merge is accompanied 
by an exclamation mark. The first merger between brackets is a preparatory sub-
derivation. The mergers in grey are a vain attempt to correctly finish the offen-
sive structure. 
 
(17) ( Merge (β, γ) → F )              (to be excluded) 
 
  Merge (A, B) → C 
  Merge (D, C) → E 
  Merge (F, E) → G 
 ! Merge (A, β) → J 
 
  Merge (H, G) → I 
  Merge (J, I) → R 
 
 
Here, A is remerged with the embedded β; this automatically leads to a tempo-
rary second root, J. The reason is that Merge by definition creates a new pro-
jection. (The same would apply if A were remerged with F itself, which is also 
embedded, namely in G.) Eventually, the two temporary roots can be combined 
into a final single root R, with possible additional material in between (such as 
H). One could call this ‘quirky internal remerge’ — internal, since no new 
  B
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material is selected; quirky, because movement to an embedded position is nor-
mally considered ungrammatical. Furthermore, even if it were grammatical, the 
then intended string of abstract terminals is /H A β γ D B/, but I do not see how 
this could possibly be read off the structure. I conclude that the theoretical possi-
bility of quirky internal remerge somehow needs to be excluded.  
 There is a counterpart of the above that we could call ‘quirky external 
remerge’, which involves remerge with an embedded position in another 
structure; see (18): 
 
(18) ( Merge (D, E) → F )              (to be excluded) 
 
  Merge (A, B) → C 
 ! Merge (E, A) → G 
 
  Merge (F, G) → H 




Here, A, which is a term of C, is externally remerged with E, which is embedded 
in the independently created F. As a result, a third temporary root, namely G, is 
created. Eventually, everything can be combined in one final root R, with 
possible additional material in between. The problem is that so far, I have not 
been able to come up with a realistic linguistic interpretation of (18). Moreover, 
like (17), it is clearly against the spirit of the extension condition, even though it 
does not involve ‘tampering’ in the strict sense.  
 Is there a plausible way to exclude both (17) and (18) at the same time? It 
seems to me that there is, but of course there is a theoretical cost to this, namely 
in the form of an explicit condition on the input for Merge. What (17) and (18) 
have in common is that at some crucial point of the derivation both input objects 
for Merge are terms and not roots (at that stage). A formal condition preventing 
this can be formulated as follows: 
 
(19) Root condition: 
 If α and β are selected as input for Merge, then α or β (or both) must be a 
root.  
 
There is a clear rationale for this condition. Consider (17) and (18) again. In both 
cases, the offensive instance of Merge creates an additional root where none was 
before. But this is not what Merge is for, from a functional perspective. Merge is 
essentially a combinatory device: it combines lexical items until a final single-
rooted structure is created, which can then be pronounced. Bearing in mind that 
every lexical item itself is a root (of a trivial structure), Merge does the following: 
 
    A. If two lexical items are merged, the result is that the number of roots is 
reduced by one. Namely, after Merge (A, B) → C, where A and B are lexical 
items, the new root is C, and A and B have become terms of C. 
D E A B 
C F G 
H 
R 
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    B. For every other instance of first-time merge (which may involve complex 
items), the number of roots is reduced by one. 
    C. For regular internal remerge, the number of roots stays the same. Namely, 
if some term A (which is not a root) is remerged with the root Ri, Ri be-
comes a term of the new root Ri+1, and A is still embedded.  
    D. For regular external remerge, the number of roots stays the same. Namely, 
if some term A of root X is remerged with an independent root Ri, the 
result is that a new root Ri+1 is created of which Ri is now a term. X remains 
a root, and A remains a term. So we start out with two roots (X and Ri), and 
end up with two roots (X and Ri+1).  
    E. For quirky internal remerge, the number of roots is enlarged by one. 
Namely, if some term A of root X is remerged with another term B of X, a 
new root R is created. Before merger, only X is a root; after merger, X and R 
are roots.  
    F. For quirky external remerge, the number of roots is also enlarged by one. 
Namely, if some term A of root X is remerged with some term B of another 
root Y, a new root R is created, and X and Y remain roots.  
 
Thus, first-time merge is the best way to proceed towards the goal of creating a 
single-rooted structure.8 Internal and external remerge are a necessary compli-
cation that causes some delay: The number of roots stays the same. But quirky 
internal/external remerge is completely counterproductive from this perspective, 
and must therefore be excluded. This insight is formalized in (20): 
 
(20) No proliferation of roots condition 
If the derivation proceeds from stage i to i+1 through Merge (α, β) → γ, then 
|{x∈{α, β, γ}: x is a root at stage i+1}| ≤ |{x∈{α, β}: x is a root at stage i}|. 
 
Informally stated: Upon Merge, the number of roots may not become larger.  
 The effect of (20) is completely equivalent to that of (19), so there are no 
two conditions, but just one that can be formalized in different ways, depending 
on the perspective. It is worth noting that there is a third way of looking at the 
root condition: one could conjecture that a derivation is always ‘active at the 
top’.9 Selecting a term is harmless as long as a root is involved as well. In the case 
of external remerge, the attention shifts from one structure to another. Quirky 
remerge does not involve any root in the input, and is therefore excluded. 
 The attentive reader will have noticed that quirky remerge was not 
included under the definition of internal/external remerge from the beginning — 
recall (4) and (5) —, and I will no longer consider it. 
 
2.4. Remerge: A Discussion of Look-Ahead, Hydras, and Locality 
 
Let us take RNR as a relevant example of a construction whose derivation 
                                               
    8 This could also be taken as a rationale for Merge-over-Move effects, to the extent that these 
are real (see, e.g., Castillo, Drury & Grohmann, in press for an overview.). 
    9 Compare also Collin’s (2002) ‘Locus Principle’ (bearing on Chomsky’s ideas about feature 
activity), which has largely the same effect, although it is not equivalent. 
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involves external remerge. A simple sentence such as (21), which is similar to (9) 
above, can be derived in the following way: 
 
(21) Mary likes ___, and Jack hates cars. 
1a Merge (likes, cars) → [likes cars]   
1b Merge (hates, cars) → [hates cars] 
2a Merge (Mary, [likes cars]) → [Mary [likes cars]] 
2b Merge (Jack, [hates cars]) → [Jack [hates cars]] 
3 Merge (and, [Jack [hates cars]]) → [and [Jack [likes cars]]] 
4 Merge ([Mary [likes cars]], [and [Jack [likes cars]]]) →  










Here, step 1b involves external remerge of the direct object cars. During step 2a, 
2b, and 3, the structure is doubly-rooted. Step 4 accomplishes a union into a 
single-rooted structure. Notice that there is no proliferation of roots at any step. 
In step 1b, we merge one root, [hates], with one term, [cars], and create one new 
root, [hates cars] — as merge always does. From the perspective of a syntactic 
workspace that initially contains all activated lexical items required for a parti-
cular derivation, we obtain the same result. In 1b, we start out with five roots, 
namely [Mary], [likes cars], [and], [Jack], and [hates], and we also end up with 
five roots: [Mary], [likes cars], [and], [Jack], and [hates cars]. 
 A number of other things are worth discussing. First, consider the order of 
mergers. The derivation in (21) seems to suggest that we start out merging cars in 
the first conjunct, and remerge it in the second. However, before the two clauses 
are conjoined, there is no first and second conjunct: The order between them (or 
their respective terms) is only established later in the derivation. Are we dealing 
with an instance of look-ahead here? By no means. It is of no importance 
whatsoever with which verb cars is merged first. The sequence of mergers in 
1a/b and 2a/b can be switched around at will. Either permutation (1a–1b–2a–2b, 
1b–1a–2a–2b, 1a–1b–2b–2a, or 1b–1a–2b–2a) leads to the same result. Therefore, it 
is impossible to tell which occurrence of cars — the one in the first conjunct, or 
the one in the second conjunct — is the original and which is the copy. As we 
said before, there are no copies, just relations. And there should be no need for 
pre-destination in syntax. It is for PF to decide where cars is to be pronounced, 
independently of how syntax arrived at the structure under consideration. Thus, 
if a particular structure has more than one possible derivational history, it should 
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 The absence of look-ahead implies that every instance of Merge must be 
motivated in some way or another. It does not imply that every structure that can 
be derived by Merge is interpretable at the PF/LF-interface. It is easy to think of 
licit derivations that are still uninterpretable in the end, that is, incomplete in 
some sense. For instance, a relevant feature could still be unvalued. Therefore, 
some possible derivations will survive at the interface, and some will not. This is 
not the consequence of look-ahead, even though it might seem so from the 
perspective of a surviving derivation. Within narrow syntax, Merge is an autono-
mous operation. 
 Turning back to the case of external remerge, we have noticed that it 
creates a multi-rooted structure (a ‘hydra’ or ‘forest’). The particular step of 
Merge itself may very well be motivated: In example (21), the verb hates selects a 
direct object. However, the existence of more than one root is problematic for the 
linearization procedure at PF (see below for details). So it is convenient that the 
two clauses are conjoined at a later stage, which resolves the problem. We can 
derive a heuristic from this: Every instance of external remerge must be compensated 
by a joining operation later in the derivation (surely, this need not be coordination; it 
can also be parenthetical insertion or subordination). Such a heuristic may 
suggest look-ahead, but that is misleading. Obviously, the system itself has no 
meta-modular analytical intelligence. The preferred derivation will survive as 
long as both the instance of external remerge and the compensating joining 
instance of Merge are independently motivated within narrow syntax.  
 Consider the hydraic configuration in (22), where α is the sister of both β1 









If this structure is sent to PF, how could it be linearized? The answer is that it 
could not at all. The reason is that the linearization procedure does not know 
where to start. And even if it randomly chooses one of the roots to be analyzed 
first, it is intuitively clear that no order between γ1 and γ2 can be established. With 
special additional assumptions, this may be resolved, but not in such a way that 
the order between the terminals remains invariant with respect to the choice of 
‘first root’. The two options here are the following: If R1 is the root taking priority, 
the string of terminals will have to be /γ1 γ2 α β2 β1/; if R2 is the root taking 
priority, the string of terminals will have to be /γ2 γ1 α β1 β2/. Clearly then, an 
asymmetry between the two (or more) temporary roots must be established: one 
is to be recognized as the matrix, the other as the secondary structure (a ‘graft’, 
using van Riemsdijk’s terminology). The way to do this is to combine them in 
syntax. As a consequence, a graft cannot only involve sharing with a constituent 
of the matrix, the top of the graft must also be syntactically connected to the 
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required because of PF demands, it also makes sense from a semantic and 
syntactic perspective. Namely, the way the graft is connected to the matrix 
determines the relationship between them. For instance, a graft can be a second 
conjunct, as in (21), or a parenthetical-like insertion, as in cleft-amalgams (10b), or 
perhaps even a subordinated phrase, as in parasitic gap constructions. 
 Next, let us turn to the issue of locality. In section 2.2., it was mentioned 
that RNR-constructions are insensitive to locality conditions, contrary to wh-
movement constructions, for instance. This is illustrated in (23), where the 
dependency crosses (or seems to cross) the boundary of a complex noun phrase 
(with (23a) RNR and (23b) wh-movement our of a relative clause): 
 
(23) a. Mary likes [men who SELL ___ ], but she hates [men who BUY cars]. 
 b.     * What does Mary like [men who sell ___ ]? 
 
External remerge, we said, creates a structural bypass. Let us see in a little more 



























In (24), the constituent α is externally remerged. As no locality boundary is 
involved, yet, we will assume that this is unproblematic. In (24b), both spines of 
the structure are expanded by regular Merge up to S1 and S2. During this process, 
the locality boundaries φ1 and φ2 are created. In (24c), S1 and S2 are united in a 
coordination phrase. The end result gives the impression that α’s relationship to 
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both β1 and β2 crosses the locality boundary φ. However, this is in fact not the 
case: α is locally related to β1 and β2 in step (24a). Whatever happens sub-
sequently to this step cannot undo this local relationship. Put differently, the fact 
that β1 and β2 are not in the same local domain does not imply that some α cannot 
be locally related to both. This is the surprising consequence of external remerge.  
 If external remerge can create apparent locality violations in RNR, we may 
predict non-local behavior to show up in other types of sharing constructions as 
well. As far as I am aware, this has never been tested. I would like to claim that 
examples of this kind can indeed be construed. A relevant illustration in Dutch is 
a complex cleft-amalgam as in (25), where the parenthetical is to be interpreted as 
de re. The content kernel is italicized. Notice that a correct intonation is important: 
right before the dash, the pitch lingers relatively high in order to create a sense of 




 Joop kuste  toen  —   Piet  beweerde dat hij  iemand   kende die zei 
  Joop kissed  then    Piet  claimed  that he  someone   knew  who said 
 dat het Mieke  was. 
  that it  Mieke  was 
  ‘Then, Joop kissed — Piet claimed that he knew someone who said that it 
was Mieke.’ 
 
Within the amalgam, Mieke is embedded in a complex noun phrase. If it is true 
that Mieke is at the same time part of the matrix (namely, as a direct object), there 
seems to be a locality problem. But this is only apparently so, and the solution is 
similar to the one sketched above for RNR. For more examples (in English), see 
de Vries (2009b). 
 Does the possibility of bypassing locality boundaries not endanger our 
theory of locality for regular movement constructions? I do not think this is the 
case. Consider the following configuration:  
 










In (26), the phrase α is first-merged with β, and internally remerged with γ. If φ 
constitutes a locality boundary, the derivation is to be excluded. One way to do 
this is to make the selection of syntactic objects sensitive to structural distance. 
Thus, selecting a term as input for Merge is allowed as long as it is not too far 
embedded (where too far may be category-sensitive). From the perspective of 
α β 
γ 
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phase theory, if φ is a phase boundary, then it seals off its components for further 
computation. Thus, if the derivation in (26) has reached γ, α cannot be selected 
anymore since it is embedded in φ. Furthermore, a derivational bypass cannot be 
established, either: α cannot be externally remerged with γ before φ is reached for 
the simple reason that γ does not yet exist at that stage of the derivation. In 
section 3.5.3. I will come back to the issue of phases from the perspective of 
linearization. 
 
2.5. Intermediate Conclusion 
 
If terms of complex syntactic objects are allowed as input for Merge, remerge of 
heads and phrases is possible, as opposed to (first-time) merge. This is a way of 
dealing with the general phenomenon that an item can be involved in multiple 
(local) relationships, but shows up in only one position. Without ad hoc 
restrictions, it follows that there are two types of remerge: Internal and external 
remerge. The first corresponds to regular movement; the second is much more 
controversial, and has been characterized as sharing, grafting or sideward move-
ment. Several construction types have been analyzed as involving what we now 
recognize as external remerge. Naturally, each of these will have to be subject to 
close scrutiny, and alternatives for some may be more viable in the end. 
However, what is of interest here is not so much the analysis of individual con-
structions, but the general mechanism of external remerge, in comparison to 
internal remerge. Both internal and external remerge can be represented in terms 
of multidominance. Though it has some graphical disadvantages, this prevents 
us from inadvertently attributing ad hoc properties to copies or traces. In this 
respect, it is worth commemorating that there is no inherent directionality in 
external remerge. If α is to be related to both β and γ, the order of mergers {Merge 
(α, β), Merge (α, γ)} is irrelevant, and look-ahead should not be necessary. 
 An automatic consequence of the structure-building characteristic of Merge 
is that it operates strictly cyclically: Merge creates a new root, and it cannot undo 
earlier relationships. But even then, some unwanted possibilities remain. These 
can be excluded by the No proliferation of roots condition, which seems a virtual 
conceptual necessity. As for locality conditions, they can be shown to be by-
passed by means of external remerge in certain configurations, but this is never 
the case for internal remerge. Finally, we have seen that external remerge creates 
a temporary multi-rooted structure, which needs to be resolved before the 
structure gets linearized. As there are always asymmetric relationships between 
the different parts of the sentence, this will be taken care of for independent 
reasons as well.  
 
 
3. The Linearization of Complex Syntactic Structures  
 
Syntactic structures have to be linearized at PF. Structures exclusively composed 
of relations established by first-time merge are easy to process; the possibility of 
remerge, however, brings about some complications. This section advances a 
proposal for the linearization of structures involving internal and external 
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remerge. The discussion below will be in terms of multidominance graphs. We 
have to keep in mind, though, that graphs as such are only representations of the 
underlying relations between syntactic objects created by Merge. Section 4 will 
examine in some more detail the necessary linearization algorithm and the 
computational cost it involves. 
 
3.1. The Problem of Remerge 
 
Comparing wh-movement (27a) to RNR (27b), we notice a difference in the 
position where the displaced constituent (in italics) is pronounced: 
 
(27) a. Which violin should this talented girl purchase ___? 
 b. The boy only admired ___, but the girl actually bought this beautiful 
Stradivarius. 
 
In (27a), the remerged phrase is realized in the first position in the string; in (27b) 
the remerged phrase is realized in the last position in the string. This must be due 
to the different effect caused by internal and external remerge, respectively. In 
fact, we are facing two complications: 
 
(C1) Remerged items are only pronounced once.10 
(C2) Internally remerged items are pronounced in a different position than 
externally remerged items. 
 
 The abstract configurations corresponding to possible derivations 
involving internal and external remerge are sketched in (28a) and (28b), 
represented in terms of multidominance: 
 








                                               
    10 I am aware of proposals involving spelled-out copies or traces for particular phenomena 
such as resumptive pronouns and wh-copying; for discussion, see Aoun & Li 2003, Groh-
mann 2003, Nunes 2004, Barbiers et al. 2008, and Schippers 2008, among others. This 
possibility, if correct, is of course exceptional. Moreover, I would like to stress that it does 
not present additional problems for a remerge approach to movement as compared to a 
copy/trace approach. Let me quote Starke (2001: 145) on this: 
 
Questions about multiple traces map onto questions about multiple mergers. 
Reduplication paradigms are another instance of this logic: To the extent that 
they are adequately analyzed in terms of spell-out of a trace (i.e. spell-out of 
multiple ‘copies’), they are now reanalysed as spell-out of multiple merger 
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The constituent called B is displaced. It is remerged with E in (28a), and with D in 
(28b). In (28b), it could also be first-merged with D and remerged with A. 
Suppose we traverse the graphs in (28) in the usual way, starting at the root (I 
will come back to this in more detail), we encounter the remerged B twice. 
Putting the terminals in a string in the order we come across them, we obtain the 
following picture, where the intended Spell-Out is printed below the other 
strings. What are terminals in (28), by the way, need not be linguistic heads; only, 
their possible internal complexity is of no direct interest to us, here. 
 
         (28a)     (28b) 
Terminals encountered 
by graph traversal:    /B x A B/   /x A B z y D B/ 
 
Desired string of terminals: /B x A/    /x A z y D B/ 
 
 From this perspective, it is the first occurrence of B that needs to be overtly 
realized in (28a), but the second occurrence in (28b). The generalization can be 
stated as follows: 
 
Internal remerge of X →  overtly realize only the first occurrence of X while  
          linearizing the structure. 
External remerge of X →  overtly realize only the last occurrence of X while  
          linearizing the structure. 
 
Below, I will discuss what happens if the two interact.  
 There is a body of literature on the linearization of syntactic structures 
involving movement, and there are also some publications on the linearization of 
sharing constructions (especially RNR). But as far as I know, the issue sketched 
here has not received any explicit attention in the literature, apart from Chen–
Main (2006), Gracanin–Yuksek (to appear), and some brief remarks in Wilder 
(2008).  
 I have no intention of negatively reviewing other linearization proposals in 
detail — and no doubt each has its own merits —, but let me indicate in general 
terms why the course taken here is somewhat different. The most straight-
forward objection to all previous proposals I am aware of is the lack of general 
applicability: theories about movement (for instance, Fox & Pesetsky 2005) are 
unfit for sharing and vice versa (for instance, Wilder 1999); so the least we can say 
is that some adaptations are necessary.  
 Wilder (2008) and Gracanin–Yuksek (to appear) try to develop Kayne’s 
(1994) Linear Correspondence Axiom (LCA) in order to manage sharing [external 
remerge] (see also Johnson 2007 for discussion), and briefly investigate if some 
extended version of the LCA is also fit for movement in terms of multidominance 
[internal remerge]. As they note themselves, it runs into trouble with moved 
constituents that are complex, that is, simply phrasal (Wilder), and with shared 
material that is not the most deeply embedded (Gracanin–Yuksek). Apart from 
that, Wilder explicitly derives the right periphery condition on RNR from the 
linearization procedure. To the extent that this is successful (see however Kluck 
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& de Vries, to appear, for critique, which also applies to Bachrach & Katzir 2009), 
it may be considered unfortunate, since it prevents the generalization of the idea 
of structure sharing (external remerge) to other constructions in which the 
presumed shared part is not necessarily right-peripheral.11 Possible examples 
involve what van Riemsdijk (1998) called ‘saddle grafts’, where the shared 
material is not peripheral inside the graft. A cleft-amalgam in Dutch is (29): 
 
(29) Dutch 
  Joop heeft [ik   vermoed dat het een Bugatti is] gekocht. 
  Joop has  I   presume that it  a  Bugatti is bought 
  ‘Joop bought — I presume it’s a Bugatti.’ 
 
 A further construction that is interesting from this perspective is ATB-
movement, where external remerge seems to feed internal remerge (see Nunes 
2004 and Citko 2005, among others). In the Dutch example in (30), the two gaps 
represent indirect object positions; these are certainly not clause-final: 
 
(30) Dutch 
  Wie heeft hij  ___ een boek gegeven en   zij  ___ een cd  ontnomen? 
  who has he     a  book given  and she  a  CD taken.away 
  ‘Who did he give a book and she take away a CD from?’ 
 
Citko explicitly states that movement following sharing is necessary for success-
ful linearization at PF. Her theory, therefore, is quite limited, since it excludes an 
analysis of RNR and amalgams in terms of sharing.  
 Chen–Main’s (2006) analysis is the most extensive one; it combines an 
inherent asymmetry between sisters (precedence) with LCA-like demands on the 
linearization. The proposal has the following basic characteristic: Multi-
dominance of left branches leads to the pronunciation of the highest, leftmost 
occurrence, whereas multidominance of right branches leads to the pronun-
ciation of the lowest, rightmost occurrence. The first corresponds to regular 
movement, the second to sharing in RNR-constructions. A serious problem 
discussed by Chen–Main herself is wh-movement of direct objects, which is 
excluded by the system. She cleverly turns this into a partial advantage by using 
it to explain Holmberg’s generalization: Namely, the configurational problem is 
resolved if the verb is moved as well. But of course Holmberg’s generalization is 
far from universal; moreover, I think the problem concerns movement of right 
branches in general, not only of direct objects. Chen–Main discusses various com-
plicated interactions between multidominance links in syntactic graphs. It turns 
out that some structures can be linearized, some cannot, and some are linearized 
                                               
    11 The particular right-periphery condition for RNR must then be explained in another way. In 
fact, this conclusion is corroborated by Kluck (2007, 2009), who shows that purely syntactic 
approaches to derive the periphery effect fail; instead she proposes to combine Hartmann’s 
(2000) theory on the semantics and prosody of the RNR-construction with a 
multidominance approach. Put differently, the periphery condition is an interface effect 
clearly related to contrastive focus; a successful explanation must somehow take that into 
account. 
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in a way we would not expect. This raises a more fundamental question: Do we 
want phonology to restrict syntax in such an intricate and hard-to-predict way? 
Without lessening any of the value of Chen–Main’s discussion, my answer right 
now would be negative. 
 This answer confirms my general skepticism towards LCA-based analyses. 
Let me briefly formulate some general considerations indicating why I am not 
convinced that this kind of approach is attractive, apart from the issues 
mentioned above. I should mention beforehand that this does not imply that I am 
against a universal Spec–Head–Comp order, and hence right-branching graphs. 
The reason is that this universal is based on conceptual reasoning as well as 
empirical generalizations. In the absence of a phonological principle such as the 
LCA, it could simply be hard-coded in syntax. 
 First, the LCA presupposes that syntax does not directly encode an 
asymmetry between sisters that can be interpreted as precedence by phonology. 
Therefore, the necessary asymmetry at PF must be calculable from hierarchical 
information. However, the mentioned presupposition has been questioned in the 
literature. In section 3.2.1., I will come back to the idea that Merge produces 
ordered pairs. 
 Second, the LCA is often used to linearize (spell out) structures, but strictly 
speaking, the LCA states a necessary property of syntactic structure; it is not a 
procedure to arrive at the demanded (transitive, antisymmetric, and total) linear 
order from the syntactic structure. Kayne (1994) explicitly formulates the LCA as 
an axiom, not an algorithm. Nevertheless, suppose that we formulate such a proce-
dure on the basis of the LCA (see section 4 for an impression how to construct a 
linearization algorithm). Even then we are not there, yet: What PF wants is not a 
mathematical linear order, but a string of words. Of course, we can formulate 
another mapping procedure that translates the set of ordered pairs of terminals 
that constitutes a linear order into a string, but it should be clear that this is an 
additional step: 
 
Linearization: syntactic structure  LCA-procedure 
      linear order   mapping of complex set onto string 
       word string 
 
From a practical perspective, if we can go directly from syntactic structure to a 
word string, this seems preferable over the state of affairs sketched above.  
 Third, the LCA involves a very intricate definition of c-command. In the 
extended approaches it is even further enriched by the notion of full dominance/ 
unique paths (see Wilder 2008, for instance). But c-command is a very general 
syntactic tool, used for many more things than linearization; essentially, it identi-
fies possible dependencies. It is doubtful that such a fundamental notion could be 
so complex. Rather, it seems likely that c-command is a direct function of Merge, 
as initially proposed by Epstein (1999) — put briefly, if A and B are merged, then 
A c-commands B and every term of B.  
 Fourth, c-command is restricted to full categories (heads or maximal 
projections); segments (or X-bar nodes, in Chomsky 1995) do not count. As a con-
sequence, a specifier asymmetrically c-commands the components of its sister, 
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but not vice versa. It seems to me that if the asymmetrical behavior between speci-
fiers and their sisters needs to be (indirectly) stipulated in this way, the goal of 
deriving linear order from hierarchy is not convincingly attained. 
 Fifth, the LCA is hard to combine with Bare Phrase Structure; see Chomsky 
(1995), Uriagereka (1999), and others. In particular, there is a lack of asymmetric 
c-command between the very first two (lexical) items that are Merged in a 
derivation.  
 Sixth, given that movement is now viewed as internal remerge, configu-
rational complications arise if more than one phrase is remerged. If I am not 
mistaken, LCA-based proposals inevitably run into trouble with remnant move-
ment and roll-up movement (see section 3.5.1. for abstract illustrations of such 
constructions). 
 In the next sections, I will formulate an alternative approach that does not 
suffer from the limitations discussed above. It is fair to say, though, that it is not 
free of stipulations that are in want of a deeper explanation. My main objective 
here is to make the required linearization procedure fully explicit.  
 
3.2. Linearization as a Process: Theoretical Preliminaries 
 
Linearization is the process of turning a hierarchical structure into a string of 
terminals. In line with Kural (2005), Kremers (2009), and others, I assume that the 
most straightforward way to do this is by means of graph traversal. The details of 
this process will be discussed from section 3.3. onwards. But first, a number of 
theoretical preliminaries need to be addressed. 
 
3.2.1. Asymmetrical Syntax 
 
Graph traversal implies that the linearization procedure can make use of the pre-
cedence relation between sisters (known as direct precedence, immediate precedence, 
strict precedence, or sister precedence). This is in line with Frampton (2004), Chen–
Main (2006), and many others, now, and especially in the 1980s, when the idea 
that directionality between heads and complements was considered a language 
parameter by most people. However, it goes against Kayne (1994) and Chomsky 
(1995), who state that syntax is about hierarchy and not about order. From the 
perspective of a derivational grammar, this means that Merge produces a 
complex whose components are unordered (an unordered set, according to 
Chomsky).  
 However, even when we grant the idea that syntax should not be 
preoccupied by linear order between sisters, the conclusion that Merge produces 
an unordered pair does not logically follow. After all, it is very well possible that 
Merge produces an ordered pair that encodes a syntactic or semantic asymmetry. 
If this is so, it may be the case that the relevant syntactic asymmetry can directly 
be mapped onto direct precedence at the PF interface. But that does not mean 
that linear order is part of syntax. It is simply a misconception to equate 
asymmetry between sisters in syntax with linear/temporal precedence, even if it 
will eventually lead to this in the phonological component.  
 So now we face two questions: First, is there indeed a consistent syntactic 
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or semantic asymmetry between sisters? In other words, does Merge automatical-
ly produce ordered pairs? Second, can this syntactic asymmetry consistently be 
mapped onto direct precedence at PF? The first question has been answered posi-
tively by several authors, albeit on somewhat different (but not necessarily con-
tradictory) grounds: Jaspers (1998), Koster (1999, 2003, 2007), Di Sciullo (2000), 
Langendoen (2003), Zwart (2004, 2006a), Di Sciullo & Isac (2008). If the second 
question is to be answered positively, a much-preferred condition, I presume, is a 
universal base order. The most likely is a universal Spec–Head–Comp order, as 
advocated by Kayne (1994), Zwart (1994), and many others since (pace alternative 
configurations in Fukui & Takano 1998 and Haider 2000). In accordance with 
several of the cited works, let me sketch an account in terms of dependency. 
 The operation Merge creates sisters. From a compositional-semantic point 
of view, the objective of Merging, say, X and Y is to relate X to Y, thereby giving 
rise to a combined meaning. Crucially, sisters are never in a symmetrical 
relationship. For one thing, it is generally assumed that complements are c- and 
s-selected by heads. If it is indeed the case that complements universally follow 
heads, then the PF-mapping of this syntactic asymmetry on a phonological direct 
precedence relationship is unproblematic.  
 How about the combination of phrasal constituents? According to Koster’s 
configurational matrix, there is always a left–right asymmetry (presupposing 
universal SPEC-left). Semantically, the righthand sister is ‘relatively about’ the 
lefthand sister, which is normally more salient: For instance, the predicate is 
interpreted with respect to the subject; a comment is about the topic, and so on. 
Syntactically, anaphoric dependencies (in the broadest possible sense of the 
word) are from the lefthand sister to (a term of) the righthand sister, modulo 
reconstruction effects due to A-bar movement, as is well-known. Thus, in a 
configuration [γ α β] it is always β (and indirectly, its terms) that is dependent on 
α. Zwart’s (2006a) hypothesis is that dependency is a function of Merge. Thus, 
Merge (α, β) produces an ordered pair <α, β> such that β is the dependent. If 
Zwart and Koster are right, then the asymmetrical merger of phrases can be 
mapped onto direct precedence at the PF interface, as well. The generalization is 
that if α and β are merged, whether they are heads or phrases, then the direction 
of dependency can directly be mapped onto direct precedence, such that the 
dependent always follows the non-dependent. Let us call this the Uniformity of 
Mapping hypothesis: 
 
(31) Uniformity of Mapping Hypothesis 
At the PF interface, generalized syntactic dependency is directly mapped 
onto phonological precedence, such that in a basic syntactic triad <γ α, β>, α 
will directly precede β. 
 
In the next sections, I will use (31) as a background assumption. In principle, the 
necessary mapping could as well be performed by a more intricate rule system 
that makes reference to language-specific directionality parameters, but let us 
stand by the simplest solution. 
 Before we return to the main subject, a note on the widespread idea of 
Spec–Head agreement may be in order. Crucially, a specifier is a sister of a 
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projection of the head: In [XP Spec [X’ X Comp]], Spec is the sister of X’. Since a 
projection of X contains all the features of X per definition (this is the idea of 
percolation), the Spec–Head relation can be reduced to a sisterhood relationship. 
One could say that the head is the nearest (most local) term of the sister of the 
specifier, which is probably the reason why the Spec–Head relation is important. 
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that it is often morphologically encoded. 
Nevertheless, there are indications that Spec–Head is only a special case of the 
more fundamental sisterhood relationship. An interesting example in this respect 
is subject-predicate agreement in Swahili. Consider the example in (32), taken 
from Carstens (2003: 395): 
 
(32) Swahili 
 Juma   a-li-kuwa  a-ngali a-ki-fanya  kazi. 
 Juma   SA-PST-be  SA-still SA-PROG-do  work 
 ‘Juma was still working.’ 
 
Here, SA is subject agreement, PST past tense, and PROG progressive. As is evident 
from the gloss, the subject agreement morpheme is spelled out on several ele-
ments within the predicate, including an adverb. Zwart (2006a) suggests that we 
can analyze this example as follows: Not just the finite verb, but the predicate as 
a whole, being the sister of the subject, is marked as the dependent of the subject. 
This dependency can then be spelled out on several terms of the predicate; which 
one(s), that concerns a language-particular morphological choice.  
 A line of research with very similar characteristics is Matushansky’s (2008) 
approach to Case marking. In her view, Case marking involves a sisterhood 
dependency, which may eventually be spelled out on a term of the dependent 
sister (normally a DP). In this way, different Case features may accumulate on a 
single DP, which leads to language-particular morphological choices. 
 Finally, let me briefly comment on Chomsky’s conception of set-Merge. 
Chomsky (1995, and subsequent work) advocates a dominance-only grammar. In 
his notation, the result of Merge (a, b) is an unordered set {a, b}, which is then 
type-lifted to {a, {a, b}} in case a projects. At first sight, the issue of the label is 
interesting in the light of the by now famous Wiener–Kuratowski convention 
(Wiener 1914, Kuratowski 1921), which states that an ordered pair <x, y> is 
equivalent to {{x}, {x, y}}. This complex set is often thought to be equivalent to 
{x, {x, y}}, for instance in Cormen et al. (1990: 80); see also Quine (1945) and 
Schneider (1977) for discussion. Such set-theoretic reductionism has been criti-
cized by several philosophers (see Armstrong 1986, Forrest 1986, Goodman 1986, 
Sider 1996), mainly because it is arbitrary. Nevertheless, the convention is widely 
used. When applied to Chomsky’s notation, it would follow that {a, {a, b}} is an 
ordered pair <a, b>. Thus, one might suppose that Merge (a, b) produces the 
ordered set <a, b> in case a projects, and <b, a> in case b projects. We will see that 
this is of no advantage for the linearization at PF. 
 Suppose we map the asymmetry of projection onto direct precedence at PF. 
That would produce an unfortunate result: Either we obtain a universal order 
/Head Comp Spec/ (if projecting elements precede non-projecting elements) or 
we obtain /Spec Comp Head/ (if the reverse is the case). The first is assumed by 
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no one; the second is actually proposed by Fukui & Takano (1998), but it is in 
clear contrast with assumptions by Chomsky himself, and of course Kayne 
(1994); see also Yasui (2004) for discussion on related issues, and Zwart (2005), 
who provides additional evidence for a universal /Head Comp/ structure based 
on a cross-linguistic typology of noun phrase conjunction. I conclude that the 
asymmetry of projection is not the asymmetry we are looking for. In this respect, 
recall that it is not certain that {x, {x, y}} can be equated with <x, y>. Also, I am 
not convinced that Chomsky is right that Merge (x, y) produces {x, {x, y}} to begin 
with, apart from the issue of asymmetrical dependency discussed above, and the 
question if projection labels are necessary at all (Collins 2002). The idea that the 
projection label equals the head is strange from the perspective of 
compositionality. Logically, the whole cannot equal one of the parts. One might, 
not unreasonably, object that the label x is not the same as the head x: These are 
different categories of things. But then of course set reduction of {xlabel {xhead, y}} 
to <x, y> is impossible. 
 In short, I contend that Merge produces asymmetrical pairs that encode 
syntactic dependency. This asymmetry can be mapped straightforwardly onto 
direct precedence at the PF interface. If this is so, one might wonder why we still 
need a linearization procedure involving graph traversal. The reasons are clear-
cut. Even though a simple structure <a, <b, c>> transparently yields the string  
/a b c/, it should be noted that this does not directly follow from the transitivity 
of precedence, as it is mediated by the inclusion relationship. The next subsection 
shows that the usually implicit ‘Inheritance of Precedence’ assumption is unten-
able as soon as we take remerge into account (whether for regular movement or 
for sharing). Syntactic structures are not simple trees, they are graphs. Further-
more, recall that establishing a (total) order, for example, {{b<c}, {a<b}, {a<c}}, 
where < means precedes — is only halfway the goal of producing an actual word 
string (see also the second objection against the LCA near the end of section 3.1.). 
 
3.2.2. Dominance/Inclusion and Precedence 
 
Merge (α, β) → γ produces three relationships: γ directly includes α, γ directly 
includes β, and β is directly dependent on α. At PF, the last relationship can be 
reinterpreted as α directly precedes β. 
 Both inclusion and precedence are transitive relations: If αRβ and βRγ then 
αRγ. Both are irreflexive: αRα is excluded. I assume the notion dominance to be 
synonymous with inclusion. Reflexive dominance/inclusion plays no role in the 
discussion here, and I will abbreviate proper dominance to dominance.  
 Direct precedence and direct dominance resulting from the same instance 
of Merge are mutually exclusive: if α directly precedes β, then it cannot be the 
case that α directly dominates β or vice versa. It is often assumed that precedence 
and dominance in general are mutually exclusive. Whether this is really the case, 
however, depends on further assumptions. Such an assumption is the inheritance 
of precedence, which can be formulated as in (33): 
 
(33) Inheritance of Precedence (to be rejected) 
If x directly precedes y, then x and all nodes dominated by x precede y and 
all nodes dominated by y. 
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 In a regular tree, this makes sense. However, in multidominance graphs, it 
gives rise to inconsistencies. Indeed, versions of (33) are known as the Non-
tangling condition, which is used to prevent crossing branches and so on (see 
also Gärtner 2002, Carnie 2008, and Fortuny 2008 for further discussion and 










Here, β directly precedes ε; by (33), β would also precede the descendants of ε, 
namely δ, γ1, α and β. But then β precedes itself, which is odd. Even worse, δ 
precedes γ1 and, by (33), α and β. Thus, β precedes δ (the descendant of ε), and δ 
precedes β (the descendant of γ1), which is a contradiction. Moreover, notice that 
ε and γ1 dominate β and are preceded by β at the same time. Given that (34) is a 
regular movement structure (involving internal remerge), it seems to me that we 
must simply reject the stipulation in (33). I conclude that the precedence relation 
is independent of the dominance relation. Therefore, there is also no basis for the 
mutual exclusion of dominance and precedence in general. 
 As we have seen in section 2, the absence of stipulative conditions on the 
input of Merge leads to the possibility of remerge, which in turn leads to multi-
dominance representations. Traditional restrictions on possible tree represen-
tations, such as the Single mother condition and the Non-tangling condition, are 
no longer wanted. It should be clear that it is not the case that anything goes. For 
instance, Merge makes sure that the resulting graphs are fully linked with respect 
to (transitive) dominance in the sense that there is a path from every node to 
every other node (that is, if we allow for a ‘change of direction’). Furthermore, we 
saw in section 2.3. that the PF interface cannot possibly interpret multi-rooted 
structures (forests); thus, the traditional Single Root condition will be maintained 
on principled grounds (but notice that this only concerns the end result of the 
derivation). Also, I argued that the proliferation of roots during the derivation is 
unwelcome (section 2.3.).  
 In the previous section, an LCA-based approach to linearization was 
abandoned on principled and practical grounds. Instead, let us try to develop an 
alternative in terms of graph traversal, which is inherently a procedure. In the 
next sections, let our guiding principle be the following: Every single-rooted 
structure that can be produced by Merge can be linearized. In other words, gram-
matical syntactic structures do not crash when they are linearized at PF. 
 
3.3. Tree Traversal 
 
Before we turn to multidominance graphs, let us have a look at tree traversal, 





On Multidominance and Linearization 
 
373
recursive tree traversal procedure yields a string of node contents. First, consider 
the basic triad in (35), were P is the root, LCh the leftmost child, and RCh the 





As for the terminology, note that what linguists often call mother is also known as 
parent or (immediate) ancestor; daughter is also known as child or (immediate) 
descendant. 
 In principle, there are three ways of traversing (35): (i) the so-called preorder 
traversal, which lists the parent first, and then the children from left to right; (ii) 
the inorder traversal, which lists the leftmost child first, then the parent, and then 
the rightmost child; and (iii) the postorder traversal, which lists the children before 
the parent.  
 Tree traversal is a recursive algorithm, consisting of three basic steps (in a 
binary tree): Select the leftmost child, select the rightmost child, and perform 
some action, such as listing the present node content. If a complex child is 
encountered, interrupt the activity in the present layer and start scanning the 
child first, returning to this higher layer later (this is called recursive depth-first 
scanning). The core of this procedure is stated in (36), the three possible positions 
of undertaking the action are indicated. 
 
(36) Scan Triad 
  ↓  (← list present node: Preorder)  
  ↓ select left child; if complex => start scan triad of child 
  ↓  (← list present node: Inorder) 
  ↓ select right child; if complex => start scan triad of child 
  ↓  (← list present node: Postorder) 
 












(38) preorder: /a b d e c f g h i/ (‘spell out before going down’) 
 inorder: /d b e a f c h g i/ (‘spell out before going down the 
second time’) 
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 A linguistic linearization requires a list of end nodes (terminals) only. In 
(39), the strings from (38) are repeated, with the terminals printed in boldface. 
 
(39) preorder: /a b d e c f g h i/ 
 inorder:  /d b e a f c h g i/ 
 postorder: /d e b f h i g c a/ 
 
Interestingly, the required ordering of terminals /d e f h i/ is obtained in each of 
the three cases. Thus, ordering terminal nodes is much less arbitrary than 
ordering projection nodes: the difference between preorder, inorder, and 
postorder is irrelevant in practice.12 What we do is recursively call upon a 
procedure like scan triad; the action of spelling out is restricted to terminals. It 
seems to me that this is a welcome conclusion.  
 Just to be concrete, let me describe precisely what happens if we linearize 
the tree in (37). We start at the root, which is a. This node has children; we turn to 
the preceding one, b, first; b is complex as well; we turn to child d, which does not 
include members. The content of node d is therefore added to some string that is 
initially empty. We return to b and scan the rightmost child e, which does not 
include members; hence it is added to the string. We return to a (via b) and scan 
the rightmost child c, which is complex; we turn to child f and add it to the string. 
We return to c and start scanning the rightmost child g, which is complex. We 
scan child h and add it to the string, return to g, scan the rightmost child i and 
add it to the string. We return (four times) and end the procedure. The obtained 
string is /d e f h i/, as required.  
 In conclusion, traversing a tree in order to produce a string of terminals is 
straightforward. No puzzling stipulations are necessary. 
 
3.4. Traversing Multidominance Graphs: The Issue of Internal and External 
Remerge 
 
Let us now turn to the effect of remerge on the linearization. It will become clear 
that we have to combine traversal with structural conditions. In section 3.1., we 
saw that a remerged node is encountered twice when traversing the graph at PF, 
whereas it is only pronounced once. Dealing with regular movement, Frampton 
(2004) proposed the following structural condition: 
 






 is omitted if x has a parent outside 
γ. (to be revised) 
 
Here, outside means ‘not dominated by’. The effect is that α is pronounced in its 
highest position. From this perspective, consider the graph in (41): 
                                               
    12 An interesting alternative is proposed in Yasui (2002, 2004), who defines syntactic structures 
without projection nodes (e.g., [will it [be raining]] ‘it will be raining’). Different ways of 
scanning such structures produce different word orders. See also Kural (2005) for a proposal 
in which the difference between preorder, inorder, and postorder traversal for non-termi-
nals is exploited to account for word order variation. 












The remerged node is B. Its two parents are C and R. Traversing the graph, we 
arrive at B directly from R. As B has no other parent outside of R, the 
linearization is not omitted; hence, let us assume that the first occurrence of B is 
linearized (spelled out). We go on, and spell out the nodes D and A. Then we 
arrive at B for the second time, now from C. In this case, there is another parent 
outside C, namely R; therefore, the linearization is omitted the second time, as 
required. Setting aside the possible internal complexity of A, B, and D for a 
moment, the produced string is /B D A/. 
 So far, so good. But now consider the case of external remerge (which is not 
discussed by Frampton). An abstract example that corresponds to an RNR-
configuration is given in (42), where the intended string of terminal syntactic 











Let us see what happens if we apply the condition in (40). The relevant remerged 
node is B again, which has two parents, C and E. When we arrive at B from C, we 
have to check if there is another parent outside C. This is the case: There is 
another parent, E, which does not dominate C. Therefore, the linearization of B is 
omitted at this point. Later, when we arrive at B from E, we determine that there 
is another parent that is not dominated by E, namely C, and again B is not 
linearized, although it should be. Thus, B will not be spelled out at all.  
 How can we improve on Frampton’s condition? We have to take into 
account several things; so let us proceed step by step. As a first preliminary, let 
us change perspective from omitting the linearization of some node to spelling it 
out. After all, in a linearization procedure (and more generally), we would rather 
want to know under which conditions a certain action is to be performed than 
when we have to do nothing. The absence of events is a universal default; actions 
need to be specified. In language, successive cyclic movement and multiple RNR 
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(43) a. What did John say ___ that Mary thought ___ that Bill ___ bought? 
 b. John hates ___, Bill likes ___, Mary admires ___, and Jack detests the 
president. 
 
In principle, only one occurrence of a linguistic object is overtly realized, whereas 
the number of silent occurrences is unbounded. 
 Furthermore, during the traversal, we have to keep track of where we came 
from. Otherwise, we do not know what a potential other parent is. Consider (44), 
where α has been internally remerged twice (its three parents are γ1, γ2, and γ3; its 













At some point during the traversal the node under consideration is α. How is it 
determined if α is to be spelled out at this point? That depends on the path from 
which α is most recently arrived at. Node α must be spelled out in the triad         
[γ3 α β3], but not in [γ2 α β2] and [γ1 α β1] because there is a parent, γ3, that is outside 
(in fact, dominates) γ2 and γ1. But how do we know in which triad we are at the 
moment? Each parent γ1, γ2, and γ3 is equally local to α. Therefore, we need to 
keep track of the traversal history in some way. To this end, let us define the 
notion of current parent: 
 
(45) Current Parent 
The current parent of α is the most recently traversed parent during the 
linearization procedure.  
 
We can now reformulate (40) as follows: 
 
(46) Spell-Out of (Internally) Remerged Nodes (preliminary version, to be revised) 
 Linearize an α with more than one parent if the current parent dominates 
every other parent. 
 
Here, I take dominance to be a transitive, non-reflexive relation; an other parent is a 
parent that is not the current parent. Note that the condition in (40) has much in 
common with the ‘Connected ancestor condition’ discussed in Barker & Pullum 
(1990: 22). 
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adding α to the string to be pronounced, although it can be. This has to do with 
the difference between heads and phrases. A phonological string of words or 
morphemes is a string of heads. So if α is complex, it must be analyzed by further 











Here, the phrase α containing two heads x and y has been internally remerged; 
the intended string of terminals is /x y δ β1/. Without a condition such as (46), x 
and y are encountered twice during the traversal. This would be problematic, 
since x and y themselves are relatively in situ heads (with only one parent), so 
their Spell-Out should be uncompromised, which leads to a double realization. 
According to (46), the linearization of α in (47) is executed only if γ2 is the current 
parent. If γ1 is the current parent (later during the traversal), α will not be spelled 
out, which implies that its components will not be traversed; hence, x and y are 
not encountered a second time. 
 Before we turn to external remerge, let me summarize the assumptions so 
far: 
 
(A1) The linearization of a syntactic object involves recursive graph traversal. 
(A2) Traversal history needs to be monitored. 
(A3) For each encountered node, further analysis of its components is condi-
tional: If the number of parents is zero (for the root) or one, further analysis 
is called upon in any case; if the number of parents is more than one (the 
consequence of remerge), the configuration between these parents, relative 
to the current parent, is decisive. 
(A4) Further analysis means further traversal if the relevant object is complex. If 
it is not, the node content is added to the string of words/morphemes.  
(A5) Traversal provides a continuously shifting perspective, where the current 
node and indirectly its current parent are the center of attention. But notice 
that the interaction with structural conditions implies that the rest of the 
structure can be inspected at any time. 
 
We are now in a position to analyze (48), which involves external remerge of α. 























Each of the two parents is ‘outside’ the other; none dominates the other. The 
configuration seems symmetrical, but not if the course of the traversal is taken 
into account. Since we already established before that the traversal history needs 
to be monitored, I take this to be a possibility. The crucial decision depends on 
the direct precedence relationship between two of the ancestors of α, namely ε1 
and ε2, which have been the input for the ‘root-uniting’ instance of Merge. Parent 
γ1 is part of the left branch of the graph, which is traversed before γ2 in the right 
branch of the graph. When α is encountered the first time during the traversal, 
via γ1, the other parent γ2 has not yet been traversed; however, when α is 
encountered the second time, via γ2, the other parent γ1 has already been 
traversed. Therefore, the necessary Spell-Out condition can be formulated as 
follows: 
 
(49) Spell-Out of (Externally) Remerged Nodes (preliminary version) 
 Linearize an α with more than one parent if  
 (i) every parent has been traversed, and 
 (ii) the current parent is not dominated by any other parent. 
 
As required, α will be spelled out if γ2 is the current parent. The second proviso in 
(49) is necessary to make sure that Spell-Out of the last occurrence is not applied 
to configurations resulting from internal remerge, where one parent dominates 
the others. Let us now combine the two conditions in (46) and (49): 
 
(50) Spell-Out of Remerged Nodes (to be revised) 
 An α with more than one parent is linearized if and only if 
 (i) the current parent dominates every other parent; or 
 (ii) every parent has been traversed, and 
  the current parent is not dominated by any other parent. 
 
No contradictory linearization demands can be imposed on a multidominated 
node. First, consider some basic possible configurations. In each case, α is the 
shared node, γi is a parent, a subscript c indicates the current parent at a particu-
lar stage of the traversal, and the plusses and minuses indicate which parents 
have been traversed at this stage. For ease of exposition, all other sentence 
material is omitted.  
 The repeated structure in (51) represents movement via an intermediate 


















γ1 + c γ2 - γ3 - 
α
 
γ1 + γ2 + c γ3 - 
α
 










    spell out α      omit α        omit α 
 
The three structures correspond to different stages where α is reached during the 
traversal. The decision whether it spelled out at this point is printed below the 
structure. In the first structure, we arrive at α from the highest parent γ1. Accor-
ding to (50i), α is spelled out; (50ii) does not apply because the other parents have 
not been traversed yet. In the second and third structure, α is arrived at from γ2 
and γ3, respectively, and the linearization of α is to be omitted. Indeed, (50i) no 
longer applies, since γ2 and γ3 are not the highest parent; and (50ii) does not apply 
because they are dominated by γ1. 
 The case of external remerge is sketched in (52). Again, α is remerged twice 
(a concrete example could be (43b) above). Recall that all parents γ1/2/3 are locally 
related to α, which is the center of attention three times during the traversal. 
 
(52) 





     omit α        omit α       spell out α 
 
In the first two situations, γ1 and γ2 are the respective current parents. They do 
not dominate all other parents, so (50i) does not apply. Furthermore, not every 
parent has been scanned, yet, so (50ii) does not apply either, and the linearization 
of α is omitted. In the third situation, where α is encountered the third time, now 
via γ3, every parent has finally been traversed, and α is spelled out.  
 We also have to check what happens when internal and external remerge 
are combined. There are two basic possibilities. The first is pictured in (53), where 
a sharing configuration is embedded in a movement configuration; this results 
from internal remerge, after root-union, of a constituent that has already been 
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   spell out α       omit α        omit α 
 
Since there is one parent, γ1, that includes all other parents of α, the structure will 
be handled on a par with standard movement configurations as in (51), and α is 
spelled out in the first position accessed, as required.  
 The second configuration is pictured in (54). Here, internal remerge is 
followed by external remerge, or at least root union has to apply after internal re-
merge. Intuitively, it seems clear that the third occurrence of α needs to be spelled 
out. This is the position where α is moved to inside the relevant dependent 
substructure. For symmetry reasons I have added internal remerge in the matrix 
(or first conjunct) as well (a concrete example may be a ‘saddle graft’ such as (29), 
where the object is moved to the middle field.) 
 






   omit α    omit α    spell out α ?!    omit α 
 
However, according to (50), α will never be spelled out: (50i) never applies since 
there is no parent that dominates every other parent (note that γ1 dominates γ2 
but not the other parents; similarly, γ3 dominates γ4 but not the other parents), 
and (50ii) never applies because only when γ4 is the current parent, all parents 
have been traversed, but γ4 is a parent that is dominated by another parent (γ3). 
How can this omission be repaired? The answer is that (50i) must be relativized 
according to the traversal status of the dominated nodes, as is shown in (55). The 
second proviso in (55i) is necessary to prevent the Spell-Out of α in intermediate 
landing sites. 
 
(55) Spell-Out of Remerged Nodes (correct, pre-final version) 
 An α with more than one parent is linearized if and only if 
 (i) the current parent dominates every other parent that has not    
  been traversed, and 
  the current parent is not dominated by any other parent; or 
 (ii) every parent has been traversed, and 
  the current parent is not dominated by any other parent. 
 γ1 + c 
α
 
γ2 - γ3 - 
 γ1 + 
α
 
γ2 + γ3 + c γ2 + c γ3 - 
 γ1 + 
α
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In (54), α will now be spelled out if the current parent is γ3, since this parent 
dominates all parents not yet traversed, namely γ4 alone. Crucially, the first 
occurrence of α, via γ1, does not lead to Spell-Out, since at this point of the 
traversal, γ3 and γ4 are not yet traversed, and they are not dominated by γ1. 
 The second proviso in (55i) equals the second proviso in (55ii); therefore, a 
more compact formulation is possible: 
 
(56) Spell-Out of Remerged Nodes (final version) 
 An α with more than one parent is linearized if and only if 
 (i) the current parent is not dominated by any other parent, and 
 (ii) – every parent has been traversed, or  
  – the current parent dominates every other parent that has not been  
   traversed  
 
 This concludes the basis of the proposal. The next section discusses some 
complex cases and potential problems. 
 
3.5. Complex Structures and Potential Problems 
 
In a number of separate subsections, I will briefly discuss crossing and nesting 
dependencies, roll-up movement, roll-out movement, remnant movement, RNR 
without coordination, head movement, and the issue of phases. 
 
3.5.1. Multiple Instances of Internal Remerge  
 
Internal remerge of more than one constituent is possible. Merge itself facilitates 
both crossing and nesting movement configurations. Let us investigate if these 
are generally spelled out correctly according to the present linearization 
proposal. Two relevant structures are depicted in (57a–b). In both cases, α and β 
have been internally remerged. Graphically, I positioned them where they ought 
to be spelled out.  
 












A brief look at (56) will reveal that these structures present no particular 
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because then the current parent dominates the other parent (which is not yet 
traversed). Notice that α and β are not related by dominance (neither includes the 
other). In this respect, (57) is no different from (58), where the two instances of 













 More interesting cases arise if α is included in β. First, consider movement 
within a moved constituent, as is depicted in two synonymous ways in (59). In a 
traditional notation, this would correspond to [δ [β … α … tα …] … tβ …]: 
 
(59) 












The first occurrence of β is to be linearized. This is performed as in simple move-
ment constructions. Within β, the terminals will be added to the string of words/ 
morphemes. Of these, only the first occurrence of α is to be spelled out; since the 
parent γ1 dominates the other parent γ2, this is indeed the case. The second time β 
is encountered, when δ2 is its current parent, the current parent is dominated by 
the other parent δ1, so according to (56i), there will be no linearization of β this 
time. This implies that none of the contents of β will be traversed again, as 
required. 
 A special case of iterative internal remerge of the embedding type is so-
called roll-up movement; see Barbiers 1995 and Brody 1997, for instance, who use 
it to mirror the order of PPs across the verbal right sentence bracket, and the 
order of adjectives across a head noun. An abstract example in traditional 
notation is [ZP [YP [XP X] [Y’ Y tXP]] [Z’ Z tYP]]. As a result of these movements, the 
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When traversing this graph, we encounter YP, which has two parents, ZP and Z’. 
As the first parent dominates the second, only the first occurrence of YP will be 
linearized. Inside YP, the situation is similar for XP. 
 In a sense, the structural reverse of roll-up movement is roll-out movement: 
after internal remerge of a complex constituent, a term of this constituent is 
remerged even higher, and so on. Abstractly, it looks like (61), where the 
required order of terminals is /X Y Z/, again a reversal of the order in which the 














Here, we recognize a violation of the Freezing principle (Wexler & Culicover 
1980). However, one should ask whether it is the task of the phonological 
interface to exclude such constructions. The answer in this article is negative 
(recall the discussion in sections 3.1. and 3.2.). If there need to be syntactic 
constraints concerning sub-extraction, so be it, but that is of no direct concern to 
the linearization procedure in principle. Apart from that, there are many 
documented exceptions to the Freezing principle, such as Dutch/German wat 
voor/was für-splits, wh-movement from a scrambled constituent, or ‘smuggling’ in 
English (for discussion, see Corver 1990, Müller 1998, and Collins 2005, among 
others). An interesting example of what could in fact be a double violation in 
German is taken from Ott (2009), who discusses a kind of ‘multiple NP split’ in 
detail (proposing an alternative solution in terms of scattered deletion, which 
goes back to Fanselow & Ćavar 2002). The final trace in (62) is not Ott’s but mine, 

























  Bücheri wurden [so  richtig gute  ti]k  in diesem Jahr nur wenige 
  books  were   PRT really  good   in this  year only few 
  tk]n rezensiert  tn. 
    reviewed 
 ‘As for books, only few really good ones have been reviewed this year.’ 
 
Returning to the abstract structure in (61), we note that XP has two parents: γ and 
YP. Since YP is dominated by γ, XP (hence X) is spelled out when it is first en-
countered, that is, if γ is the current parent. In turn, YP has two parents, β and ZP, 
where β dominates ZP; therefore YP is linearized in the highest position as well. 
When traversing YP, we spell out Y, and encounter XP for the second time, but 
here XP cannot be linearized because the current parent, YP is included by an-
other parent, namely γ. And so on. I conclude that the linearization of both roll-
up and roll-out movement is correctly performed by the conditioned traversal 
proposed in (56).  
 Finally, let us turn to remnant movement, which is perhaps the most 
complicated of all. An abstract illustration in traditional notation is (63), where α 
is originally a term of β. A well-known concrete example involves topicalization 
of a remnant VP after movement of an object to the middle field (for discussion, 
see den Besten & Webelhuth 1990, Koopman & Szabolcsi 2000, and Müller 2001, 
for instance). 
 
(63) (…) [β … tα …] … αi … tβ (…) 
 
A corresponding multidominance structure is (64), where α has parents γ1 and γ2, 











When scanning this structure, we first encounter β via δ1. As in regular move-
ment constructions, β is linearized in the highest position, since δ1 dominates the 
other parent δ2. Within β, we encounter α via γ1. Since γ1 does not dominate α’s 
other parent γ2, and not all parents have been traversed yet, the linearization of α 
is omitted here. Later, when α is encountered the second time and γ2 is the cur-
rent parent, the remnant α will be linearized because γ2 is not dominated by the 
other parent and all parents have been traversed by that time. In retrospect, what 
makes remnant movement special is that an instance of internal remerge (here, of 
α) gets the structural appearance of external remerge because of an additional 
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As a consequence, only the second occurrence of α will be spelled out. 
 Needless to say, δ1 in (64) could be input for further roll-up movements. 
This poses no particular problem. As a final (theoretical) worst-case scenario, 
consider iterative remnant movement, which would result from moving γ2 across 
δ1 in (64); this is shown in (65), where γ2’s parents are called ε1 and ε2: 
 













Here, γ2 will be linearized upon its first encounter (because ε1 dominates ε2), and 
α will be spelled out in the highest position since γ2 dominates γ1 (via β). The con-
tents of β are omitted when first encountered via δ2, and spelled out when δ1 is 
the current mother, as required. It is worth noting that there are no actual loops 
in the multidominance structure in (65), despite its circular appearance at first 
sight. Therefore, the linearization procedure will have no trouble in ending. 
 In conclusion, the structures resulting from all possible instances of 
multiple internal remerge are spelled out correctly, and rather straightforwardly. 
 
3.5.2. Some Issues Concerning External Remerge  
 
The application of external remerge in a derivation may eventually lead to a 
structural representation that apparently involves a violation of the strict cycle. 
Consider (66), and recall from section 2.3. that such a structure cannot involve 
internal remerge, for the simple reason that Merge functions inherently cyclically 








This abstract representation can be derived cyclically by first merging a with c, 
then externally remerging c by applying Merge (b, c), thereby creating a second 
root node Z, and finally merging the two temporary roots, Y and Z. We could 
also start with merging b and c, and then remerge c by Merge (a, c). 















  Y Z
X 
b a 
  c 
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consequences for the linearization: Applying the conditioned linearization in (56) 
gives the string of terminals /a b c/ (and not /a c b/). Crucially, therefore, it is 
impossible to analyze c in the representation of (66) as being internally remerged 
with (moved to) the embedded position within Y, as was discussed in section 2.3. 
Instead, (66) is a type of sharing construction. 
 A well-known example of sharing is RNR, but section 2.2. suggested that 
there are many more possibilities. It does not automatically follow from Merge 
that structures like (66) are only possible in coordinative constructions (that is, 
where the node joining the double-rooted substructure is a coordination phrase). 
Of course, we could stipulate such a limitation as a syntactic constraint, but this 
is not the most interesting way to go. We already briefly touched upon paren-
thetical-like insertions called amalgams. Here, let me present two examples that 
fit the pattern in (66). The first involves syntactic subordination of a phrase that 
contains a shared constituent; see (67), in Dutch, where the shared constituent is 
printed in italics:  
 
(67) Dutch 
 Het kan moeilijk  zijn om syntactische  ___  van semantische 
 it  can difficult  be  to  syntactic     from semantic   
 factoren te onderscheiden. 
 factors to distinguish 
 ‘It can be hard to distinguish syntactic ___ from semantic factors.’ 
 
The prepositional phrase van semantische factoren ‘from semantic factors’ is part of 
the (extended) predicate. This possibility has been noticed before in Huybregts & 
van Riemsdijk (1985), among others. Examples like (67) give the impression of 
RNR at the constituent level (note that the adjectives syntactic and semantic are 
contrasted). And in fact, verbs like distinguish, compare, as well as comparative 
constructions and comitative constructions, are semantically related to coordi-
nation. In each case, two or more items with the same selectional properties are 
used. Syntactically, however, the prepositional connection is subordinative. This 
leads to the interesting idea that syntactic subordination/ coordination and 
semantic subordination/coordination are independent of each other. For further 
discussion, see Postal (1993), Culicover & Jackendoff (1997), van der Heijden 
(1999), and Lechner (2001). 
 Another example that is reminiscent of RNR involves a parenthetical-like 
insertion hierarchically above the phrase that contains the shared part; see (68):  
 
(68) Dutch 
 Joop is, ofschoon een schuldbewuste gebruiker van ___,  
 Joop is although  a  contrite    user   of 
 niettemin  principieel   gekant   tegen  de    intracontinentale  luchtvaart. 
 nevertheless  principally   opposed   against  the  intracontinental  aviation 
 ‘Joop is, although a contrite user of ___, nevertheless principally opposed to 
 intracontinental aviation.’ 
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Again, there is an implied contrast, and the two prepositions van ‘of’ and tegen 
‘against’ must be stressed. The details of the construction need not concern us, 
here. What is immediately clear is that the structure involves the pattern in (66).  
 In my analysis, external remerge leads to the pronunciation of the second 
occurrence of the remerged item — unless it is followed by internal remerge, as 
in ATB-movement (see sections 2.2. and 3.4.). From this, it can be predicted that 
instances of forward deletion are not sharing constructions involving external re-
merge, but actual cases of deletion (or ellipsis). Whether this prediction is correct 
or not must be substantiated by empirical research. What I can say at this point is 
that indeed the large majority of sharing analyses concern backward deletion 
constructions, or constructions where there is no overt clue and the analysis 
could go either way. An important exception, which inspired some others, is 
Goodall (1987), who also discusses forward gapping from a sharing perspective. 
However, many differences have been reported between forward and backward 
deletion in coordination constructions (see Wilder 1997 and de Vries 2005b, for 
instance), which raises doubts concerning this particular proposal.  
 Finally, I should add a note on head movement. As the topic is beyond the 
scope of this article, I will limit myself to a few remarks. A much-discussed 
problem is that head movement appears to be counter-cyclic (Watanabe 1995). 
That is, in a structure [YP Y [XP… X …]] the head X should not be able to move to 
Y because Y is embedded in YP. Instead of simply relegating head movement to 
phonology, many people feel that we should try to find an answer to this 
problem. One potential solution, first proposed by Bobaljik & Brown (1997), I 
believe, involves ‘sideward movement’ — and hence external remerge.13 The idea 
is illustrated in (69): 
  
(69)   






 Merge (X, …) → [X …] 
 Merge (…, [X …]) → XP 
          Merge (X, Y) → Y 
                   Merge (Y, XP) → YP 
 
In the crucial step, the head X is externally remerged with an independent item 
(head adjunction). The combination of both is then merged with XP, such that Y 
projects. 
 According to the present linearization proposal, (69) will be treated as a 
sharing construction. That is, without further assumptions, the second occurrence 
                                               
    13 Others have argued that head movement does not involve a derived adjunction structure; 
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of X (the first-Merge position inside XP) will be pronounced, contrary to fact (at 
least for ‘overt’ head movement). Does this mean that we have to abandon the 
sideward movement approach to head movement? Not necessarily so. Suppose, 
tentatively, that the final representation in (69) can somehow be transformed into 
(70) before the actual linearization commences. This would mean that the 
morphological component is activated at PF. If indeed it recognizes the head 
incorporation structure created by syntax as a word, it can simplify it into a 
syntactic unit X+Y (that is, morphological fusion by combining more than one 
feature bundle under a single category heading). As a consequence, the structure 
is reinterpreted as a regular movement configuration, with the required linear 
result.  
 







Needless to say, this is a non-trivial operation, whose validity needs to be 
evaluated carefully. I leave the issue open for further research. 
 
3.5.3. What about Phases? 
 
So far, we have discussed the linearization of completed syntactic derivations. 
However, one may wonder if this approach is compatible with the idea that 
syntax operates in cycles or phases (see Chomsky 2005 in particular). To the ex-
tent that phases can be equated with domains of syntactic locality, the idea is not 
very controversial. Chomsky also suggests that phases reduce the computational 
load. Though this is intuitively not implausible, it remains to be shown how it 
would work out exactly. Importantly, material inside a previous phase of the 
derivation is no longer accessible for further syntactic computation. Whenever a 
phase is completed, the contents are transferred to the interfaces. Crucially, it 
does not follow from this that the phonological component and the semantic 
component work in phases themselves. It might very well be that the materials 
transferred by syntax are accumulated until they are complete, and then further 
processed. Evidence that the phonological and semantic component work in 
phases (what is more, the same phases as syntax does, and in the same direction) 
can only come from phonology and semantics, respectively, and not from 
syntax.14 Furthermore, linearization is probably not a part of phonology proper, 
but an interface process. 
 Bearing in mind, then, that the linearization procedure at PF may have 
access to the complete structure without contradicting the idea of syntactic 
                                               
    14 Interestingly, there are indications that certain phonological processes work in cycles. To 
which extent these correspond to syntactic domains is currently debated. For some 
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phases, let us nevertheless examine the possibility that the linearization works in 
similar phases.  
 Linearization is essentially a top–down procedure, starting at the root with-
in each cycle.15 By contrast, the syntactic derivation is standardly thought of as 
bottom-up (here, I cannot discuss alternative proposals, but see, among others, 
Phillips 2003, Chesi 2007, and Zwart, in press). At the end of each syntactic cycle, 
the structure is handed over to the PF interface. Suppose that this substructure is 
linearized right away. When the next cycle is entered, the previous cycle becomes 
opaque (ideally, in every respect). As long as there is no remerge, this seems 
possible, indeed. In fact, for each step of Merge (α, β) → γ it is the case that lineari-
zation (γ) = linearization (α) + linearization (β). Suppose β is a phase, then the out-
come of linearization (a string) is already stored, and the structure of β need not 
be scanned again. If each projection counts as a phase, that is, if phases are as 
small as possible, then of course the linearization can be said to behave bottom-
up for all practical purposes; see Uriagereka (1999) for a fundamental discussion 
of ‘multiple Spell-Out’.16, 17  
 If, however, remerge is at stake, non-trivial problems arise. The basic 
trouble, as discussed in section 3.2.2., is that we can no longer rely on Inheritance 
of precedence. 
 Per definition, internal remerge across a cycle boundary is impossible, 
unless the designated escape hatch (the edge) of the phase is used. For external 
remerge we can simply state that it must take place before the cycle is closed 
(giving rise to a hydraic structure, as discussed). Let us restrict the discussion to 
internal remerge for the moment. Suppose some object δ has been remerged (that 
is, ‘moved’ to the edge). It is normally assumed that the edge of a cycle is not 
passed on to PF at the interface (for the obvious reason that what is in the edge 
will be used in the higher cycle). It is the complement of the phase head that is 
transferred (‘spelled out’). But then the question arises how the actual spelling 
out of δ within the lower cycle can be prevented. Its linearization should be 
                                               
     15 For LCA-based approaches this may not be entirely true, depending on the implementation. 
However, recall from sections 3.1 and 3.2.1. that establishing a total order is not the final 
step in a linearization procedure. In order to map a set of asymmetrical (precedence) 
relationships between pairs of terminals onto an actual word string, this list of relationships 
needs to be scanned in a way comparable to what top–down graph scanning amounts to 
when viewed from the perspective of basic relationships (see section 4). 
    16 Interestingly, for Uriagereka, in an attempt to adapt the LCA to Bare Phrase Structure, PF 
linearization crucially makes use of multiple Spell-Out (with minimum-sized phases) in 
order to cope with complex left branches. This conclusion is almost opposite to the one in 
this section, for reasons explained immediately below. 
    17 Another approach making crucial use of phases is Fox & Pesetsky (2005). They claim that 
the order of elements in one cycle is preserved in the next. Contrary to how it is often refer-
red to, this theory is not an actual linearization procedure, as far as I understand it. The 
central condition states that the relative positions of elements must be preserved across 
cycles. But how these relative positions are actually determined, and how and when it is 
decided which occurrence of a remerged item is overtly realized are secondary issues from 
this perspective. I guess any procedure that does the job would be fine, including, perhaps, 
an adapted version of the present proposal. Notice, however, that the apparent incom-
patibility of remerge and PF-cycles discussed in the main text constitutes a serious problem 
for this. For critical comments concerning the idea of order preservation per se and the rele-
vant data involved, see Nilsen (2005), among others.  
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omitted, as Frampton (2004) calls it (meaning that the lower occurrence is not to 
be pronounced), but the information that δ has another, dominating parent, 
which would lead to this decision, is no longer present after transfer, during the 
linearization procedure targeting the structure generated in the lower cycle. 
Unfortunately, Frampton does not discuss this issue. According to Chomsky 
(2007: 16), who describes movement in terms of copies instead of remerge, there 
does not seem to be a problem at all: “[…] all copies are formed by IM [internal 
merge] at the phase level, hence identifiable for Transfer”. To me, honestly, this is 
more of a mystery than an explanation of how it would work exactly. Perhaps 
the phase head, which has the higher copy in its specifier position, is able to 
discern and mark the lower copy as ‘lower copy’, information that PF can then 
use after transfer. Clearly, such a move would not be possible in a remerge 
account, where a lower and higher occurrence involve one and the same item. 
 I conclude that the introduction of cycles in PF is highly problematic under 
a remerge account of displacement (disposing of copies or traces), even for stan-
dard internal remerge. Not very surprisingly, the situation further deteriorates if 
external remerge is taken into account:18 
 
(D1) External remerge leads to a temporarily multi-rooted structure.  
(D2) External remerge shows apparent non-local characteristics, which compli-
cates the need to recover the structural relationship between the relevant 
parents of a remerged element. 
(D3) An externally remerged element must then be first-merged in the cycle 
where its Spell-Out is to be omitted, but in a bottom-up derivation the 
relationship between the higher structural parts is not yet fixed, so it cannot 
be decided which part is, say, the first conjunct, and which the second. 
 
In short, PF linearization must be exempt from the opacity restrictions imposed 
by phases. This implies that the full syntactic structure must be made accessible 
to the linearization procedure after the completion of the full sentence. This 
conclusion is not an argument against phases in syntax: it just means that an 
essential procedure on the way to phonology does not operate in the same way. 
 
 
4. A Computational Perspective on Linearization 
 
The linearization of syntactic structure is a procedure performed at PF. Let us 
examine in some detail what it amounts to. The semi-formal algorithm in (71) 
combines the basic idea of recursive traversal in (36) with the conditions in (56) 
for remerged elements. I supplemented it with some comments between braces. 
Needless to say, if the input is a syntactic object, the output will be a word string. 
 Lines 1–6 are the initialization and ending. Lines 9–13 are the conditions for 
                                               
    18 Bachrach & Katzir (2009) claim that their analysis of RNR (which is also in put terms of 
remerge) involves Spell-Out in cycles. However, they seem to overlook that their notion of 
complete dominance implies that the linearization procedure is able to ‘see’ the complete 
structure (which is necessary if some node Y has parents in different phases). 
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linearization. Here, line 9 refers to single-merged items; lines 10–13 apply to re-
merged nodes. Lines 15–21 involve recursive graph scanning. Terminals are pro-
nounced; non-terminals are subject to further analysis, which means going over 
the entire procedure again at a lower hierarchical level. The elsewhere case in line 
22 implies omitting the linearization of the relevant substructure. 
 The traversal history can be monitored in a very simple way. Each node 
that is currently inspected is assigned an index; with each subsequent step in the 
graph, the index is raised by 1. The effect will be that the current node always has 
the highest index, and the current parent (if relevant) is always the parent with 
the highest index. Furthermore, each node that has been traversed has an index 
greater than zero. Thus, it is easy to see that lines 10–13 are equivalent to the 
conditions in (56).  
 
(71) Linearization Algorithm for Syntactic Graphs Involving Remerged Nodes 
algorithm linearization      {performs the conditioned linearization of a binary branching graph  
with the possibility of multidominance resulting from internal or external remerge} 
1 create a new, empty string  
2 create a numeral index i with an initial value of 0 
3 assign an indexical value of zero to each node {corresponding to “not yet scanned”} 
4 select the root;  
5 scangraph {start the scanning procedure with the root} 
6 end 
 
procedure scangraph {conditioned scanning procedure based on recursive traversal} 
7 add 1 to the numeral index 
8 mark the present object with the numeral index i {keep track of which node 
 is scanned when} 
9 if (the present object has ≤ 1 parents) {single parent or no parent (for the root)} 
10  OR ((there is no parent that dominates the parent with the highest index)  
11   AND ((every parent has an index i ≥ 1)  {external remerge: last occurrence} 
12    OR (the parent with the highest index dominates  
13     every parent with a zero index))) {internal remerge: arrival  
from hierarchically highest parent} 
14  then {depth first recursive traversal; add to the string if a terminal is reached} 
15   if the present object directly includes members {is it a non-terminal?} 
16    then  {traverse both daughters in order of precedence} 
17     select the preceding member 
18     scangraph {recursive step} 
19     select the other member 
20     scangraph {recursive step} 
21    else add the present object to the string {“spell out terminal”} 
22  else — (do nothing) {“omit linearization”} 
23 return 
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 The algorithm refers to syntactic structure as if it involves a graph. This is a 
metaphor, since a graph is only a representation of an underlying array of basic 
syntactic relationships brought about by a series of mergers. Merge creates direct 
inclusion relationships, and dependency relations between sisters (which is 
directly mapped onto precedence at PF). We are used to the (ordered) set, 
bracketed structures, and graph notations, but that implies the following con-
vention, where left–right order, top–down lines, and subscripts are interpreted in 
a specific way: 
 
(72) Basic syntactic triad convention 
<γ α, β>  =def  
  
[γ α β]   =def      (γ directly includes α) ∧ (γ directly includes β) 
            ∧ (β is a direct dependent of α /  
  α directly precedes β)  
      =def  
 
 
A sequence of mergers produces a list of triads, and hence a list of basic relation-
ships. A full graph or complex set can rather straightforwardly be composed on 
the basis of this list. Nevertheless, if we want to estimate the computational cost 
of the algorithm in (71), we have to examine what it does in terms of such a list of 
local relationships.  
 In formalized grammars it is often the case that a designated node is 
defined as the root node. In principle, this is completely unnecessary; because it 
can be derived which node is the root node by going over the complete list of 
basic relations (just once). For instance, the list in (73b), which results from the 
mergers in (73a), can only be interpreted such that ε is the root, as it is the only 
node that is not included by any other node. 
 
(73) a. Merge (α, β) → γ 
  Merge (δ, γ) → ε 
 b. γ directly includes α, γ directly includes β, α directly precedes β, 
  ε directly includes δ, ε directly includes γ, δ directly precedes γ 
 
If we find more than one node that satisfies this criterion, the list is not 
linearizable. For example, the list in (74b), which corresponds to the hydraic 
structure in (74c), produces two possible roots: γ and ε. 
 
(74) a. Merge (α, β) → γ 
  Merge (β, δ) → ε 
 b. γ directly includes α, γ directly includes β, α directly precedes β, 





  β 
γ 
α 
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Thus, (74) would crash at the PF interface, contrary to, say, a completed RNR- or 
ATB-movement construction, in which a uniting instance of Merge has taken 
place.  
 When there is a detectable root, the linearization procedure scangraph in 
(71) can be started. In line 9 it is checked if the present object (PO) has one parent 
or less. This amounts to going over the list and find all items of the type p directly 
includes PO. The parents are temporarily stored in a set {p1, …, pn}, whose cardi-
nality can then be determined. 
 Line 10 checks if there is no parent that dominates the current parent 
(which is the parent with the highest index). This is the most costly condition be-
cause of the transitive character of dominance. A straightforward way to proceed 
is as follows. For each parent pi separately, go over the list and check for items of 
the form pi directly includes xi1/2. Notice that the binary character of Merge makes 
sure that there will always be two such statements, if applicable. Temporarily 
store every xi1/2 in a set. If this set is not empty, go over the list again and check 
for items of the form xi1/2 directly includes yk. Temporarily store every yk in a set. If 
this set is not empty, go over the list again, etc. Finally, check if the current parent 
is present in the unified set of dominated items {x1, …, xn(x), y1, …, yn(y), …}. If this 
is not the case, the condition is fulfilled.  
 Line 11 checks if all parents have been traversed, which simply involves 
checking the index of each pi.  
 Lines 12–13 check if the current parent dominates every untraversed 
parent. Thus, we go over the list and check for items of the form pcurrent directly 
includes xi, and temporarily store every xi. As before, we go over the list again, 
now checking for xi directly includes yk, etc. The set of dominated items can be 
combined into a unified set. Now, if the subset of parents with a zero index is 
also a subset of the combined set of items dominated by pcurrent, then the 
condition is fulfilled. 
 Line 15 checks if the present object is a terminal. This condition is fulfilled 
if the list of relations contains the items PO directly includes xi. In order to select 
the preceding or the other child (lines 17 and 19) it is necessary to go over the list 
again and find the item x1 precedes x2 or the other way around. 
 Let us try to estimate the number of steps required to linearize a graph 
relative to the number of mergers involved in deriving the structure. Note that 
the number of nodes in a single-rooted graph is directly proportional to the 
number of mergers (to be precise, two times the number of first-time mergers 
plus one time the number of remergers plus one), which in turn is one third of 
the cardinality of the list of basic relations. 
 After finding the root, the procedure scangraph is passed through for each 
node. In doing so, it is necessary to go over the list of basic relationships a few 
times (lines 9 and 15–21) for one-parented nodes. Furthermore, because of the 
possibility of remerged nodes, we must also check the conditions in lines 10–13, 
which involves going over the list multiple times, thereby looping over the graph 
depth. Thus, we obtain the formula in (75), which shows polynomial growth: 
 
(75) CS = c0 + c1·M + M·(c2·M + c3·M2) = c0 + c1·M + c2·M2 + c3·M3 
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Here, CS is the number of computational steps, M is the number of mergers 
involved in the derivation, and c0 through c3 are constants (depending on units of 
computation, etc.). The term c1·M involves finding the root; c2·M2 is essentially for 
scanning the entire graph and finding the terminals; c3·M3 is the toll for allowing 
remerge/multidominance.  
 In fact, the estimate above is a worst case scenario, in which all the infor-
mation that is necessary for the linearization is calculated at the PF interface. It is 
also conceivable that each node α carries information such as a complete set of 
nodes included by α. A set like this can be established by Merge during the 
derivation, simply by adding the ‘inclusion sets’ of the two relevant input nodes. 
With this information available, (75) would reduce to linear growth, if I am not 





Complex syntactic objects are derived by the operation called Merge. The input 
for Merge is free in the sense that input objects can be selected from the lexicon 
(or numeration), from the syntactic workspace (including syntactic objects that 
are the output of earlier instances of Merge), and from within complex syntactic 
objects in the workspace. The last option leads to the effect that an item can be 
merged more than once, that is, remerged. I showed that remerge can be internal as 
well as external. Internal remerge, which corresponds to regular movement, is 
commonly accepted, but external remerge is not. However, both possibilities 
simply follow from the core system; both involve the basic operation Merge. If 
one or both are to be excluded, this has to be stipulated explicitly. I argued 
against such stipulations, not only because minimalist guidelines urge us to, but 
also since there are sensible interpretations of structures involving external 
remerge, including several types of amalgams, RNR, and ATB-movement. The 
sheer variety of relevant construction types can be taken to be a warning to re-
frain from hastily building in additional constraints on Merge. Furthermore, we 
must make sure that the linearization procedure at the phonological interface can 
handle such structures. 
 Both internal and external remerge can be represented in terms of multi-
dominance. The difference between ‘sharing’ and ‘interarboreal movement’ is an 
artifact of the notation. The unification of internal and external remerge makes it 
particularly clear that there is no need for a copying mechanism, for traces or for 
(movement) chains. Thus, the syntactic apparatus can be kept to a minimum. 
This is not to say that there are no differences between constructions involving 
internal remerge and those involving external remerge. The structural effect of 
remerging with the dominating root or remerging with an external object is quite 
different. The parents of an internally remerged syntactic object are in a 
dominance relation, whereas this is not the case for the parents of an externally 
remerged syntactic object. In the last case, apparent non-local behavior may show 
up, which can be explained as the possible consequence of a structural ‘bypass’ 
between complex substructures that are united at the top. Furthermore, there is 
no inherent directionality in external remerge. The structural result of first-
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merging α with β and remerging it with γ is the same as first-merging α with γ 
and remerging it with β. Both derivations yield the same configuration with the 
same structural relationships, and both should be spelled out in the same way. 
For internal remerge the situation is different: Remerging α with the root is fine, 
but remerging α with a hierarchically lower position is inherently impossible, 
since Merge operates strictly cyclically by its very nature, and does not allow 
‘tampering’ of existing relationships.  
 External remerge creates a temporary multi-rooted structure; this need not 
be a problem, provided that it is compensated by a uniting instance of Merge at a 
later stage of the derivation. There are several reasons for such a union; one is 
that the structure must eventually be linearized, and PF can only interpret a 
single-rooted object. Thus, even though remerge may lead to unconventional 
structures, the possibilities are not unconstrained. I argued that there is an 
additional limitation, dubbed the No proliferation of roots condition, which says 
that Merge may not create an additional root, which would be counterproductive 
from a functional perspective. This does not generally exclude external remerge, 
since the external structure simply keeps having a root of its own, but is does 
exclude the possibility of remerging an item with another item that is embedded 
(internally or externally), which would result in undesirable structures. As a 
consequence, it must always be the case that one of the input elements for Merge 
is a root at the relevant stage of the derivation.  
 Evidently, the possibility of remerge complicates the linearization of 
completed syntactic objects, which must be performed at the PF interface. It is not 
only the case that remerged items are normally only pronounced once, there also 
seem to be contradictory linearization demands for internal and external 
remerge: Informally put, movement is to the left, sharing is to the right. These 
issues are insufficiently discussed in the literature. All the linearization proposals 
I am aware of can adequately deal with only a subset of the relevant data. I also 
argued against LCA-based proposals on principled and practical grounds. 
Moreover, I showed that the linearization procedure is not likely to operate in 
cycles. Therefore, I proposed an alternative solution in the form of a conditioned 
linearization algorithm, which makes use of the different structural 
configurations created by the two types of remerge. First, it was presented as a 
graph traversal procedure, in combination with relative structural conditions. I 
showed that it can handle all kinds of intricate structural patterns involving 
multiple instances of remerge, including roll-up movement, combinations of 
sharing and movement, and iterative remnant movement. Subsequently, I 
showed what this procedure amounts to in terms of a list of basic relationships 
brought about by a series of mergers, and I estimated the computational load of 
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Metrical Combinatorics and the Real Half  
of the Fibonacci Sequence 
 
William J. Idsardi  &  Juan Uriagereka 
 
 
Languages with stress group syllables into metrical feet (Halle and Idsardi 1995, 
Hayes 1995)—non-exhaustive groups of contiguous syllables. The size of feet in 
natural languages ranges from unary (a single syllable) to unbounded (as many 
syllables as possible); in addition syllables can also remain unfooted. Under these 
conditions, the number of possible metrical footings for a string of n syllables is 
known to be Fib(2n) (Idsardi 2008), where Fib(n) is the Fibonacci sequence, as in 
(1)1 where the nth element is the sum of the previous two elements (for example, 
13 = 8 + 5). 
 
(1)  n:   0  1  2  3  4  5  6   7  … 
 Fib(n): 1 1 2 3 5 8 13  21 … 
 
For example, a string of two syllables (here notated with ‘x’s) can be non-
exhaustively footed in five ways (= Fib(4)): (xx), (x)(x), (x)x, x(x), and xx. In 
contrast, if footing were required to be exhaustive (that is, if every syllable had to 
belong to some foot) then a string of two syllables could only be footed in two 
ways: (xx) and (x)(x). It is easy to see from the bracketed grid representations that 
the number of possible exhaustive footings of a string of n syllables must be 2n-1 
as every exhaustive footing must begin and end with foot-boundaries and 
between each pair of x’s we have a binary choice between having a foot juncture 
and not having one. Since there are two choices for each space between x’s and 
there are n-1 spaces between n x’s, it follows directly that there are 2n-1 distinct 
exhaustive footings.   
 As a consequence, only half of the Fibonacci numbers (those underlined in 
(1): 1, 2, 5, 13, …) are solutions to the task of creating non-exhaustive footings; the 
other half (3, 8, 21, …) are not. An intriguing question is: Why is it the one half of 
the sequence and not the other? We venture some speculations about potential 
answers. 
 In 1680, Cassini (1733) discovered a relation among successive members of 
the Fibonacci sequence, expressed in (2):2 
 
(2)  Fib(n)2 – Fib(n–1) · Fib(n+1) = (–1)n 
                                                
    1 The Fibonacci sequence can also be defined to start with 0: 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, … 
    2 This relation was independently discovered by Simson (1753). 




That is, the square of any Fibonacci number is equal to the product of the two 
flanking Fibonacci numbers, give or take one. For example, Fib(4)2 – Fib(3) · 
Fib(5) = 25 – 3 · 8 = 1 = (–1)4 and Fib(5)2 – Fib(4) · Fib(6) = 82 – 5 · 13 = –1 = (–1)5. 
Rearranging (2) gives (3): 
 
(3)  Fib(n)2 – (–1)n = Fib(n–1) · Fib(n+1)  
 
The left-hand side of (3) has two possible expansions, depending on whether n is 
odd or even, as in (4):  
 
(4) a. n is even: Fib(n)2 – 1 
 b. n is odd:  Fib(n)2 + 1 
 
We can now see that (4a) has the form (x2 – 1) and (4b) has the form (x2 + 1). Ele-
mentary algebraic polynomial factorization (Herstein 1977) shows that (4a) has 
real-valued roots, (5a), whereas (4b) only has complex-valued roots, (5b): 
 
(5) a. Fib(n)2 – 1 =   [Fib(n) – 1][Fib(n) + 1]  
 b. Fib(n)2 + 1 =   [Fib(n) – i][Fib(n) + i] (where i2 = –1) 
 
Thus, for example, Fib(3) · Fib(5) = 3 · 8 = 24 = 4 · 6 = [Fib(4) – 1][Fib(4) + 1]. Only 
the even-numbered Fibonacci numbers (here, Fib(4)) show up in the real-valued 
roots, and this is the same Fibonacci subset that characterizes the number of valid 
metrical groupings of strings of n syllables.  
 In conclusion, the ‘metrical’ half of the Fibonacci sequence is also the ‘real-
valued’ half of the sequence (in the sense of (5)). Evidently, the Fibonacci charac-
ter of footing arises just when we allow for non-exhaustive footing, as exhaustive 
footings can be counted as a simple set of independent binary choices. Generally, 
the Fibonacci sequence is associated with a number of ‘edge of chaos’ effects, 
especially systems which illustrate dynamical frustration (Binder 2008); systems in 
which opposing forces cannot reach an equilibrium solution. We speculate that 
the ‘forces’ operative here in defining non-exhaustive footings could be the local 
coherence of syllables into feet clashing with word-level properties of footing. 
Another potential view of the emergent complexity observed here would be that 
sequences of footed syllables can be metrically distinct — for example, (x)(x) ≠ 
(xx) — whereas all sequences of unfooted syllables are the same; thus we have 
asymmetric growth patterns in the footed and unfooted portions of syllabic 
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Climbing up the Eiffel Tower 
 
Berger, Ruth. 2008. Warum der Mensch spricht. Eine Naturgeschichte der 
Sprache. Berlin: Eichborn. (Why man speaks. A natural history of language.) 
 
by Michael Crombach 
 
 
On étonne toujours en disant que le problème de l’origine du langage n’est pas un 
problème d’ordre linguistique.             (Vendryes 1921: 6) 
 
Ruth Berger presents an ambitious attempt on the origins and evolution of 
human language, she even maintains a website intended for regular updates on 
the topic (http://www.sprache-und-evolution.de). She lists over 400 references, 
and thereby shows great research efforts, although a sorted bibliography would 
be of great help. The book reminds of Kenneally (2007), reviewed in Biolinguistics 
recently (Jenkins 2008), although they arrive at completely different solution 
scenarios. Ruth Berger’s is popular science writing that, although not authored 
by an expert in the field, provides a lot of insight into an ever-growing field. 
Warum der Mensch spricht (‘Why man speaks’) is somehow unusual for German 
popular science as it is written in a witty, colloquial style that is fast and easy to 
read, and it does not contain any obvious errors. Still, some of the pert statements 
are annoying and should not go uncommented — therefore this contribution. 
Another reason to review the book is to create awareness that research in the 
field of biolinguistics is also pursued in languages other than English. Hardly 
ever a work is translated like Oudeyer (2006); works on language (evolution) not 
published in English go mostly unnoticed by the academic community. 
 This has been the case with the anthropological-psychiatric couple Doris 
and David Jonas, who despite being an English–German melange decided to 
publish their book on the origins of language in German (Jonas & Jonas 1979). 
They did not receive much attention although they originally presented their 
results in English (Jonas & Jonas 1975); maybe the mid to late Seventies have not 
been the time to present a ‘female’ origin of language. Anyway, I can not follow 
Berger (212f.) in her claim that the arguments for a ‘motherese’ origin of language 
brought forth by Jonas & Jonas would be more elaborate than Falk (2004, 2009). 
The trouble with both explanations of the origin of language is that they miss the 
bigger picture. The loss of body hair, neoteny, and upright walk led to the 
evolution of language, the lateralization of the brain, etc. — these are the basic 
arguments of Jonas & Jonas (1975), Jonas & Jonas (1979), Falk (2004, 2009), but 
these premises of language development also need an explanation, otherwise it is 
not too prudent to base the explanation of language origins on it. 
 According to Berger, Falk represents the currently most popular 
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explanation for the origin of language. Still she devotes only seven lines of text in 
parentheses to one of the essential premises of this thesis, the loss of body hair (p. 
211). I would expect more arguments, not only the hint that genetic evidence 
points to hairlessness in homo ergaster, why hominids have lost their body hair 
early in their evolutionary development. The relative chronology of events is 
essential to all evolutionary assumptions; if the loss of body hair is a premise of 
language evolution, because it lead to “putting the baby down” (Falk 2009: 58), 
then there should be an explanation why it is so sure that hominids lost body 
hair before they started to talk, and why they lost it at all (Dawkins 2004: 67 
considers gain and loss of body hair as trivial; for possible scenarios, see e.g., 
Kingdon 2003, Morgan 1997, and Niemitz 2004). Otherwise the argument is not 
complete. Anyway, I think that the motherese hypothesis has some good points 
that should get more attention, and with the methodological precautions 
mentioned here this is a promising direction. 
 I read Warum der Mensch spricht in Finland, but while I read it I thought a 
lot about the Eiffel Tower. The escalator that takes visitors from the ground to the 
first platform slowly moves upwards passing steel beams, rivets, and paint. If 
you pass a box of rivets in a hardware store, you’ll surely call them ‘rivets’, but 
you’ll never see them as a part of the Eiffel Tower, although you might explain to 
your child that these are things are used for the Eiffel Tower. The major error of 
all gradualist approaches is that they ignore the insight of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
(1041b), that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. There is no way to 
declare a pile of some 18,038 iron beams, 2.5 x 106 rivets, and 60 tons of paint the 
Eiffel Tower — being the Eiffel Tower is a quality in its own right and therefore 
can be studied independently. Human language shares features with (other) 
animal communication systems, but as Keller (2003: 44) explains:  
 
Die Fähigkeit zur Kommunikation ist dem Sprachbesitz logisch vorgängig. 
Eine Sprache erleichtert das Kommunizieren, ist aber nicht Bedingung 
seiner Möglichkeit.1 
 
 In the end, we have to accept that human language is unique, and there is 
no way to bridge the gap between the communication of animals and language of 
humans (see e.g., Bickerton 2008). Berger dares to claim that there is no principle 
difference between animal communication and language (p. 250), while a few 
pages later humans “slowly crossed a Rubicon” (p. 254). That is confusing, but I 
would say that hominids in curse of their evolution approached the Rubicon, 
crossed it, and now there is no turning back. It is even hard for us to imagine a 
communication system that is not ‘language’ — we use language, and even our 
thinking is essentially language, so we can hardly imaging being without it. It’s a 
bit like the pink elephant you can impossibly not think of if asked to do so.  
 Rather irritating within the book is something I would call ‘Chomsky 
bashing’ (pp. 18–27). Berger even announces “the failure of the Chomsky-project” 
(p. 27). I do not have any objections on critique towards Chomsky and his theo-
ries; as a matter of fact, I do think there is a lot of room for improvement. But 
                                                
    1  ‘The ability to communicate is a precursor to the possession of language. Language makes 
communication easier but is not a premise to the possibility of communication.’ 
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Berger devotes a lot of energy in showing how wrong Chomsky was, though I 
can not see where she offers an alternative. Again the Eiffel Tower: Many single 
explanations do not make a theory; the theory as a whole has a value in its own 
right, and as long as there are only details changed, the theory can stay in place. 
Chomsky has been and will remain to be a controversial figure, but I do not think 
that Chomsky is to blame for everything that went wrong in linguistics in the last 
60 years or so. All linguists have had the opportunity to make up their own 
minds. And as long as there is no convincing alternative to Generative Grammar 
as a theory, I would not abandon it. When Berger states in the end that Chomsky 
was right with the assumption that the language faculty is innate (p. 255), this 
somehow leads back to the start — so, why first condemn Chomsky, his ideas, 
and his pupils? 
 The claim by Berger that linguists are “traditionally left” (p. 130) must not 
go uncommented either, as it leaves out a lot of dark history of linguistics. To cut 
this short, I dare to claim that it is one of the biggest achievements of Noam 
Chomsky to have freed linguistics of the racist, fascist heritage and suspicion that 
was burdened onto it by men from Arthur de Gobineau to Walter Wüst. The 
mindless mixture of linguistic terminology with racism has discredited gener-
ations of linguistic research. It is essential that science keeps sound distance to 
ideology; ideology is non-scientific. Berger embeds her statement in the 
discussion, whether or not all “native speakers” share the same competence, as if 
degree of language skills was of any relevance to the basic principle described by 
the innateness of language. 
 Berger creates the impression that the emergence and evolution of 
language are a biological necessity (pp. 252–254). She does not make a clear 
distinction between ‘target’ and target (Jenkins 2008). Language is the ‘target’ (i.e. 
the result) of human evolution, but not the target (i.e. the goal). There is no teleo-
logical necessity in the rise of language. Berger correctly understands the evo-
lution of language as a process stretching over millions of years, but she arrives 
at the rather strange conclusion that “language was at the beginning and not at 
the end of the human evolution” (p. 259). She believes in a developmental 
continuum of language evolution stretching over 2.6 million years one the one 
hand, while on the other hand, language capability was the prerequisite for the 
evolution of homo sapiens. This contradiction asks for a solution I cannot offer 
here. 
 The book starts with the observation that language origins have mainly 
been the concern of linguists and not of biologists. This is true, and a pity — as 
the evolution and the origin of language are not a problem of linguistics as 
already observed by Vendryes (1921). The evolution of language is a biological 
problem and has to be solved by biological means. But as long as biologists do 
care so little about this issue, linguists/linguistics have/has to stand in for them. 
Berger does not explain why biologists ignore language evolution, although the 
blurb states that she studied “Turk languages, Hebrew and English, general 
linguistics and biology”. Maybe the true solution is the interdisciplinary co-
operation proposed and demonstrated by Hauser et al. (2002). But still, I think the 
evolution of language is focused too narrowly on language. Jonas & Jonas and 
Falk try to add other aspects, but still are focused on language. In my opinion, 
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explanations need to be found for all of the small but significant differences 
between humans and apes — from the loss of body hair to bipedal locomotion, 
from the white in the eyes to art and music, etc. — to really understand the 
origins and evolution of language, and what it means to be human.  
 Berger’s book, like Kenneally’s, is a valuable source for resources. 
Although Berger maintains her website for updates, she should have stressed the 
fact that most of the things dealt with in the study of language evolution are in 
permanent movement and the main skill for any scientist is to balance 
probabilities, exclude impossibilities, and reorder events. Or as Bickerton (2007: 
524f.) has put it:  
 
[The study of language evolution is] still a paper-and-pencil field, though 
with immeasurable amounts of reading and thinking involved. It is, accor-
dingly, an ideal field for any ambitious young scholar itching to make his 
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Everything You Wanted to Know About the 
Genetics of Language (and Beyond) 
 
Benítez–Burraco, Antonio. 2009. Genes y Lenguaje: Aspectos Ontogenéticos, 
Filogenéticos y Cognitivos [Genes and Language: Ontogenetic, Phylogenetic, and 
Cognitive Issues]. Barcelona: Editorial Reverté. 
 
by Víctor M. Longa 
 
 
As Cedric Boeckx and Kleanthes Grohmann pointed out in ‘The Biolinguistics 
Manifesto’, which opened this journal, there are two different senses of the term 
‘biolinguistics’, a weak one and a strong one. Their own words illustrate: “The 
weak sense of the term refers to ‘business as usual’ for linguists, so to speak, to 
the extent that they are seriously engaged in discovering the properties of 
grammar” (Boeckx & Grohmann 2007: 2). With regard to the second (strong) 
sense, it “[…] refers to attempts to provide explicit answers to questions that 
necessarily require the combination of linguistic insights and insights of related 
disciplines (evolutionary biology, genetics, neurology, psychology, etc.)” (p. 2). 
 The book reviewed is one of the most important references in the second 
(strong) sense of ‘biolinguistics’ which has been published to date. This piece of 
impeccable scholarship pursues two main aims. Firstly, it provides the reader 
with an impressive and completely up-to-date overview on the genetic and mole-
cular (and, by extension, biological) foundations of language. In this respect, it 
suffices to say that whereas the discussion about the genetics of language is 
usually restricted to the role of the ‘famous’ FOXP2 gene, the book refers to (and 
analyzes) more than 150 genes which recent research has somehow linked to 
language. Fundamental as this enterprise would be by itself, the book is not 
confined to it. As a second aim, the aforementioned overview is the input for 
sophisticated and in-depth discussion about key issues having to do with the 
biology of language. These include (i) how to manage the relationship between 
genes and behavior; (ii) what the true significance is of genes, their properties, 
and their products for understanding human language; (iii) what genes can 
reveal for topics such as language organization in the brain, language phylogeny 
(evolution) or language ontogeny (development); (iv) how the relationship bet-
ween language and cognition should be characterized; and (v) what degree of 
convergence exists between discoveries coming up from the genetics of language 
and proposals which theoretical linguistics (especially, the Minimalist Program, 
henceforth, MP) has brought to the fore. For these reasons, I consider the book by 
Antonio Benítez–Burraco (henceforth, ABB) to be an essential reference (to put it 
more precisely, a true hand-book), which everybody interested in the biological 
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seat of language should consult. 
 I began the review by mentioning the two senses the term ‘biolinguistics’ is 
endowed with, according to Boeckx & Grohmann. In order to go deeper in 
discussion on the strong sense of the term, it should be noted that there are in 
principle two different strategies for such a strong sense to be fulfilled — a 
multidisciplinary approach and an interdisciplinary approach. Although both 
strategies are usually conflated, a great difference opposes them. A multi-
disciplinary approach means that the same problem is studied from several 
disciplines, but this approach does not necessarily connect achievements gained 
by each of them. However, with regard to an interdisciplinary approach, quite 
the opposite applies. Knowledge offered by different disciplines is integrated (i.e. 
merged), the outcome being a shared body of knowledge. Needless to say, an in-
terdisciplinary approach is much harder to be obtained than a multidisciplinary 
one. It is perhaps for that reason that, according to Newmeyer (1997), linguists 
have been traditionally reluctant to seriously consider issues which transcend 
linguistics itself (for example, clinical, behavioral, cognitive or biological 
evidence). In that regard, one of the many merits of ABB’s book is that it clearly 
surpasses a multidisciplinary approach (a perspective which does not ensure the 
property of consilience, or unity of knowledge, as stated by Wilson 1998), to 
become truly interdisciplinary. ABB is an especially suitable scholar for achieving 
such a task, given his (really welcome) academic training both in molecular 
biology and theoretical linguistics. 
 I will offer a brief outline of the organization of the book and of the main 
topics the chapters deal with, although this is not an easy task considering the 
denseness of the book. After a brief introduction (pp. 1–3) where the raison-d’être 
of the book is outlined and its main objectives are advanced, Chapter 1 (pp. 5–33) 
is devoted to the anatomical and physiological foundations of language. It 
critically discusses a number of models aiming at explaining the anatomical and 
functional organization of language. The neurolinguistic discussion is summar-
ized in an appendix which gathers all the brain areas involved in linguistic 
processing, with an indication of the key references for each of them. 
 Chapter 2 (pp. 35–53) analyzes the polemic issues of innateness and 
learning in language ontogeny, and the controversies surrounding them. The 
author makes the point that, for nativism to be truly justified, the need exists to 
consider a wider range of evidence than the linguistic one, thus broadening the 
evidence with which linguists have been mainly concerned. According to ABB, 
genetic and molecular evidence is suitable for such an objective to be achieved. 
Nevertheless, what I take to be the main contribution of the chapter is the 
discussion of what the very notion of ‘innate’ means, and how it has been 
reformulated within MP, as opposed to the previous generative tradition. Mini-
malism has reduced the role of the genetic endowment for language (i.e. the 
linguistic genotype or ‘first factor’, following Chomsky 2005) which was sup-
posedly required for language acquisition to take place (cf. Longa & Lorenzo 
2008 and Lorenzo & Longa 2009). Accordingly, MP reduces the specifically 
linguistic (i.e. specifically grammatical) component of the human mind (cf. 
Lorenzo & Longa 2003), and considers the faculty of language to be the outcome 
of epigenetic processes rather than the product of purely genetic processes. It is 
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for those reasons that minimalism redefines the very notion of innateness. As 
opposed to preceding generative models (paradigmatically GB, that is, Govern-
ment–and–Binding Theory) and to the Neo-Darwinian framework as well, the 
notions of genetic trait and innate trait are no longer conflated in MP (cf. Longa 
2006). Therefore, minimalism argues for a phenotypic notion of innateness, not a 
genotypic one (Longa & Lorenzo 2008). The faculty of language would lose its 
genetic character, but not its congenial or innate nature, in such a way that it 
would be innate attending to its propensity to arise irrespective of the foun-
dations of its development, those foundations not requiring to be purely genetic 
(cf. Maclaurin 2002 and Moore 2001: Chap. 13, for a defense of such a view from a 
strictly biological point of view). ABB’s discussion of that issue is well taken and 
illuminating. 
 Chapters 3 and 4 develop a wide analysis of the currently known genetic 
and molecular mechanisms which are responsible for how the neural circuits 
related to language develop and function. Chapter 3 (pp. 55–81) approaches the 
molecular bases of development and plasticity of the brain linguistic areas, and 
how those areas work. The chapter aims at exploring both the structural and 
functional development, and, furthermore, it seeks to integrate them. As usual in 
every chapter, an appendix is offered (pp. 80–81) where the different genes 
referred to so far are summarized: Gene name, chromosome localization, protein 
function, and main scientific literature. 
 As of chapter 4, it could well be an independent book by itself on the basis 
of its length alone (pp. 83–281), and it is undoubtedly one of the most valuable 
chapters of the book. Had I to highlight one of the chapters, it would be this one. 
To put it simply, it is impressive. As far as I know, it offers the most extensive 
overview of the genetic bases of language to date, and it is this overview which 
makes the chapter so innovative. It begins by presenting the essentials of the 
different methods and strategies available for cloning genes (comparative, 
functional, and positional cloning), and then it goes on to characterize the 
problems which arise when trying to define the linguistic phenotype and its 
impairments. After those introductory topics, the main goal of the chapter is 
approached in which the author provides us with both a structural and 
functional characterization of the currently known genes which are somehow 
linked to language. For this goal to be achieved, ABB carried out a large and 
detailed search in many scientific journals, and applied further analysis and syn-
thesis. This has allowed him to collect up to and characterize more than 150 
genes which recent research has shown to be related to language. The genes are 
arranged according to three general categories: 
 
(A) genes involved in exclusively linguistic impairments (although ABB ack-
nowledges the controversy surrounding the specifically linguistic nature of 
those deficits); 
(B) genes involved in general cognitive impairments which also affect 
language, and  
(C) genes involved in cognitive impairments which do not seem to affect 
language, but are relevant anyway in order to characterize the genetic 
bases of language.  
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 Although the extensive analysis of the FOXP2 gene ABB offers should be 
high-lighted, specific treatment of the remaining genes is worth considering as 
well. The overall picture offers a comprehensive overview about the regulatory 
mechanisms which are responsible for how language areas involved in language 
are organized and function. 
 Although the appendices are not unusual in the book, I feel obliged to 
stress a very extensive appendix (pp. 240–281) which ends chapter 4. Its purpose 
it to collect all the genes discussed in the chapter and their main properties: gene 
name, chromosome localization, protein function, linguistic impairments 
associated to the gene mutation, clinical name of the syndrome, and selected 
scientific literature. 
 For the reasons specified so far, the chapter is a ‘bedside reading’ reference 
about the genes which are somehow related to language ontogeny. As mentioned 
above, the overall picture spectacularly surpasses the usual conception which 
conflates the genetics of language with just FOXP2. 
 Chapter 5 (pp. 283–337) is devoted to the other side of the coin, language 
phylogeny. ABB claims that the range of traditional evidence on language evo-
lution (mainly the vocal tract, symbolic artefacts, and paleoneurological evidence 
related to brain size and cranial reconstructions) should be broadened with new 
types of evidence; especially, those that are offered by genetic and molecular 
analyses. According to ABB, this type of evidence could help us judge more 
traditional ones, which suffer from an intrinsically ambiguous nature. The goal of 
the chapter is therefore quite similar to that of chapter 4, but referred to at the 
phylogenetic level, which is to discuss the evolution of the known genes (related 
to language) whose expression levels have been modified over the evolutionary 
course. In a quite similar vein to chapter 4, chapter 5 offers an exhaustive picture 
of the relevant genes, those genes being arranged according to several categories: 
(i) genes related to brain size, (ii) brain metabolism, (iii) brain lateralization, and 
(iv) neural structures (circuits or areas) which have to do with language. The 
properties of the genes are summarized in a valuable appendix on pp. 332–337. 
 Finally, chapter 6 is the clearest example of the truly interdisciplinary (not 
multidisciplinary) nature of the book. Although ABB has chosen to simply name 
it ‘Conclusions’, the chapter is really much more than what its title suggests. In 
fact, the chapter develops a wide discussion (pp. 339–364) about the linguistic 
significance of the biochemical and genetic evidence analyzed in the preceding 
chapters. The discussion seeks to unravel the ontogenetic, phylogenetic, and cog-
nitive implications of the genes involved (in several ways) in human language. 
Many topics of main concern from a theoretical point of view are confronted, and 
sophisticated attempts are made to offer answers for them. To give some hints of 
the relevance of the chapter, some of the topics it is concerned with are: (i) how 
genes really work (far from simplifying assumptions about the direct relationship 
between genes and phenotypic traits); (ii) an assessment of how the relationship 
between nature and nurture should be addressed; (iii) a discussion on language 
evolution; and (iv) how the notion of modularity should be understood in the 
light of how genes work and are organized. In addition, (v) a proposal is made 
that the language organ derives from a double developmental program (one 
being more general and the other one being more specific), and (vi) claims are 
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made about the non-specific nature of the ‘genes of language’ (this expression is 
systematically endowed with quotation marks through the whole book). Let us 
take into account that this point was already fully advanced by Lenneberg (1967: 
Chap. 6), when he wrote that it was not necessary to make doubtful claims about 
‘genes of language’. Finally, (vii) an assessment is made of how the genetic issues 
considered in the book, and the non-specific nature of the genes themselves, fit in 
with proposals suggested by MP. 
 The book ends with an impressive reference section, of more than 80 pages 
(pp. 365–449) listing more than 2,000 references, showing the immense work put 
in by the author. A very detailed thematic index is offered as well (pp. 451–478). 
 Although the book is highly technical (it becomes obvious that such a book 
could not be jargon-free), ABB’s effort to make its reading and use easier should 
not go unnoticed. Beyond the aforementioned appendices, the book is endowed 
with 20 tables and no less than 115 figures (the vast majority in color). 
 I hope that the brief presentation of the main contents of the book will 
allow to shed light on at least some of its many merits.  In addition, it seems 
necessary to highlight that, although the book focuses on genes, ABB’s view is, 
much to my delight, very far from the primacy of the ‘genetic program’ metaphor 
(and, consequently, very far from the primacy of the genes themselves) which 
has been at the heart of Neo-Darwinian thinking (and which can still be 
perceived in works such as Carroll 2005 and other practitioners of Evo–Devo). To 
put it in other words, the author is well aware of the dangers a strictly 
reductionist perspective has meant for the biological study of organisms (cf. 
Kaufmann 2000 and Lewontin 2000, among many other references). ABB’s own 
words clearly illustrate: “[…] the genetic approach to the study of language 
should not be understood from a strictly reductionist perspective, which 
considers the gene to be the final point of any analysis of language” (p. 364; own 
translation — VML). As Oyama (2000: 40) puts it, “[…] a gene initiates a 
sequence of events only if one chooses to begin analysis at that point”. For that 
reason, the author contends that knowledge gained from genetic and molecular 
analyses should be integrated in an overall picture. As ABB himself acknow-
ledges, his view is not far from ‘probabilistic epigenesis’ as developed by Gilbert 
Gottlieb (cf. Gottlieb 2001), an influential scholar close to Oyama’s Develop-
mental Systems Theory (cf. Oyama et al. 2001a, 2001b). Consequently, according 
to ABB, genes are not the main biological entities, but they strongly interact with 
the whole range of developmental resources and levels (cellular, neural, 
behavioral, environmental, and so on) of which the system is composed. Such a 
position concerning the role attributed to the genes is in full agreement with 
theoretical stances which strongly depart from Neo-Darwinian assumptions; in 
fact, in several passages of the book, ABB suggests that his proposal fits in well 
with Developmental Systems Theory (cf. p. 363, among others), and with the 
view sustained by MP as well. Thus, for ABB the genome cannot be conceived of 
as an encapsulated entity. 
 Other hints also make it clear that the author departs from the biological 
establishment (i.e. Neo-Darwinism); for example, this is demonstrated in his con-
ception of heredity. Such a conception goes beyond the usual (Neo-Darwinian) 
stance, according to which genes are the only biological elements which can be 
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inherited. ABB recognizes the role of other types of heredity (maternal, epi-
genetic, social or even behavioral; cf. p. 84), in full agreement with positions 
which defend that “there is more to heredity than genes” (Blumberg 2005: 148, 
Jablonka & Lamb 2005: 1), as can be seen in the four dimensions of heredity 
developed by Jablonka & Lamb (2005) (for a synthetic presentation, see Jablonka 
2001), or the even wider notion of ‘extended heredity’ argued for by Develop-
mental Systems Theory (cf. Griffiths & Gray 2001 and Oyama et al. 2001a, 2001b). 
 Another aspect of the book I fully agree with is the status ABB confers to 
MP, an ontological one rather than merely methodological. This means that the 
author does not share the ‘consensus view’ (cf. Boeckx 2006, Freidin & Vergnaud 
2001, and Hornstein et al. 2005, among many others) by which minimalism would 
be no more than an extension, or a mere refinement, of the Principles–and–
Parameters model which creates an opening for simplicity, naturalness, and so 
on (cf. Longa & Lorenzo 2008 for a discussion of the differences between GB and 
MP). The following words by Hornstein (2009: 178) illustrate: “[…] MP is a 
continuation of the GB research program […]. MP starts from the assumption 
that GB is roughly correct.” It seems to me that this position is based on a metho-
dological (i.e. weak) minimalism, and it does not jibe with an ontological (i.e. 
strong) consideration of minimalism. On the contrary, ABB considers MP to be 
an important (or even radical) break with regard to GB (cf. chapters 3 and 6), and 
I think that his view is accurate. It should be noted that the biological position 
adopted by GB was based on the ‘consensus view’ on organisms and organismal 
development which Neo-Darwinism brought to the fore (cf. Lorenzo & Longa 
2009 for discussion). Robert (2004: 39) characterizes that ‘consensus view’ 
according to three main features: (1) genetic informationism (the information 
required for the development of an organism is contained within its genes), (2) 
genetic animism (such information consists on a genetic program), and (3) 
genetic primacy (genes are the vehicles by which the information is inherited, the 
main promoters of development). The solution GB provided to Plato’s Problem 
was to fully assume that ‘consensus view’, to assume a genetically encoded state 
of linguistic knowledge (Universal Grammar) or ‘linguistic genotype’ (Chomsky 
1980, Lightfoot 1982, 2006), which was taken to be a direct expression of the 
genes. Therefore, the strong geneticist view of GB can be summarized in the 
notion of a genetic program (Chomsky 1980, Wexler 1999) (cf. Longa 2008 for 
critical discussion of that notion). However, the strong geneticism (which has 
been the focal point in every generative model except the minimalist one) has 
been removed from the agenda, since minimalism advocates the need to reduce 
the role of the genetic endowment, and argues for the non-specific nature of the 
principles the language faculty is composed of. The book reviewed clearly favors 
an ontological minimalism, and, interestingly, ABB shows that the conclusions 
reached from the analysis developed in the book are consistent (both in 
phylogeny and ontogeny) with the framework of (ontological) minimalism, as 
the author himself acknowledges. 
 To sum up, the book provides us with a delicious cocktail: Biology and 
theoretical linguistics side by side (i.e. merged in a truly interdisciplinary way). 
There is no room for doubt: The field of biolinguistics has many reasons to cele-
brate the publication of ABB’s book. I am sure it will become an indispensable 
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reference for anyone seriously interested in the biolinguistic approach. For this 
reason, given that the book has been published in Spanish, an English translation 
would be highly desirable as soon as possible. The lack of such a translation 
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